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ABSTRACT 
In the last fifty years, the gap in incomes per capita between rich countries and poor 
countries has widened. There is an evolving literature on the reasons why some 
countries grow faster than others, while yet other countries appear not to be growing at 
all. Models of economic growth vary with respect to the determinants of growth and 
the relative importance of these determinants, however, there is generally a consensus 
that physical capital is an essential input. Given this, one of the arguments advanced 
for the growing gap between rich and poor countries is that poor countries are caught 
in a saving trap — average incomes are too low for saving, meaning that these 
countries simply cannot afford the investment in physical capital necessary for growth. 
This argument immediately raises two questions: firstly how today's rich countries 
were able to afford the investment in physical capital necessary to grow, when they 
were once poor themselves; and secondly, how being unable to afford the necessary 
investment in physical capital can be a meaningful constraint on growth in a world 
where capital is internationally mobile. If the saving trap were truly a barrier to growth 
confronting today's poor countries, then the following must be true: a country's rate of 
saving should increase with the level of income, demonstrating that households will 
save more if they can afford to; and the rate of investment should be closely linked to 
the rate of saving, demonstrating that a low rate of investment is due to insufficient 
saving. Importantly, any increase in saving should be retained as investment. 
This thesis finds that while rates of saving rise with incomes in developing countries, 
this saving is not always retained as investment. This means that low levels of 
investment in physical capital cannot be attributed solely to lack of affordability due to 
low incomes and low rates of saving. Borrowing the gravity equation from the 
international trade literature on intra-industry trade, this thesis develops and tests an 
alternative model to find that while low incomes and low rates of saving are a barrier, 
they are neither the sole nor the primary barrier to growth. 
Further, the application of the alternative model finds that the rate of investment in 
physical capital across countries is linked to the determinants of the return on that 
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investment — capital flows out of countries with relatively low marginal products of 
capital and into countries with relatively high marginal products of capital. Poorer 
countries not only have less physical capital per capita, but also have 
disproportionately poorer health, and political and economic institutions compared to 
developed countries. The ability of physical capital to drive growth in incomes is 
limited in the absence of a healthy, educated workforce to operate it and generate a 
return, or the political and economic conditions necessary to ensure that the return that 
is generated is repaid to investors. As capital markets become more open, developing 
countries must compete with more developed countries to attract and retain 
investment. 
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1 OVERVIEW; INCOME AND GROWTH 
1 . 1 INTRODUCTION 
On the scale of human history, sustained growth in income per capita is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. Prior to the nineteenth century, global average income per capita 
fluctuated at roughly the same level for most of the countries in the world (see Figure 
1.1). In his treatise on the determinants of population, Malthus noted that both 
populations and per capita incomes were constrained by a cycle in which per capita 
incomes rose with the availability of food, and fell as the population expanded in 
response to this abundance (Malthus, 1798). He argued that since technology grew at a 
linear rate, and population unchecked grew at an exponential rate, sustained growth in 
per capita incomes would never occur. Sadly for Malthus, it was only a few decades 
after his treatise was published that the rate of growth in technology started to 
overtake the rate of population growth in what are now 'the developed countries'. The 
Industrial Revolution of the early nineteenth century, and the associated technological 
advances, marked the beginning of a steady, sustained upward climb in global income 
per capita. As Figure 1.1 shows, however, this growth was not equally distributed 
across countries. 
FIGURE 1.1 DIVERGENCE IN GLOBAL INCOMES FOLLOWING THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION 
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Source: (Maddison, 2001) 
Clark (2008) argued that while incomes in the developed countries grew strongly, they 
actually declined in the rest of the world. Maddison (2001) divided the countries of the 
world into regions, and showed that growth was strongest in the Western European 
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economies, and their off-shoots (collectively referred to henceforth as 'the western 
economies').' Maddison's data do not show a decline in incomes in the other regions, 
but it is evident that they did not grow as quickly. In either case, both Maddison's and 
Clark's data showed that average global incomes were similar across countries for a 
significant period of time, only to significantly diverge after the Industrial Revolution. 
The new ideas and knowledge generated in the Industrial Revolution could reasonably 
be expected to first benefit the western economies in which they originated before they 
spread through the rest of the world. In the nearly two hundred years since the 
western economies began their sustained upward climb, however, most of the rest of 
the world has yet to catch up. More than that: in almost every year, the gap between 
rich and poor countries has widened further. 
For example, in the period that Maddison examined, income per capita in the western 
economies had risen from around $1,200 in 1820 to $17,000 and $26,000 in western 
Europe and the western offshoots respectively in 1998 (2001). Meanwhile, average 
income per capita in Africa was $400 in 1820 and — at $1,300 in 1998 — had grown to 
roughly where the western economies were nearly two hundred years ago. Using the 
same dataset, Galor (2005) noted that the ratio of income per capita between the richest 
and the poorest regions increased from 3:1 in 1820 to nearly 20:1 in 1998. More recently, 
in the roughly fifty years between 1950 and 2005, income per capita in Ethiopia, the 
poorest country in 1950, grew by only 50 % in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, 
while in Luxembourg, the richest country at the time, income per capita increased 
nearly five-fold (Heston et al., 2009). 
Economic growth models seek to explain the differences in incomes between countries. 
In neo-classical models, the rate of factor accumulation drives the transitional rate of 
growth as economies move from an initial level of income to a steady-state level. Factor 
accumulation in the form of the rate of investment affects not only the rate of 
transitional growth, but also the levels of capital and income per capita that the 
economy attains at steady-state. Once the steady-state level is reached, the economy 
Maddison defines 'Western offshoots' as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States of 
America. 
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grows at a rate of technological progress that is exogenous (Solow, 1956, Swan, 1956). 
Long run growth is also determined by the rate of technological progress in 
endogenous growth models. As the rate name suggests, the rate of technological 
progress in these models is endogenous, and is in turn determined by the rate of 
human capital accumulation — either as embodied in labour skills, or through 
expenditure on research and development (Aghion and Howitt, 1998). 
In the case of both the neo-classical and the endogenous models, growth in per capita 
incomes comes at an upfront cost — either through investment in physical or human 
capital, or both. In the absence of international movement in technology, aid or 
investment, differences in rates of factor accumulation between countries could be 
explained by poor countries being unable to afford to become any richer. Incomes are 
low, as a result of which rates of investment in physical and human capital are also 
low. Since either or both of these are the major drivers of economic growth, the rate of 
growth is low, and so a poor country remains mired in poverty. A pessimistic take on 
this would imply that today's poor countries are consigned to poverty forever. Poverty 
by itself being a barrier to growth in incomes is an unsatisfactory explanation, since it 
fails to explain how today's rich countries managed to grow. At some point in their 
development history, today's rich countries were able to overcome poverty. The 
widening gap in incomes per capita suggests that today's poor countries are either 
unable to overcome poverty in the same way, or they are faced with different barriers 
to growth. 
If simple poverty were the reason that rates of investment are low, then the rate of 
saving should rise as income rises — as households can afford to set more of their 
income aside for subsequent consumption — and the rate of investment should rise 
with the rate of saving — as additional saving is converted into much needed physical 
capital. The relationships between income, investment and saving are discussed in this 
chapter and in chapter 2, and tested in chapter 3. An alternative to the simple saving 
trap described is that today's poor countries are unable to accumulate sufficient 
physical or human capital because they must compete with today's rich countries to 
attract and retain investment — a barrier that today's rich countries were not 
confronted with when they were poor themselves. As long as capital markets are open 
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and unhindered, capital should flow to where it can generate the highest return. Poor 
countries are disproportionately afflicted by poor health, poor nutrition, poor 
institutional quality, civil wars and lower educational attainment than rich countries — 
all factors that affect the incentive to invest in physical and human capital in these 
countries, and the associated return. Chapter 4 incorporates these variables into an 
alternative model, which is tested in Chapter 5. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first discusses the role of the rate of 
investment, among other variables, in driving economic growth. The second section is 
a discussion of barriers to growth — in particular, the simple saving trap that this 
thesis will test. The third summarises the existing empirical literature about the extent 
to which poverty is itself a barrier to growth and the fourth concludes. 
1 . 2 W H A T DRIVES ECONOMIC GROWTH? 
In a closed economy — or in an open economy where the current and capital accounts 
are balanced and the terms of trade are constant — domestic income is equal to 
production, which is equal to expenditure. Growth in incomes, therefore, is the same as 
growth in output. In the Solow-Swan neo-classical growth model, output (Y) is defined 
as an increasing function of capital (K), and effective labour (AL). Effective labour is the 
product of labour (L) and labour augmenting technology (A). The neo-classical model 
is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale, and positive but diminishing marginal 
returns to individual inputs. Further, each input is essential —there is no output if one 
of capital or effective labour is missing. Finally, in order for there to be a single, stable, 
non-trivial steady-state, the production function is assumed to meet the Inada 
conditions.^ The Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale 
meets all of these requirements, where output is defined as: 
^ The Inada conditions require that for any y=f(x): 
fix) is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing in x; 
fiO)=0; 
f (x) is decreasing in x; 
f'(0)=oo; a n d 
f (00) = 0 (Inada, 1963). 
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(1.1) Y = K"{ALf'"^ 
By assumption, ct is constant, and 0 < ci < 1. To analyse incomes per effective worker, 
the production function is re-specified in intensive form, to give: 
(1.2) y = k" 
where y is income per effective worker, and k is the ratio of capital to effective labour 
ratio. 
The rates of growth for labour and for technology are exogenous, fixed, and defined as: 
(1.3) L(t) = L(0)'e"' 
and 
(1.4) A ( 0 == A O H ' " 
The rate of growth for capital is endogenously determined within the model. The stock 
of capital in a given period is equal to the stock of capital in the preceding period plus 
any gross additions or upgrades (investment), less any stock that is broken down or 
redundant (depreciation). In this closed economy Solow-Swan model, investment is 
equal to saving, where saving is some fixed and exogenous proportion (0 < s < 2) of 
income. The rate of depreciation is also exogenous and fixed, and denoted as 6 
(0 < 6 < 1). The stock of capital per effective worker is also effectively depreciated by 
growth in the population and in technology. The equation of motion for the country's 
capital stock per effective worker is therefore: 
(1.5) k = S'k" -{)i + g + S)k 
From this, the proportional growth rate of capital per effective worker is: 
(1-6) k = j = + g + 
Finally, the proportional rate of growth of income per effective worker is: 
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y 
m 
(1.7) = f\k)' 
m 
= a — - ( r t + ^ + J ) 
The proportional growth rates of income and capital per capita decline with respect to 
capital per effective worker — the more capital per capita a country has, the slower its 
transitional rate of growth, which is consistent with the model's diminishing marginal 
returns to individual inputs. The transitional growth rate is exhausted once the 
economy reaches steady-state, which is the level of capital per effective worker at 
which additions to the capital stock are exactly off-set by removals from it, or: 
(1.8) 
S'k"-{n + g + d)k=0 
k = 
{n + g + S)^ 
( l - a ) 
The steady-state value of capital per effective worker can be substituted into the 
production function to give the steady-state value of income per effective worker: 
(1.9) y = 
{n + g + S) 
( l - a ) 
The neo-classical model implies that differences in transitional growth rates between 
countries can be explained by the current capital to effective labour ratio relative to its 
steady-state level (Z:/^) ' the rate of saving (s), and the rates of population growth {n), 
depreciation (6) and knowledge and technology (g). Differences in these variables 
across countries mean that not only do countries have different transitional rates of 
growth, but that they are also converging towards different steady-state levels of 
income and capital per capita. By assumption, the rate of investment is the only 
variable in the neo-classical model that can be directly affected or chosen by 
households — the others are either taken as given {n, g, b) or are the result of changes 
in other variables {k). As described, the model predicts that during this transition, rich 
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countries will grow more slowly than poor countries — as long as rates of investment, 
population, technological progress and depreciation are identical across countries. 
This 'absolute convergence' is not supported by the available data, since countries have 
different rates of investment, depreciation and so on. As a result, all countries are not 
on the same growth path toward the same steady-state. Figure 1.2 shows a rich country 
with a more efficient production technology than the poor country — demonstrated by 
having higher values of gross domestic product (GDP) for the same capital to labour 
ratio. At a capital to labour ratio in between [SS POOR] — the steady-state for the poor 
country — and [SS RICH] — the steady-state for the rich country — the rich country 
will experience positive growth, while the poor country will encounter negative 
growth. In the empirical work, growth economists control for differences between 
countries' steady-states, in addition to cross-country differences between rates of 
investment and initial levels of income. While countries' steady-states cannot be 
directly observed, they can be controlled for using variables that account for 
differences in production technology across countries, such as health, education, and 
institutional quality. Differences in countries' rates of growth can then be explained by 
differences in countries' distances from their steady-states. 
The long run rate of growth is evaluated once the transition is complete, and the 
economy has reached steady-state. Since the steady-state is defined as the point at 
which there is no net capital accumulation per effective worker, the long run rate of 
growth in income per capita (as opposed to per effective worker) at steady-state is the 
rate of growth of technological progress, g. With no sustainable gain from simply 
increasing capital or labour, the only way to increase output (and through it, income) 
per capita is to improve the production technology in order to generate more output 
with the same amount of input — similar to the western economies' escape from 
Malthus' population trap. As long as the speed of convergence is not instantaneous, 
then the exogenous growth of technology can transform the economy's steady-state 
into a moving target. This means that the rate of growth for the economy is a 
combination of the transitional growth rate, and the rate of growth of technological 
progress. 
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FIGURE 1.2 ALLOWING DIFFERENT STEADY-STATES FOR DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 
c-
8 " 
[SS POOR] 
Capital stock 
GDP (poor) — GDP (rich) 
Saving (poor) Saving (rich) 
Population and Depreciation 
Many economists have argued that simply taking the rate of technological progress as 
exogenous is unsatisfying, given the implications for country's rates of growth — 
particularly since it fails to explain the divergence in countries incomes. Treating the 
rate of technological progress as exogenous implies that no action can be taken to affect 
the long run rate of growth. Endogenous growth theories sought to fill this gap in the 
literature, through the development of models of growth in which the rate of 
technological progress was determined within the model's framework. There is a rich 
and continually evolving literature on whether neo-classical or endogenous growth 
models best fit the data. While there is evidence to support endogenous growth 
models, and the models themselves have evolved to better fit the data, the focus of this 
thesis is on the saving trap and the neo-classical model's prediction that capital should 
flow from rich to poor countries because there are diminishing marginal returns to 
capital. For this reason, endogenous growth models are not discussed further. 
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1 . 3 BARRIERS TO GROWTH 
Physical capital is essential to economic growth. Equally important, however, are the 
variables that determine the economy's steady-state, or long run growth rate — 
physical capital is nothing without healthy, skilled, labour to operate it, and an 
institutional infrastructure that facilitates the production of output and the payment of 
returns. The empirical support for conditional convergence depends on the effect that 
variables such as health, education, and institutional quality have in controlling for 
differences in production technologies across countries. This explains how, in spite of 
diminishing marginal returns to capital, a capital-rich country with a higher rate of 
investment or a superior production technology can have a higher marginal product of 
capital than a capital-poor country. Where a country's low rate of investment, or 
inferior production technology, is due to poverty, the country's poverty can become a 
barrier to growth. 
In the same year in which Solow and Swan developed their now familiar growth 
model. Nelson (1956) developed a growth model that allowed for more than one 
steady-state, the lowest of which was a poverty trap, or a 'low-level equilibrium', using 
the same Cobb-Douglas production function shown in equation (1.1). Income per 
capita grows when the proportional rate of growth of income is higher than the 
proportional rate of growth of the population — in line with Malthus' population trap. 
Nelson generated multiple equilibria by allowing the model 's dynamics to vary 
according to whether average incomes were lower than or equal to subsistence levels, 
or whether they were higher. An economy was likely to be trapped at the low-level 
equilibrium if: the rate of income growth was close to the rate of population growth; 
the marginal propensity to invest out of income was low; there was a shortage of 
uncultivated but arable land; and the production technology was inefficient (Nelson, 
1956, p. 901). 
Nelson went on to argue that an escape from the low-level equilibrium would be 
achieved through some combination of: raising the rate of investment; increasing 
labour force participation; initiating a government investment program; utilising a 
more efficient production technology; and changing the social structure (encouraging 
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smaller families, thrift and entrepreneurship). Nelson noted that inflows of aid or 
investment from abroad could potentially free a country from the trap if they were 
accompanied by socio-political changes or they were large enough to permanently 
move the economy away from the low-level equilibrium, and to a level of income at 
which the domestic rate of saving increases, and a higher stable equilibrium can be 
sustained. It is this last that forms the basis of the 'big push' theories of 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and Murphy et. al. (1989). There is, however, evidence that 
such an approach may not meet with success in the absence of other initiatives — in 
particular, initiatives that address institutional quality (Easterly, 2005). 
Attempting to establish whether poverty is a barrier to a country's economic growth is 
difficult, because it requires an answer to the following question: what would be 
different if the country were not poor? Simple poverty is not enough to designate a 
country as being caught in a poverty trap, since a country may be relatively poor, but 
growing rapidly as it moves from its initial level of income towards its steady-state. A 
low, zero or negative growth rate by itself is also not enough, since neo-classical theory 
predicts countries' rates of growth will slow as they converge on their steady-states. 
Low incomes and a low or negative rate of growth are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions to determine whether or not a country is caught in a poverty trap. The 
'sufficient' condition is that increasing income or capital per capita leads to an 
acceleration in the country's rate of growth, and that this movement toward a higher 
steady-state level of income and capital per capita can be sustained once foreign aid or 
foreign capital is no longer forthcoming. Related to this is the fact that a country with 
an economy characterised by a neo-classical model can temporarily enjoy income per 
capita higher than the steady-state level — it is only that this higher level of income 
cannot be sustained in the absence of continued inflows of foreign capital or aid. 
Establishing this counterfactual, 'what would be different if the country were rich' 
scenario is complicated further by the fact that poverty is not the only type of barrier to 
growth, and poor countries are often afflicted by more than one such type. These other 
barriers — such as poor health, education, institutional quality and so on — will erode 
the expected return on investment, and therefore reduce the willingness of households 
that are otherwise able to invest in that country. In seeking to explore why capital does 
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not flow from rich countries to poor countries, Lucas (1990) suggested that once 
differences between poor and rich countries in variables such as human capital 
accumulation, political risk, or institutional quality had been accounted for, the 
marginal product of capital in poor countries was not necessarily greater than in rich 
countries. Under these circumstances, an inflow of foreign capital or aid will not, by 
itself, lift the country out of poverty permanently. Inflows of foreign aid and capital in 
the absence of reforms to health, education, institutional quality, and so on, may do 
more harm than good. There is evidence to suggest that improperly allocated foreign 
aid can have adverse long-term effects on a country's growth prospects, partly due to 
countries becoming dependent on aid, and partly due to concerns about the aid being 
misappropriated (Burnside and Dollar, 2000, Easterly, 1999). 
1 . 3 . 1 POVERTY AS A BARRIER TO GROWTH — THE SAVING TRAP 
The focus of this thesis is on testing the extent to which the simple saving trap is a 
barrier to growth. The trap is characterised by a situation in which the rate of saving is 
low because nearly all household income is devoted to meeting basic, subsistence 
needs. Assuming the economy is closed, or that there is no international capital 
movement, the rate of investment will also be low, and an increase in the capital stock 
may not be sufficient for a net gain in capital per capita once population growth and 
depreciation are accounted for. This means that the marginal product of labour 
remains low and so incomes per capita remain low. If the rate of saving is low because 
income is low, then the rate of saving should increase once income per capita reaches a 
critical threshold. Figure 1.3 illustrates the multiple equilibria that can arise when the 
rate of saving is non-constant with respect to income. 
In Figure 1.2 earlier, two different steady states were shown for two different countries 
with two different rates of saving for all levels of income. Figure 1.3 is different, 
because it shows two different rates of saving for the same country, varying according 
to that country's level of income per capita. At low levels of income and capital, the 
rate of saving is low, and the level of saving is indicated by saving (low) in the figure. 
Once income per capita increases beyond a given threshold — shown as 
[THRESHOLD] in Figure 1.3 — households can afford a higher rate of saving, shown 
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as saving (high). Countries that start with an initial level of income that is less than the 
threshold level will converge on low levels of income and capital per capita [SS LOW]. 
Countries with an initial level of income that is greater than the threshold will 
converge on the higher levels of income and capital per capita, associated with the 
point labelled [SS HIGH] in Figure 1.3. In a closed economy, and in the absence of a 
windfall income gain, there is no way for a country that is converging toward 
[SS LOW] to ever reach [SS HIGH] unless, for some reason, the rate of investment is 
increased. 
FIGURE 1.3 THE SAVING TRAP - MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA 
Capital stock 
GDP 
Saving (low) 
Population and Depreciation 
Saving (high) 
There are a number of intuitively appealing explanations for why the rate of saving 
may vary with the level of income. From the neo-classical model, households in a 
closed economy cannot consume all of their income and save nothing, since capital is 
an essential input into the production function. In practice, households also cannot 
save everything and consume nothing, as they will not survive from one period to the 
next. The choice of the rate of saving must fall somewhere between these two extremes, 
but there is nothing in the Solow-Swan model to specify how (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
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2004) the rate of saving should be chosen." The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model, an 
extension of the Solow-Swan model (which is discussed further in the next chapter), 
dynamically optimises the rate of saving by introducing parameters that control for 
households' rates of time preference and inter-temporal substitution, and the rate of 
return on capital. The relationship between income and the rate of saving as predicted 
by the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model can be ambiguous. It is generally expected to 
increase with income when households want to smooth consumption over time, which 
means that rates of consumption are higher at low levels of income. In a closed 
economy, this effect can be offset by the diminishing marginal return on capital 
associated with higher levels of capital per capita, and the fact that as household 
income increases, the return on investment is lower. Empirically, Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin note that the rate of saving tends to rise with income when an economy is 
in transition towards its steady-state (2004). 
The parameters of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model may be such that households at 
low incomes consume almost nothing, and save almost everything — after all, it is 
possible that rates of return may be high enough, and that households are patient 
enough and flexible enough with respect to when they enjoy their consumption. 
Assuming, as Nelson (1956) did, that a minimum level of consumption is required in 
each period in order for members of the household to subsist, there is a limit to the 
extent to which consumption can be delayed. While there is no consensus on what this 
minimum amount is, or what it should cover — let alone how to allow for differences 
in preferences across individual households and even countries — the idea of there 
being a minimum level of consumption is a relatively uncontroversial one. One 
benchmark is the World Bank's definition of 'absolute poverty', which is $1 a day in 
PPP terms. It was estimated that in 27 countries around the world, more than a quarter 
of the population lives on less than $1 a day (UNDP, 2003), indicating that there are 
households that are unable to meet even the most basic needs out of their income. 
There is a 'golden rule of capital accumulation', which is defined as the point at which the level of 
consumption is equal to the level of saving, and under which households do not consume any more 
than they set aside for hjture generations (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). In the absence of 
intertemporal substitution elasticities, or rates of time preference, there is nothing inherently superior 
about the golden rule condition. 
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From this, it is reasonable to suggest that households on low incomes may increase 
rates of saving as their incomes overtake the subsistence threshold. 
Essentially, there are four reasons why the rate of saving may be low at low incomes. 
The first is that if households do not fully consume their incomes, they risk starvation. 
Gersovitz (1983) explicitly modelled the probability of a young agent surviving to old 
age as a function of that agent's consumption when young. Forgone consumption in 
the current period reduces the probability of the agent surviving until the next period. 
An agent who does not eat today in order to save may not live to enjoy the return on 
their investment. The second reason is that insufficient consumption may reduce the 
agent's physiological capacity for work. This follows from the Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984), 
efficiency wage argument — foreign owned firms in developing countries offer a wage 
that is higher than the market clearing rate in order to attract workers, but also to 
ensure that they are well-nourished because well-nourished workers are more 
productive, and miss fewer days due to illness. Another aspect of this same issue is 
that parents who are undernourished are more likely to have children that are also 
undernourished. This occurs not only because the parents' incomes are insufficient to 
provide for the children, but also because the child is born with a lower birth weight, 
which has implications for its subsequent health and development (Dasgupta, 1997). 
Thirdly, even after they have reached the level of subsistence, households at low 
incomes are likely to be less patient with respect to the inter-temporal substitution of 
consumption. Life expectancy is lower in poorer countries than in rich countries, but 
may not necessarily be endogenous as in Gersovitz's model. Even if increased 
consumption has no meaningful impact on longevity, agents with a lower life 
expectancy will discount delayed consumption at a much higher rate than agents with 
a longer life expectancy — simply because the likelihood of their surviving to derive 
utility from the delayed consumption is so much less — which is reflected as greater 
impatience. Controlling for differences in age, education, family size and race, 
Lawrance estimated that on average, the rate of time preference for low income 
households was three to five percentage points lower than for richer households, for a 
panel sample of households in the USA between 1974 and 1982 (1991, p. 55). Lawrance 
noted that a higher rate of time preference in low income households led not only to a 
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lower rate of saving, but also to reduced investment in education. At a cross-country 
level, Chakraborty extended Gersovitz's model of endogenous longevity to take 
account of investment in human as well as physical capital, and found that low rates of 
investment in both types of capital are associated with countries where life expectancy 
is low (2004). 
This aspect of the low income saving trap may be further exacerbated by the fourth 
and final reason, which is the fact that the price of capital goods relative to 
consumption goods is higher in poor countries than it is in rich countries. Households 
in poor countries may appear to be more impatient because they have to give up a 
greater volume of consumption goods — including the basics, such as food, shelter, 
clothing and so on — to purchase the same volume of capital as households in rich 
countries. The prices of capital goods in poor countries are usually also higher in 
absolute terms compared to rich countries due to the transport costs and tariffs that are 
added at import. For example, the cost of items of capital equipment items in Egypt, 
Iran, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria and Zimbabwe was estimated to be around three and a 
half times as expensive as in the countries where they were manufactured (Eaton and 
Kortum, 2001). Capital goods are imported by poor countries, since more than 70 % of 
the world's production of capital goods occurs in developed countries (UNIDO, 2005). 
In 2003, developed economies accounted for 91 % of the world's manufacturing value 
added in office, accounting and computing machinery, 89 % of electrical machinery 
and apparatus, 73 % of radio, television and communication equipment, 85 % of motor 
vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, and 84 % of other machinery and equipment 
(UNIDO, 2005). 
The higher cost of capital goods relative to consumption goods in poorer countries has 
been attributed to two stylised facts. The first is that poorer countries have a greater 
endowment of labour relative to capital compared to richer countries (Bhagwati, 1984), 
and so labour productivity is lower in poorer countries than in richer countries. From 
this, imported goods cost more than domestically produced goods, because it is 
assumed that the price of traded (capital) goods is linked to international prices while 
the price of non-traded (consumption) goods is linked to the low wages associated 
with low productivity (Kravis et al., 1982). Both of these things put together mean that 
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the higher relative price of capital goods in poor countries compared to rich countries 
occurs because poor countries have less capital per capita. Put together with the 
likelihood that households on very low incomes cannot afford to defer much 
consumption to begin with, the rate of saving at low incomes falls even further. 
The obvious way out of the saving trap is to increase the rate of saving at lower levels 
of income so that the model only allows for a unique steady-state, rather than the 
multiple equilibria shown in Figure 1.3. As noted by Nelson (1956), depending on the 
parameters of the model, an alternative solution may be to improve the production 
technology used, so that for the same rates of saving at low and high incomes, only a 
single steady-state exists (as indicated by 'GDP (high A)' in Figure 1.4), because more 
output is produced with the same amount of capital. Another option, which is also 
shown in Figure 1.4, is to slow the rate of population growth (indicated by 'population 
and depreciation (low)'). At low levels of income, however, it may not be any easier to 
improve the production technology or slow the rate of population growth than it is to 
arbitrarily raise the rate of saving. Undertaking these sorts of changes requires 
investment in health and education, initiatives to address the higher relative price of 
capital goods — such as better transport infrastructure or lower tariffs — and so on, in 
order to ensure the goal is met in the longer term. All of these things come at a cost, 
which may seem just as insurmountable to low income countries as delaying 
consumption at low incomes. 
FIGURE 1.4 THE SAVING TRAP - UNIQUE EQUILIBRIUM 
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1 . 3 . 2 OTHER BARRIERS TO GROWTH 
The saving trap is only one type of barrier to growth. The rate of saving is the only 
variable in the Solow-Swan model that can be directly chosen, even if it is not 
optimised as in the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model. This does not mean that the other 
variables in the model can or do not vary at different levels of income. Another way in 
which multiple equilibria can arise is if the relationship between capital and output — 
the production technology itself — is more efficient at a higher level of capital per 
capita than at low levels. This violates the Inada conditions, since it means that there is 
a range of capital per capita across which there are increasing marginal returns to 
capital. The 'big push' literature in economic growth relies on the existence of these 
increasing returns. At low incomes, countries generate output using a 'traditional' 
technology —for example, an agrarian production technology. A more efficient use of 
the same capital would be to adopt a modern production technology — such as 
manufacturing — but this can only be done at a fixed cost per worker, as shown in 
Figure 1.5. Increasing marginal returns to capital per capita occur close to the point at 
which it is economical for the economy to switch to the modern technology (shown as 
[THRESHOLD] in Figure 1.5). At [THRESHOLD], both production technologies 
produce the same amount of output per capita from the same amount of capital per 
capita (net of the fixed cost of the modern technology). 
F I G U R E 1.5 I N C R E A S I N G R E T U R N S T O S C A L E - M U L T I P L E E Q U I L I B R I A 
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In addition to [THRESHOLD], there are three other points of interest in this model 's 
dynamics — the low-level equilibrium [ S S L O W ] , the unstable steady-state 
[SS UNSTABLE] , and the high level equilibrium [SS HIGH]. Countries that have 
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capital per capita that is lower than the level at [SS UNSTABLE] will converge on the 
low-level equilibrium at [SS LOW]. This is because the rate at which the stock of capital 
is depleted through depreciation and population growth is greater than the rate at 
which it is accumulated. Countries that have a starting value of capital per capita that 
is higher than the level at [SS UNSTABLE] will converge on the high level equilibrium 
at [SS HIGH], As the dynamics are shown in Figure 1.5, it is possible for a country to 
adopt the modern production technology, but unless its big push toward development 
moves it to a level of capital per capita that is greater than [SS UNSTABLE], it will 
eventually return to [SS LOW]. A second, related point is that the model dynamics 
allow for two countries to have levels of capital per capita that are similar in 
magnitude to one another, but that are on either side of the level of capital per capita at 
[SS UNSTABLE]. From these initial starting points that are so close to one another, 
levels of capital and income in these two countries will diverge from one another as 
they move towards different steady-states. 
Much of the 'big push' literature is based on the work of Rosenstein-Rodan, in which 
some level of coordination is necessary in order for the economy to exploit the 
increasing returns present in the model. In Rosenstein-Rodan's model (1943), 
increasing returns to scale arise when domestic demand for goods from the modern 
sector is insufficient to sustain a profitable, modern sector in that country. Domestic 
demand for manufactured goods is low because the country is poor, and average 
incomes are low. The incentive to invest in the modern sector is limited by the 
domestic market for the products. A significant, coordinated increase in investment 
can grow the industrial sector of the economy and — by increasing employment and 
payments to labour in this sector — stimulate demand for both agricultural and 
manufactured products so that these returns to investment can be realised over time. In 
this way, 'a simultaneous industrialization of many sectors of the economy can be 
profitable even when no sector can break even industrializing alone' (Murphy et al., 
1989). 
There are other types of coordination failure that can be addressed by a big push. For 
example, capital goods may not be divisible into increments that each pay a return — 
an investment in two metres of railroad will not generate a higher proportional return 
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than an investment in several hundred i<ilometres of railroad. Secondly, a railroad 
connecting an inland mine to a port on the coast may not be built at all unless the mine 
is operational, and the mine may not be profitably operated unless there is a reliable 
way to transport the output to the port. Under these circumstances, it is the role of 
government to identify and address such bottlenecks through public investment. A 
government 's budget depends on what it can raise through taxation, and if output and 
income are low, then tax receipts are also necessarily low. This also makes it difficult 
for governments to borrow from the rest of the world. Thirdly, the coordination failure 
may not be limited to where there are increasing returns with respect to physical 
capital alone, but to the broader definition of capital, which includes human capital 
such as health and education. 
The 'big push' is an argument that Sachs makes. It is implied in the Millennium 
Development Goals, which seek to end poverty by 2015 by improving outcomes in 
health, education, and fertility as well as incomes. In this case, it is the necessary 
investments in education and health that form the fixed cost b shown in Figure 1.5. 
Once that cost is met, Sachs argues that '[a]ll good things tend to move together...: 
capital stock, greater specialisation, more advanced technology, and lower fertility... 
Economic development.. .tends to build on itself. But it must get started' (2005, p. 73). 
Sachs further estimates the cost of 'getting started', and uses the Harrod-Domar 
financing gap model (Domar, 1946) to put a value on the shortfall that must be met by 
foreign aid. 
Easterly, one of the most prominent critics of the 'big push', argues that more than 
investment or saving, it is institutional quality that facilitates growth, since the right 
institutional arrangements provide incentives for 'small steps from the bottom' as 
opposed to growth coming from 'a big push planner at the top' (2005, p. 30). Easterly 
rejected the 'financing gap' approach advocated by Sachs on both theoretical and 
empirical grounds (1999), noting that: poorer countries could grow dependent on aid 
and treat it as permanent income, rather than a temporary inflow to overcome a 
poverty trap; and that there existed a moral hazard risk with countries consuming 
foreign aid — instead of saving or investing it — in order to widen the financing gap to 
attract yet more foreign aid. Finally, Easterly pointed to the mammoth task of 
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information gathering and consolidation necessary to plan, implement and evaluate 
the success of a big push, and noted that there are no easy answers as to how the 
process would be managed. By the same token, however. Easterly only advocated that 
poor countries improve institutional arrangements through the adoption of 
'democratic institutions and economic freedoms', and — since he treats institutions as 
exogenous — provided no insight as to how a positive change in institutional quality 
may actually be effected and sustained. By contrast, Glaeser et. al., for example, linked 
institutional quality to education, and argue that increased education leads to people 
participating more in the political process, and that effectively, countries need to be 
able to afford good institutions, which implies yet another type of barrier to growth 
(2007). 
As with any growth model characterised by multiple equilibria, there is more than one 
way for a country caught at the low-level equilibrium to escape. The 'big push' is one 
such approach to the model with increasing returns shown in Figure 1.5. As with the 
saving trap, one of the ways in which the trap can be escaped is to alter the rate of 
saving, or the rate of population growth, so that there is only a single equilibrium as 
shown in Figure 1.6. Depending on the model parameters, it may be possible to 
eliminate all but the highest steady-state by selecting a sufficiently high rate of saving, 
or implementing policies that inhibit the rate of population growth, as shown in Figure 
1.6. The extent to which the country can do so, of course, depends on what its 
households can afford. 
FIGURE 1.6 INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE - UNIQUE EQUILIBRIUM 
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1 . 4 EVIDENCE 
Empirical tests show that the neo-classical model provides a good fit for the data, in 
spite of the gap between rich countries and poor countries being wider in 2005 than it 
was in 1955 (see Table 1.1 and Figure 1.7). The failure of poor countries to catch up is at 
odds with the neo-classical model 's predictions, however, this can be reconciled since 
the model only predicts that poor countries will grow faster than rich countries if 
everything else is equal. Since countries vary with respect to their rates of saving, 
education, health, production technologies, rates of population growth, and 
institutional arrangements, everything else is demonstrably not equal. When these 
differences are controlled for, the transitional rate of growth depends on how far away 
a country is from its unique steady-state levels of income and capital per capita, and 
there is evidence to support this 'conditional convergence' , where a country's steady-
state level of income is conditioned on some combination of rates of investment and 
population growth, and the variables such as education, health and institutional 
quality that determine the country's production technology. 
T A B L E 1.1 G D P PER C A P I T A - S U M M A R Y F I G U R E S 
n Min Max St. Dev. 
1955 71 $406 $ 1 5 , 2 4 6 $ 3 , 8 1 2 
2005 71 $366 $ 7 1 , 2 0 9 $ 1 4 , 2 8 5 
Source: (Heston ct al., 2009) 
Empirical work in this area has focussed on establishing which cross-country 
differences have the greatest impact on a country's steady-state goal, as well as how to 
identify these variables and test their validity. The influential work of Sachs and 
Warner (1997) advanced the importance of controlling for cross-country differences in 
economic openness, population growth, government spending, institutional quality, 
life expectancy, geography,^ and the share of GDP made up of exports of natural 
resources. In their discussion on the empirics of economic growth, Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (2004) suggest that a 'basic' cross-country growth regression would 
include controls for: the investment ratio and the log of initial income; measures of 
' ' Favourable ' geography is where a country is not situated in the tropics, and/or not landlocked 
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economic stability such as government spending, openness, the terms of trade and the 
rate of inflation; population dynamics such as fertility and life expectancy; human 
capital accumulation, such as enrolment ratios or average education attainment; and 
measures of political stability, such as the rule of law, democracy, and whether or not 
there have been any civil wars or political assassinations. 
FIGURE 1.7 HISTOGRAMS OF GDP PER CAPITA - SELECTED COUNTRIES 
WHHM) «IKHH> " 
Source: (Heston et al., 2009) 
Note: There are seventy-one countries in the sample for both 1955 and 2005. 
All of these variables have tested well in the empirical literature. The work of 
Acemoglu et. al. (2001) and Rodrik et. al. (2004), for example, established the 
importance of differences in institutional quality*' across countries as accounting for 
much of the cross-country differences in levels of income. Bhattacharyya (2004) 
undertook the same analysis as Rodrik et. al. but with economic growth, rather than 
levels of income, as the dependent variable, and established that cross-country 
differences in institutional quality also explained cross-country differences in rates of 
growth. With respect to human capital, Mankiw et. al. (1992) undertook an extension of 
the Solow-Swan model to include it as a complementary input to physical capital, and 
this work was built upon by Dowrick and Rogers (2002), in demonstrating that cross-
country differences in human capital accumulation explained the different speeds at 
which countries could absorb technology, and subsequently, their different rates of 
economic growth. In addition to this, human capital accumulation has also been linked 
to reducing the rate of fertility (Galor and Weil, 2000), and as being one of the variables 
'' Institutional quality in each study was reflected in cross-country differences in the average protection 
against appropriation risk, and the rule of law respectively. 
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that positively influences institutional quality (Glaeser et al., 2007). As discussed 
already, the average level of health in a country — both in terms of mortality and 
morbidity — is an important consideration, as demonstrated in Chakraborty's (2004) 
work on the impact of health and mortality on saving decisions and the implications 
for poverty traps. Gallup and Sachs (2001) specifically focused on the impact of malaria 
on the economic prospects of countries, and found that countries where malaria was 
prevalent had significantly lower growth than countries with less 'intensive' malaria, 
after controlling for cross-country differences in initial incomes, geographic location, 
institutional quality and economic openness. More recently, Weil (2007) estimated that 
if there were no cross-country differences in health, then the variation in the log of 
GDP per capita across countries would also be significantly reduced. 
As well as identifying and testing individual variables — with appropriate controls — 
there is also a considerable literature on testing the robustness of these variables, 
including how well they perform if there are changes made to the other variables that 
are included in the specification. For example, Martina (2009) examined the rapid 
growth of some of the East Asian economies, and found that while health and 
institutional quality were linked with sustained growth in incomes, it was not possible 
for a country to sustain growth with one and not the other. Glaeser et. al. looked at the 
role of human capital and education in economic development, and compared the 
histories of North and South Korea after their separation. Both North and South Korea 
were dictatorships initially, but South Korea eventually moved to a model of 
democracy because South Korea had higher economic growth, and higher human 
capital attainment. The authors argue that it was is factors that influence institutional 
quality (2004). In the 1990s, it was found that investment in machinery and equipment, 
which embodies technological development, was critical to the growth prospects of 
developing countries (De Long and Summers, 1993). The impact of equipment 
investment on economic growth remained positive and significant irrespective of 
which other variables were controlled for — a result which has been arrived at by more 
than one study (Levine and Renelt, 1992; Sala-i-Martin, 1997). This is of particular 
importance because empirical results of models of economic growth are highly 
sensitive in relation to the specification of the model, and which variables are included 
in the regression. More recently, Sala-i-Martin et. al. undertook a similar analysis 
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where the inclusion of 67 different variables were sensitivity tested, and found that the 
relative price of capital goods to consumption goods displaced the rate of investment 
as the one of the most robust explanatory variables as a determinant of growth (2004). 
They noted that when it was included, the coefficient on the rate of investment as a 
proportion of GDP declined in magnitude (becoming negative). Since the inclusion of 
the relative price of capital goods did not have a similar impact on the coefficient 
estimates of any of the other control variables, this observation was most likely due to 
correlation between the rate of investment, and the price of capital goods. 
This strong evidence in support of conditional convergence does not rule out poverty 
traps or the existence of multiple equilibria. The variables that a country's steady-state 
is conditioned upon in the neo-classical model are the same variables that can generate 
multiple equilibria if they vary across different levels of income within the same 
country. As a result, a test for conditional convergence will show that a poor country is 
growing slowly because that country is close to a low-level equilibrium, however, it 
cannot test for the existence of multiple equilibria, or the possibility that there exists a 
higher level equilibrium that can be reached once a critical income threshold is 
surpassed. Bloom et. al. (2003) explicitly tested for whether or not the existence of 
multiple equilibria is supported by the available data. They used maximum likelihood 
estimation to test for whether a model with a single possible equilibrium or a model 
with two possible equilibria for each country fit the available data best. They found 
that the two-equilibria model fit the data best, and that around 85 % of the countries in 
their sample fell into the low income equilibrium category. They also found that some 
countries far away from the equator have a higher probability of converging to their 
high income equilibrium than countries that are close to the equator, and that it is 
easier for countries with 'favourable geography' — that is, countries situated on the 
coast with high levels of rainfall — to move from the low income equilibrium to the 
high income equilibrium than it is for landlocked countries that have lower levels of 
rainfall. While they argued that geographic location is not the only factor that 
determines a country's income or equilibrium, they also acknowledged that their paper 
did not explore how multiple equilibria arise, or how a country that is converging on 
the low income equilibrium can change its growth path so that it can converge on the 
high income equilibrium. 
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Graham and Temple expanded on this work, and conducted an analysis where they 
allocated individual countries as being in the low or high income equilibrium based on 
the proportion of the workforce and value added contained in or generated by the 
agricultural sector (2006). They then estimated what GDP per capita might be if some of 
the resources in the agricultural sector were to be redeployed to the modern sector. 
Based on this, they estimated that multiple equilibria accounted for around 15 to 25 % 
of the variation in GDP per worker across countries (2006, p. 5). Nevertheless, their 
findings depend on their initial allocation of countries being in the low income or high 
income group, which in turn was based on the relative importance of agriculture to the 
economy and to the labour market of that country. This in turn assumed that multiple 
equilibria existed, and that they were attributable to whether or not a country has 
industrialised and has reduced its reliance on its traditional sector. 
Another test of multiple equilibria is to establish whether non-linearities, or increasing 
returns to scale, exist over critical parts of the growth model. Chakraborty's work on 
endogenous longevity found that threshold effects applied to household decisions to 
invest in education, because a certain income threshold was associated with greater 
public spending on health and increases to longevity, which in turn provided a greater 
incentive for human capital accumulation that would generate a higher rate of growth 
and higher incomes (2004). In their analysis of the existence of poverty traps, Kraay 
and Raddatz (2007) conducted empirical work on a cross-country dataset, plotting the 
average rate of saving between 1970 and 2000 in individual countries against their 
capital to labour ratios. Their hypothesis was that if the saving trap were a barrier to 
growth, then there should be a rapid acceleration in the rate of saving once a critical 
capital to labour ratio was achieved. That is, once the marginal product of labour — 
and the payments to labour associated with it — crossed a critical threshold, the rate of 
saving would increase because workers were earning enough to meet their basic needs, 
and have something left over to save. Kraay and Raddatz did not identify this sort of 
acceleration in their dataset (see Figure 1.8), and from this, they concluded that the 
historical relationship between aid, saving and growth is not consistent with escapes 
from poverty traps (2007). 
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FIGURE 1.8 RATE OF SAVING AND THE CAPITAL TO LABOUR RATIO 
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Source: Reproduced from (Kraay and Raddatz, 2007) 
Their analysis, however, did not control for differences between countries except with 
respect to their stocks of capital per capita and their rates of saving. Given that the 
analysis was conducted across different countries, the exclusion of other variables 
implies that the analysis assumed that all countries are on the same growth path 
towards the same steady-state, albeit at different stages of development. The strong 
empirical case for conditional, as opposed to absolute, convergence means that the 
relationship between saving and the capital to labour ratio across different countries 
cannot meaningfully be used to draw conclusions about the relationship between 
saving and the capital to labour ratio in a single country over time. Finally, since they 
focused on the rate of saving rather than the rate of investment, their analysis also 
implicitly assumed that all of the countries included had closed economies, which is 
not the case. 
In his assessment of the existence of poverty traps. Easterly (2005) focused on the rate 
of investment, rather than the rate of saving. He defined poverty traps as successive 
periods of zero, or close to zero, growth, and argued that since almost no country has 
exhibited successive periods of zero growth, poverty traps did not exist. Easterly also 
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argued that in the few instances where a country demonstrated a sudden burst of 
growth that was sustained over subsequent periods, this acceleration could often not 
be attributed to the inflow of foreign aid, and that instead, it was improvements in 
institutional quality that led to sustained economic growth (Easterly, 2005). Easterly's 
finding — that improvements to institutional quality (using information from the 
Polity IV database as a proxy) are linked with sustained economic growth — has a 
strong intuitive appeal. His definition of both the poverty trap and the escape from the 
poverty trap, however, are somewhat arbitrary — a fact that he acknowledged. The 
existence of a poverty trap does not mean that the economy experiences zero growth — 
in the case of Malthus ' population trap, incomes per capita fluctuated as changes to 
income were followed by changes to the population. And even in the neo-classical 
model, countries may have a zero rate of transitional growth, but they have a long-run 
rate of growth equal to the exogenous rate of technological progress meaning that even 
very poor countries can exhibit positive rates of growth while still being mired in a 
low-level equilibrium. 
1 . 5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the various explanations for the divergence in the incomes of 
rich and poor countries. While there is strong evidence for conditional convergence, 
this evidence does not by itself rule out the existence of multiple equilibria. Testing for 
multiple equilibria is problematic, as it requires some assumptions about a country's 
counterfactual, such as what income, investment and saving might look like if that 
country were to have better health, education, institutional quality, or production 
technologies than it currently does. Added to this is the complication that many of 
these variables are interlinked, and it is difficult to separate out the impacts of, say, 
good population health from good educational attainment, since countries that have 
one usually have the other. One alternative is to look for evidence of changes to 
variables such as saving, health, education and institutions in response to changes in 
income, and once again, the evidence presented is mixed. At the same time, it is not 
necessary for poor countries to fund expenditure on health, education and physical 
capital out of their own incomes, when some of these expenditures — particularly 
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physical capital, which can be collateralised — can be financed by borrowing from the 
rest of the world. 
The empirical work in subsequent chapters of this thesis applies a simpler test of 
whether or not poverty is a barrier to growth — that is, whether an increase in a poor 
country's rate of saving is retained as an increase in the rate of investment in physical 
capital. In the national accounting sense, an increase in income may be allocated across 
an infinite number of consumption or investment aggregates. In a given period, the 
national accounting concept of saving is what is left of income after decisions about 
consumption have been made. Since the national accounts treat expenditure on health 
and education as consumption, saving can only be allocated as domestic or foreign 
investment. If a poor country has a low rate of investment in physical capital solely 
because people in the country have limited means to invest then everything else being 
an equal, an increase in that country's rate of saving — for example, through an inflow 
of foreign aid — should be retained as an increase in the rate of investment. If it is not, 
then the simple saving trap is not the only barrier to growth that this country must 
overcome. 
The next chapter presents and discusses the literature on open economy models of 
growth, the evidence on international capital mobility, and the extent to which 
countries' rates of saving are the same as their rates of investment. 
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2 CAPITAL ACCUMULATION IN AN OPEN 
ECONOMY 
2 . 1 INTRODUCTION 
As the previous chapter discussed, for the simple saving trap to be a country's primary 
barrier to growth, a necessary condition is that the country's rate of saving must rise 
with income. Even where saving rises with income, the simple savings trap can only be 
a country's primary barrier to growth where that increase in saving is retained as 
investment in physical capital — the sufficient condition. When both of these 
conditions hold, then a sufficiently large inflow of foreign aid or investment should 
lead to an increase in the stock of capital, and trigger a virtuous cycle towards higher 
incomes. If both conditions do not hold, then there are other aspects of development 
that must be addressed in addition to the rate of saving. These are health and 
education outcomes, institutional quality and so on — the variables that influence the 
production technology, and the same variables that growth economists use to 
condition the expected steady-state levels of capital and income per capita for 
individual countries. 
As long as the international movement of goods and capital is not restricted, open 
economy growth models predict that a country will import capital if its marginal 
product of capital is higher than the rest of the world on average, and export capital if 
it is lower. The previous chapter outlined the rationale for countries' rates of saving 
increasing with income. A neo-classical growth model would predict the opposite for 
rates of investment, since the richer a country is, the lower its marginal product of 
capital becomes — all other things being equal. If, as these models predict, the rate of 
saving rises with income while the rate of investment falls, investment and saving are 
not positively linked. This means that the necessary condition is met, while the 
sufficient condition is not, which means that the saving trap cannot be the only barrier 
to growth. In 1980, Feldstein and Horioka conducted an empirical study on the 
relationship between rates of saving and investment across OECD countries, and 
found that they were closely and positively correlated. Furthermore, the correlation was 
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one-to-one, such that the variation in the rates of saving across countries could almost 
entirely explain the variation in the rates of investment across the same countries. From 
this, the authors concluded that any change in a country's rate of saving would be 
transmitted entirely as a change to the same country's rate of investment, implying that 
while economies might be open in practice, they behaved as though they were 
effectively closed. This in turn would mean that for poor countries, the rate of 
investment would be limited by what that country could afford to save, rather than the 
country's ability to attract foreign investment. As a result, the prediction of the 
neo-classical model — that diminishing marginal returns would drive the flow of 
capital from rich countries to poor — would not be observed. 
The theoretical and the empirical literature are at odds with one another when it comes 
to international capital flows in the context of economic growth. The neo-classical 
growth model can be adapted to the open economy, however, it is limited in the extent 
to which it can explain the movement of capital across borders, implying that 
households devote all of their saving into either domestic or foreign investment 
entirely, with no portfolio balance. Barro and Sala-i-Martin adapted the Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans for the open economy and allowed for households to split their saving 
between domestic and foreign investment, but generated a number of counterintuitive 
outcomes, or required counterintuitive assumptions to generate meaningful outcomes 
— flaws that the authors themselves acknowledged (2004). The early empirical work, 
by contrast, strongly implies that countries' rates of saving are identical to their rates of 
investment, and that capital is not internationally mobile. 
This chapter examines the current theory and evidence in the literature on the 
relationship between investment and saving in open economies. The first section 
presents a discussion of open economy versions of the Solow-Swan and Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans models of economic growth. The second section discusses Feldstein and 
Horioka's empirical results, the apparent paradox that the findings pose in light of 
what the theories predict and the results obtained by others asking the same question. 
The third section discusses theories of international capital movement that attempt to 
explain how an unrestricted and competitive international market for capital can be 
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reconciled with Feldstein and Horioka's results. The fourth section summarises and 
concludes. 
2 . 2 NEO-CLASSICAL GROWTH AND THE CURRENT ACCOUNT 
At a country or economy-wide level, investment and saving are defined, measured and 
reported using the national accounting framework. GDP is estimated as the sum of 
private consumption (C), public consumption (G), public and private investment (/) 
and exports (X) less imports (M). 
( 2 . 1 ) GDP = C + G + I + X-M 
Gross national product is similar in concept to GDP, however, being 'national' rather 
than 'domestic' means that the scope of economic activity that is recorded is based on 
the resident status of individual agents rather than the geographic location in which 
production occurs. 'Gross national product' is also called 'gross national income' (GNI), 
since it reflects the actual payments received by the residents of a particular country, 
and is estimated as GDP plus net factor payments from the rest of the world (F).' 
Saving is measured as a residual — since it cannot be directly observed — and is 
defined as the difference between what is earned and what is consumed in a given 
period. As a result, estimates of saving differ depending on whether they are derived 
using GDP or GNI. Gross domestic saving (So) is derived from GDP: 
(2.2) " 
= I + EX-IM 
Gross national saving (SN) is derived from GNI, with the addition of net transfers from 
the rest of the world (R): 
' Factor payments are the not compensation of employees, investment income from the ownership of 
foreign financial claims (interest, dividends, rent, etc.), and nonfinancial property income (patents, 
copyrights, etc.) paid to non-residents. 
® In the balance of payments, transfers are recorded whenever an economy receives goods, services, 
income, or financial items without a quid pro quo. All transfers not considered to be capital are 
'current transfers', otherwise they are 'capital transfers' THE WORLD BANK (2008) World 
Development Indicators Online. The World Bank.. 
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S ^ = G N I - C - G + R 
(2.3) =gDP + F + R - C - G 
National saving can also be estimated using a country's financial accounts, where the 
change in a country's international financial position — or the acquisition of foreign 
assets less the incurrence of foreign liabilities — is equal to the sum of national saving 
and investment. The international financial position is the stock of a country's foreign 
financial assets and liabilities, made up of its holdings of foreign direct investment 
(FD/), portfolio investment { P I ) , other investment (O/) and reserves ( R E S ) . 
MFP =\^FA\-\^FL\ 
(2.4) = ^ F D I + ^ P I + ^ O I + ^ R E S 
= S , + I 
The maximum value that saving can take is constrained by income. The minimum 
possible value of saving is limited only by an agent's ability to borrow in order to 
finance extra spending, since saving can be less than zero when consumption is higher 
than income. Economic models often characterise an agent's ability to borrow as the 
discounted sum of expected future streams of income. Effectively, the rate of saving as 
a proportion of income cannot be higher than 100 % but can be infinitely negative. 
Unlike saving, investment can be directly observed and estimated as expenditure on 
goods and services designated as 'fixed assets' or capital goods. These include: 'land 
improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment 
purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, 
offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial 
buildings' (The World Bank, 2008). The measurement of investment also includes the 
net change in stocks or inventory — goods that have been produced, but which have 
not as yet been purchased. As a result, if expenditure on capital goods is low, and if 
there is a significantly large reduction in inventory, then the estimate of investment can 
be less than zero. The measure of investment that includes changes in inventories is 
'gross capital formation', and the measure of investment that excludes changes in 
inventories is 'gross fixed capital formation'. The minimum and maximum values that 
investment can take are the mirror opposite of saving. The rate of investment as a 
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proportion of income cannot be lower than 0 %, since there can be no negative 
expenditure on capital goods, but it can be infinitely positive, constrained only by an 
agent's ability to borrow. 
In the absence of restrictions on the international movement of goods and capital, and 
given that investment and saving have entirely different relationships with income, 
there is no reason why a country's levels or rates of investment and saving should be 
the same as one another. Not all saving need be invested domestically, or even 
invested at all. Since saving is estimated as a residual, its measurement is vulnerable to 
errors in the estimation of the components that make up income and expenditure.'" 
Even if income and expenditure can be comprehensively and accurately measured, 
agents' decisions about investment and saving are motivated by different 
considerations, and each has different substitutes. Those who save because they want 
to set something aside for another day, or so that they have a means of supporting 
themselves in the future, may do so in a number of ways." Investment is an input into 
the production process — whether through the direct purchase of capital goods, or 
through the purchase of a financial instrument that in turn finances the purchase of 
capital goods — and this input can be sourced either domestically or internationally. 
The difference between a country's investment and saving is shown in its current 
account, from the balance of payments: 
CAB = GNI-C-G-I^R 
(2.5) 
= EX-IM + F + R 
Further, there is no way to determine whether the difference between what is recorded as income and 
what is recorded as expenditure is used by households to formally augment the stock of physical 
capital — domestically or overseas — or whether it is used in black market transactions that cannot be 
recorded, stashed inside the mattress as currency, or smuggled out of the country and into a private 
foreign bank account. 
Examples include using family networks (agents depend on their parents when they are too young to 
work, and repay this by taking care of their parents once they are old enough to work and their parents 
are retired), or the purchase of stores of wealth other than designated capital goods (jewellery, 
collectors' items, and other valuables). 
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As equation (2.5) shows, a country's current account balance is determined by more 
than simply investment and saving decisions, since it also captures the net 
international flow of trade in goods and services. Equally, as implied from equation 
(2.4), it reflects the net change in a country's international financial position, or the 
change in the proportions of foreign assets and liabilities. Understanding what drives 
saving, investment and the current account balance on a national level is complicated 
by the fact that the actions of one domestic sector (government, business or household) 
may be off-set by the actions of another, so that neither is distinguishable at an 
aggregated level in the national accounts. For example, unexpectedly high government 
spending may be off-set by equally high private saving, as households prepare for 
higher taxes in subsequent periods. This interplay between the sectors is not always 
reflected in models where the behaviour of a country's economy is characterised as the 
behaviour of a representative, optimising household — particularly since these 
households own firms, and elect governments. 
2 . 2 . 1 EXOGENOUS SAVING 
In the Solow-Swan model, it is traditional to have a fixed, exogenous rate of saving, 
which is equal to the rate of investment in a closed economy. In an open economy, the 
rate of saving can still be fixed and exogenous, but investment decisions are made 
based on where investment is most profitable. In a scenario with absolute convergence, 
capital would flow from rich countries to poor countries. Lucas (1990) observed that: 
capital did not appear to be flowing from capital rich to capital poor countries; this ran 
counter to expectations consistent with diminishing marginal returns to capital; and 
the discrepancy might be explained if cross-country differences in stocks of human 
capital, or in political and sovereign risk were taken into account. In the case of the 
former, the return on investment in poor countries would be reduced as their lower 
stocks of human capital were taken into account. And in the case of political or 
sovereign risk, the marginal product of capital might be unaffected, but the likelihood 
of an investor receiving that return would be reduced. Benge and Wells, in a 
diagrammatic analysis of determinants of the current account in a small open 
economy, noted that the choice of the rate of saving affected patterns of consumption 
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and wealth, but that it was the choice of the rate of investment that affected the capital 
stock and flows of output (2002). Further, an increase in the rate of productivity growth 
would lead to a reduction in the current account surplus — that is, countries with 
superior production technology would be expected to import capital from the rest of 
the world. All of these explanations fit within the framework of the neo-classical model 
where a country's steady-state is conditioned on variables that drive differences in 
production technologies across countries — for example, human capital accumulation 
and institutional quality both perform well in cross-country growth regressions (Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). 
2 . 2 . 2 ENDOGENOUS SAVING 
In the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model, the rate of saving is endogenous because the 
level of consumption is dynamically optimised. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) 
augmented the model to allow for foreign ownership of capital. Households maximise 
utility by choosing consumption in each period: 
00 
(2.6) U = \it[c{t)}e"''e-'"dt 
0 
Since households can borrow from or lend to the rest of the world, the budget 
constraint is: 
a = w, - I - ( r - c , 
(2.7) 
= w,+{r-n,y{k.-d.)-c, 
Wealth (fl,) is defined as a country's stock of capital (fc), less its net debt {d) to the rest of 
the world. Each country (i) has its own consumption {a), wealth {a), rate of population 
growth (n/), rate of depreciation {bi), rate of technological progress (gi), stock of physical 
capital (ki), wages (xvi) and debt (di). Each country (;) is assumed to be small, so that its 
saving and investment decisions have no direct, individual impact on the exogenous 
world interest rate (r). Within countries, firms maximise profit, defined as the value of 
output less payments to factors of production: 
(2.8) K=F{K„L,)-{r + S,)K-w,L, 
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Firms are perfectly competitive price takers, so labour and capital are paid their 
marginal products. In units of capital per effective worker, the profit maximising 
conditions for firms are given as: 
(2 .9 ) f'i^k) = r + S, 
( 2 . 1 0 ) w,={f{k,)-k,'f\k)\'e''' 
Equation (2.10) is substituted into equation (2.7) to obtain the following equation of 
motion for wealth per effective worker: 
(2.11) d ^ f [ k i ) - { r + d , - a , ) - { g , + n, + ^a, - c , 
The change in wealth per effective worker is the value of production less: rents owed to 
foreign investors; the reduction in wealth per effective worker due to depreciation of 
the existing stock, and growth in the number of effective workers; and what is 
consumed. The model recognises total assets (ai), the country's stock of capital (fc) and 
net ownership of foreign capital (di, which can be positive or negative). If the change in 
wealth is positive, then saving is positive. 
If a country has more capital per effective worker than its open economy steady state 
— the level that fulfils the profit maximising condition shown in equation (2.9) — it 
will export capital, because its return on capital is necessarily lower than in the rest of 
the world. Countries are assumed to be using the same production technology. The 
steady-state levels of output and rates of growth are known, since countries' rates of 
growth in this neoclassical model are the exogenous rate of technological progress (gi). 
Since capital can move freely across borders, convergence to the steady-state is 
instantaneous — something that the authors acknowledge as a shortcoming of the 
model, since instantaneous convergence is not supported by the data. So that capital 
accumulation does not centre around one country (to the point where this country is 
large enough to affect the world interest rate) and so that the growth in wages is less 
than the return on capital (so that the present value of future wages is finite), the 
authors make the following assumption about the world interest rate: 
(2.12) g,+n,<r<p,+d,g, 
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That is, the world interest rate is assumed to be higher than the rate of growth in 
aggregate output. It is also less than or equal to the rate of interest that would apply if 
the economy were closed. This gives the following function for consumption per 
effective worker in an open economy is: 
(2.13) c, = 
r-p-e.g,) 
The power to which c is raised is either negative by assumption (from equation (2.12)) 
— which means that consumption per effective worker falls over time, and approaches 
zero as t approaches infinity — or it is zero, in which case consumption per effective 
worker is constant over time. The same is true of wealth, since wealth per effective 
worker is given by the following expression: 
(2.14) a. -
K) 
a,(0) + -
r - g ^ - n , 
•e 
K) open 
r - g , - " , 
If r = pi + gidi, then wealth is constant over time. If r < pi + gidi, then wealth not only 
shrinks over time, but approaches the negative term on the far right of equation (2.14). 
Both pi and 0, are indicators of patience — the rate at which future utility is 
discounted, and rate of inter-temporal substitution respectively. The most patient 
country will have the highest values of p; and di. To solve for the world equilibrium, 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin assume that gi and m are the same across all countries. The 
exponent in equations (2.13) and (2.14) varies only according to countries' patience. 
The most patient country has r= pi + gd,, whereas for all of the other, less patient 
countries, r<p, + gOi. 
From this, wealth and levels of consumption will decline faster in countries that are 
relatively more impatient, which — from Lawrance's findings — are more likely to be 
poorer countries. Conversely, the most patient country will accumulate all of the 
world's assets over time. In order to forestall instantaneous speeds of convergence, the 
authors augment the model by allowing pi and di to vary by income, so that 
consumption does not go to zero, and wealth does not run to the negative. This 
requires counterintuitive assumptions about the way in which the preference 
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parameters will change with respect to income — households must be more patient 
when they are poorer, which is counter to both intuition and evidence (Barro and Sala-
i-Martin, 2004). Further, convergence to the steady-state is still instantaneous, even 
under these circumstances. 
The speed of convergence can be slowed by introducing credit constraints that retard 
the flow of capital, and effectively allowing r to vary across countries. This means that 
countries are limited with respect to how much they can borrow, and that the return on 
investment domestically can be considerably different to the return on investment 
internationally. Barro and Sala-i-Martin achieve this by distinguishing between human 
and physical capital — the former which can only be locally owned, and the latter 
which can be domestically or foreign owned. The rate of growth depends on the 
accumulation of both human and physical capital, which are complementary inputs 
into the production function. The speed at which the economy grows in transition is 
limited by the speed at which the stock of human capital grows. This allows for a finite 
speed of convergence, a non-zero level of consumption and a non-negative stock of 
wealth. The authors note, however, that the global equilibrium results in credit 
constraints binding all countries, except for the most patient country. And because the 
most patient country is not credit constrained, it can accumulate both physical and 
human capital at infinite speed from the rest of the world, and reach its steady-state 
instantaneously. 
2 . 3 T H E FELDSTEIN AND HORIOKA PUZZLE 
The neo-classical model can only meaningfully be applied to motivating the direction 
of capital movement intuitively, rather than formally. In doing so, the open economy 
versions of both the Solow-Swan and the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model predict that, 
all else being equal, capital should flow from capital rich countries to capital poor 
countries. As a result, the international flow of capital should ensure that the marginal 
product of capital is the same across all countries, and that all countries are converging 
toward the same level of GDP per capita, if not the same levels of wealth and/or 
consumption. Since this is clearly not the case, either everything else is not equal, or 
there is insufficient international capital movement. Thirty years ago, Feldstein and 
PAGE 38 
I N C O M E , I N V E S T M E N T A N D S A V I N G 
Horioka undertook an analysis of rates of investment and saving in O E C D countries 
and found tiiat rates of saving were perfectly correlated with rates of investment for 
the years 1960 to 1974 (1980). They concluded from this that there was little to no 
international capital mobility, since any change in a country's rate of saving was 
retained as investment. This finding ran counter not only to the predictions of 
neo-classical growth theory, but also to the prevailing belief at the time that capital 
markets were unrestricted and efficient. This section describes and explores the 
Feldstein and Horioka Puzzle (henceforward referred to as 'the Puzzle'). 
2 . 3 . 1 T H E O R I G I N A L S T U D Y 
Feldstein and Horioka used a simple model to conduct their analysis, and obtained a 
powerful result that held even as the model was augmented (1980). To begin with, they 
compared rates of gross saving and investment (as proportions of GDP) in individual 
O E C D countries, and found that these were very close to one another in magnitude, 
implying that the current accounts of these countries were in balance. Table 2.1 shows 
Feldstein and Horioka's regression results based on the following specification: 
(2.15) 
I J ' 
( S 
The authors found that for a sample of sixteen O E C D countries'^ between the years 
1960 and 1974: the variation in the rate of saving explained 83 to 94 % of the variation 
in the rate of investment; and the coefficient on the rate of saving was close to one. 
T A B L E 2.1 G R O S S DOMESTIC SAVING RATIOS ON GROSS INVESTMENT RATIOS 
Period Pi t-stat n 
1960-64 0 . 9 1 1 5 . 1 5 0 . 9 4 16 
1965-69 0 . 8 7 8 . 6 3 0 . 8 3 16 
1970-74 0 . 8 7 9 . 4 7 0 . 8 5 16 
1960-74 0 . 8 9 1 1 . 9 9 0 . 9 1 16 
Source: (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980, p. 321) 
The countries in the sample were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America. France, Luxembourg, Spain and Switzerland were excluded due to lack of 
consistent data at the time. 
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From this, the authors inferred that there was close to no international movement in 
capital between OECD countries — a finding that characterised an apparent paradox, 
given the relative ease with which capital could move from one country to another. 
Even twenty years later, the paradox was categorised as one of 'the six major puzzles 
in international macroeconomics' (Obstfeld and Rogoff, ZOOl)." While Feldstein and 
Horioka's 'headline results' were obtained using the simple model shown, they 
augmented the model by — variously — introducing a squared term for the rate of 
saving, controlling for the openness of each of the economies (using trade as a 
proportion of GDP), the size of the economies (using GDP itself), and controlling for 
possible endogeneity in the rate of saving in a two-stage least squares regression. In 
each case, the estimate for /SJ remained statistically significantly close to one, and they 
concluded that it was likely that 'portfolio preferences and institutional rigidities 
impede the flow of long-term capital among countries [and that] increases in domestic 
saving will be reflected primarily in additional domestic investment' (Feldstein and 
Horioka, 1980, p. 328). 
2 . 3 . 2 ANALYSIS BY OTHERS — PRIOR TO 1 9 9 0 
Since the initial study, many others have repeated the analysis, and while most of them 
agreed with Feldstein and Horioka's findings, they disputed the methodology and the 
conclusion that capital was not mobile. This was a criticism that Feldstein and Horioka 
acknowledged in their original study, particularly since the sample contained a group 
of relatively developed and financially sophisticated countries. They allowed that a 
high value for /Si could still 'reflect other common causes of the variation in both saving 
and investment' (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980, p. 328), but noted that the burden of 
identifying these common causes lay with those who argued in favour of perfect 
" The six major puzzles in international macroeconomics that the authors defined were: (i) why 
consumers seem to have a strong preference for domestically manufactured goods and services; (ii) 
why investors seem to have a strong preference for domestic equity assets; (iii) why current account 
imbalances in OECD countries are small relative to saving and investment (the Puzzle); (iv) why 
consumption is not more strongly correlated across OECD countries; (v) why exchange rates are so 
volatile and disconnected from economic fundamentals; and (vi) how it is possible that the half-life of 
real exchange rate innovations can be three to four years. 
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international capital mobility. Subsequent studies have attempted to do so, but in the 
main, the rate of saving has had strong explanatory power — at least up until 1990. 
One of the criticisms of the original study was that the sample was limited to OECD 
countries, many of which were large economies. Saving decisions in these large 
economies would affect global interest rates, and through them, rates of inveshnent in 
large and small economies. For example, an increased rate of saving in a large economy 
would lead to a fall in global interest rates as borrowing became cheaper. As the cost of 
borrowing fell, the rate of investment would rise, explaining why the close correlation 
was observed only in samples of rich countries (Apergis and Tsoumas, 2009). This 
criticism is supported somewhat by the fact that the rate of saving and investment in 
non-OECD countries was not as closely correlated as it was in OECD countries. Dooley 
et. al. (1986) used the same specification as Feldstein and Horioka, and undertook the 
analysis for groups of both developed and developing countries. They found a weaker 
relationship (as evidenced by a of less than one) for developing countries compared 
to the OECD countries, but noted that this difference was not statistically significant 
(see Table 2.2). In fact, they found that the only group of countries for which rates of 
investment and saving were not correlated was for countries 'that depend primarily on 
aid to finance current account imbalances' (Dooley et al., 1986, p. 37). 
T A B L E 2.2 T H E R E L A T I O N S H I P B E T W E E N G R O S S S A V I N G R A T I O S A N D G R O S S 
I N V E S T M E N T R A T I O S - D E V E L O P E D A N D D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S 
1960-73 
1 ^ 
t-stat n 
Developing 1 0 . 4 7 5 . 8 8 0 . 4 0 50 
Developed 1 0 . 7 5 7 . 1 7 0 . 7 9 14 
Difference* 1 0 . 2 8 1 . 2 6 64 
1974-84 P t-stat R' n 
Developing 0 . 6 0 8 . 4 8 0 . 5 9 50 
Developed 0 . 7 4 4 . 2 5 0 . 5 7 14 
Difference* 0 . 1 3 0 . 4 8 64 
Source: (Dooley et al., 1986) 
Notes: * The difference between the coefficient estimated for developing countries and the coefficient estimated for 
developed countries, calculated using a dummy variable (1 if the country is developed) and an interaction term. 
In seeking to refute Feldstein and Horioka's conclusions, several subsequent papers 
reference Sachs (1981) as having shown that investment is more closely linked with the 
current account balance in developing countries than it is with saving. Sachs compared 
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indicators across fifteen O E C D " and ten developing countries"^ between 1965 and 1979 
and looked at the relationships between investment, national saving and the current 
account balances as proportions of GNI in these countries. For developing countries, he 
observed that while 'economic and political thinking [was] still caught up in the 
mercantilist idea that deficits reflect overspending and require adjustment' (1981, p. 
263), for the most part, current account deficits in developing countries were driven by 
borrowing to finance investment, rather than borrowing to finance consumption. 
For the fifteen OECD countries, Sachs estimated the specification shown in equation 
(2.16), where the difference in the variables was taken as the average for 1974-79 less 
the average for 1968-73: 
(2 .16) 
CAB 
GNI 
\ 
' ' GNI GNI 
M"" in the specification is the value of imports of oil. In apparent contrast to Feldstein 
and Horioka's results, Sachs found a close correlation between the change in the rate of 
investment and the change in the current account ratio to GNI, with (pj = -0.59 (t-stat -
5.9) and (p2 = -0.30 (t-stat -1.2) (Sachs, 1981, p. 250). The current account balance tended 
to deficit as domestic investment and the import of oil increased. This suggests that 
domestic investment was linked to borrowings from the rest of the world rather than to 
savings generated at home. When the variable for imports of oil (M"'') was omitted 
from the regression, the coefficient on the rate of investment was still high, (pi = - 0.61 
(t-stat - 6.2). When the rate of saving was used instead of the rate of investment, the 
regression produced a much weaker coefficient estimate of -0 .34 (t-stat -1.0) . This 
gives the peculiar implication that an increase in the rate of saving will also lead to a 
reduction in the current account, driving it towards a deficit. 
The countries included were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
of America. The difference between this sample and Feldstein and Horioka's OECD sample of 
countries is that Sachs omits Greece, Ireland and New Zealand, but includes France and Norway. 
" The developing countries analysed were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico Peru, the 
Phillipines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
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In fact, Sach's study supports Feldstein and Horiaka's findings, because a negative 
coefficient on botii the ciiange in the rate of investment and the change in the rate of 
saving implies that investment and saving are positively correlated. As equation (2.17) 
shows, the current account balance is the difference between saving and investment. 
All other things being equal, an increase in the rate of saving should lead to an increase 
in the current account balance. The fact that Sachs found a negative correlation 
between the two suggests that an increase in investment was being funded by 
increased saving, as well as a current account deficit. In addition, (2.17) shows that the 
coefficient on the rate of saving — when the C A B to GDP ratio is the dependent 
variable — is equal to one minus /3i, which is the coefficient on the rate of saving when 
the rate of investment is the dependent variable. Based on equation (2.17), an estimated 
yi of - 0 . 3 4 implies a J8j of 1.34, which means that there is a multiplier effect on 
increases in the rate of saving — something that can only occur if the country is 
importing capital from the rest of the world, and reducing its current account balance. 
fCAB^ fs^ 
f O 
[ Y J . y j 
(2.17) 
r Ao + A 
= ro + r, 
r j 
It should be noted that Sachs' sample includes Norway, a resource-rich, oil-exporting 
country that was not in Feldstein and Horioka's sample. Sachs shows that when 
Norway is omitted from the sample, rises from -0.59 to -0.33 (t-stat -2.6), making it 
similar in magnitude to the estimated coefficient on the change in the rate of saving, 
and supporting a very close positive correlation between investment and saving 
(Sachs, 1981, p. 250). ' ' 
" Without Norway in the sample of countries, <p2 remains largely unchanged (<^2= -0.32, t-stat -1.5) . 
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2 . 3 . 3 ANALYSIS BY OTHERS — P O S T - 1 9 9 0 
Restricting the sample to developed countries, others have been able to replicate 
Feldstein and Horioka's findings, even after including and controlling for variables 
that were omitted in the original study, such as differences in population, production 
technology, and government expenditure (AmirKhalkhali et al., 2003; Tesar, 1991). 
Kraay and Ventura analysed the relationship between the current account balance and 
gross national saving as proportions of GNI for a group of thirteen OECD countries, 
generating estimates for yi of 0.24 {t-statistic 8.14) for data averaged across the period 
1973 to 1995 — an indirect confirmation of the Feldstein and Horioka result (2000). 
After 1990, however, the correlation is no longer as strong, even for OECD countries. 
Up until 1995, the data for OECD countries generated estimates for /3i of around 0.6 — 
statistically significant and strongly positive, but not as compelling as the Feldstein and 
Horioka estimate of 0.89 (s.e.0.07) for 1960-74. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff estimated a /3i of 0.6 for gross national saving as a proportion of 
GDP, measured as individual country averages between 1990 and 1997 for twenty-four 
OECD countries (2001). AmirKhalkhali et. al. separated gross national saving into 
private and public saving for nineteen OECD countries, in order to test for whether or 
not crowding out occurred. The authors found that the rate of private saving was 
closely correlated with the rate of investment, although the estimated coefficient 
weakened from 1.02 (s.e. 0.11) for country averages in 1970-79 down to 0.62 (s.e. 0.09) 
for the same countries, averaged across 1990-99 (2003, p. 1144). Coakley et. al. 
estimated fii at 0.68 (s.e. 0.11) for twelve OECD countries using quarterly rates of 
national saving and investment averaged between 1980 and 2000 (2004, p. 584). They 
also found, however, that if country specific effects were controlled for in the 
regression, the average coefficient estimate on the rate of saving for the total sample of 
countries was nearly halved in comparison to the OLS estimator (/Si = 0.33), and was no 
longer statistically significant (s. e. 0.18) (Coakley et al., 2004). 
More recently, Helliwell replicated Feldstein and Horioka's methodology, extending 
both the sample of countries and the time period (2004). The countries in the sample 
were designated as either being one of the twenty-four OECD countries, or being a 
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n o n - O E C D country, and he calculated five year average rates of gross national saving 
and investment as proportions of G D P for these countries from 1976 to 2000. HelHwell 
wrote that fell over time for O E C D countries, and that the estimated coefficient for 
' the global sample is always weaker for the global samples than for the O E C D 
countries' (2004, p. 373). His results, however, actually show that the coefficients for 
the global sample in the 1981-1985 and 1991-1995 periods were higher than for the 
O E C D sample (see Table 2.3). While the coefficient on the OECD sample was higher 
than for the global for the 1996 to 2000 period, neither are statistically significant at the 
5 % level. 
TABLE 2.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GROSS NATIONAL SAVING RATIOS AND 
GROSS INVESTMENT RATIOS 
O E C D NON-- O E C D ALL C O U N T R I E S 
PERIOD n* Pi t-stat t-stat Pi t-stat 
1976-1980 95 0.80 6.65 0.70 12.15 0.68 13.65 
1981-1985 103 0.53 4.04 0.57 9.20 0.55 10.10 
1986-1990 110 0.60 6.94 0.51 9.58 0.52 11.27 
1991-1995 130 0.42 5.30 0.59 11.29 0.56 11.81 
1996-2000 136 0.17 1.63 -0.06 0.83 -0.06 0.94 
Source: (Helliwell, 2004, p. 376) 
Notes: The number of countries in the sample for each period (n) refers only to the non-OECD countries, and does not 
include the 24 OECD countries included in the global sample. 
Partially in response to the findings in these subsequent studies, Feldstein (2005) 
acknowledged that estimates for pi had fallen over time — both for the sixteen 
countries in the original study, as well as for all thirty (current) O E C D countries. He 
argued, however, that this result was driven by the equal weighting given to all of the 
countries in the sample, and that if the regression were weighted by GDP, /5i for the 
original sixteen countries for the period 1992 to 2002 would increase from 0.19 
(unweighted) to 0.57 (weighted) (2005, p. 4-5). Given that the criticisms of the 'large 
economy bias' that were discussed earlier were made with respect to the original, 
unweighted analysis, weighting the regression by countries' GDPs would be giving 
greater emphasis to the larger of the O E C D economies, which would exacerbate the 
bias further. 
In summary, the findings from the literature are mixed. When using the specification 
set out in equation (2.15), rates of investment and saving across countries are positively 
correlated. This result holds for more recent time periods up to 1995, and for 
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non-OECD countries. It also holds when national — rather than domestic — saving 
and investment are used. Some studies confirm the Puzzle as still being in effect over 
time and across different countries (AmirKhalkhali et al., 2003, Feldstein, 2005, Kraay 
and Ventura, 2000, Penati and Dooley, 1984, Tesar, 1991). Other studies show that: the 
correlation is weaker in developing countries (Helliwell, 2004, Sachs, 1981, Penati and 
Dooley, 1984) — although they argue that the difference is not statistically significant; 
that the coefficient estimated for OECD countries has weakened over time (Helliwell, 
2004, Feldstein, 2005); or that the close correlation between rates of investment and 
saving does not mean that capital is not mobile (Coakley et al., 2004, Tesar, 1991). In 
their review of the literature, Apergis and Tsoumas concluded that: the majority of the 
studies that they referred to supported a strong correlation between countries' rates of 
saving and investment, albeit lower than that displayed in the earlier attempts; and 
that the majority of the results did not clearly validate the capital mobility hypothesis 
(Apergis and Tsoumas, 2009). On the face of it, the fact that developing countries' rates 
of investment are linked to their rates of saving would imply that the saving trap is a 
barrier to growth in these countries, even if it is not the only or most affecting one. 
While the majority of the studies referenced may indeed have failed to validate capital 
mobility, the more recent studies have shown that the Puzzle has weakened over time 
in developed countries, and declined to near non-existence in the latter half of the 
1990s. With respect to developing countries, the studies referenced show that the 
Puzzle has applied to developing countries to a lesser degree, albeit not always a 
statistically significantly lesser degree than richer countries. The weakening in the 
estimated coefficient on the rate of saving may demonstrate that capital is becoming 
more mobile, but it does not by itself rule out the existence of the saving trap. This is 
because it is still possible for omitted variables to bias the estimated coefficient on the 
rate of saving toward zero - something that is tested and discussed in Chapter 5. In 
the absence of additional variables, a reduced coefficient on the rate of saving implies 
either that rates of investment and saving are relatively independent of one another, or 
that the relationship between the two has grown more complicated, and additional 
control variables are necessary. 
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2 . 4 EXPLAINING THE PUZZLE 
A coefficient on the rate of saving that is close to one does not by itself mean that there 
is little or no international capital mobility. It is also important to consider the intercept 
term — which is often not reported in the studies referenced — and whether or not it is 
significantly different than zero. If it is, then this implies that on average, the current 
accounts of the countries in the sample are not balanced. As equation (2.5) shows, the 
current account can be derived as saving less investment. If is equal to one, then /So is 
the reverse of the current account balance (being investment less saving). It is not 
necessary, however , for ) 5 O = 0 in order for )5T=2 as shown in Figure 2.1. 
FIGURE 2.1 NON-ZERO ESTIMATES FOR THE CONSTANT 
Rate o f saving 
Rate of investment (CAB) 
Rate of investment (CAS) 
Rate of investment (CAD) 
N o t e : C A B i n d i c a t e s a b a l a n c e d current account , w h e r e i n v e s t m e n t is equa l to sav ing . C A D indicates a c u r r e n t a c c o u n t 
def ic i t , a n d if the c o u n t r i e s in the s a m p l e on a v e r a g e h a v e the s a m e C A D w h e r e i n v e s t m e n t is h i g h e r than sav ing , then 
the e s t i m a t e o f j3o wil l b e pos i t ive . T h e o p p o s i t e is t rue for C A S , w h i c h indica tes a current a c c o u n t surplus , w h e r e 
i n v e s t m e n t is l o w e r t h a n s a v i n g , a n d w h e r e the e s t i m a t e o f fc wil l be n e g a t i v e . 
If countries ' current account balances are also similar with respect to GDP, then it is 
possible to have a non-zero intercept term together with a co-efficient of close to one. It 
is unlikely that all of the countries in a sample will have the same current account to 
G D P ratio, and the larger the sample becomes, the less likely this will be - countries 
PAGE 47 
INCOME, INVESTMENT AND SAVING 
cannot all be importing (exporting) capital, since at least one country has to export 
capital to (import capital from) the others. At the same time, it is possible for there to 
be a current account balance in every country simultaneously, while still allowing and 
observing international capital movement: countries can export and import capital in 
identical amounts to ensure the net change in their financial position is zero.'" 
Equation (2.5) shows that the difference between investment and saving in the national 
accounts reflects the balance on trade (net exports) as well as the change in the 
country's financial position (net overseas lending). In order to reconcile the Puzzle with 
the economic theory, authors have advanced theories on how these flows — the 
current and capital accounts — can net to zero, implying a one-to-one correlation 
between countries' rates of investment and saving even when economies are open and 
trade is unrestricted. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) and Sachs (1981) do this by analysing 
what drives consumption and importing decisions. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), 
Kraay and Ventura (2000), and Caselli and Feyrer (2007) evaluate the current account 
by analysing the drivers of domestic and foreign investment — usually by comparing 
countries' marginal products of capital. 
2 . 4 . 1 INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN GOODS 
In the same study reference earlier, Sachs (1981) developed a theory of the current 
account, and how it adjusted to macroeconomic shocks, in order to analyse the 
relationship between countries' current account balances and the movements in their 
exchange rates. He defined the current account for any given period as: 
CAB = {GDP-C-G-I)+PJN" ~N) 
(2.18) ^ ' 
= {EX-IM)+P^[N"-N) 
The current account balance is given as GDP less consumption (C + G), less investment 
(/) which leaves net exports {EX - IM). This is similar to equation (2.5), except Sachs 
This does not align with neo-classical growth model's predictions of capital movement in an open 
economy 
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assumed that there are no international transfers or factor payments, and the 
consumption and import of one particular good — N — is identified separately. The 
expression PN(N^^-N) represents expenditure on an intermediate input that is critical to 
production (for example, oil). NH is the volume that is domestically produced, and PN is 
the world price at which the good is traded. Households, firms and the government 
operate in a two period model where whatever is borrowed from the rest of the world 
in the first period must be repaid in the second period, and vice versa. 
Sachs argued that countries' rates of investment were the primary driver of changes in 
their current account balances due to 'world investment shifts', and attributed the 
sharp rise in investments in less developed countries as being financed by borrowing 
from the rest of the world — particularly in Mexico and Brazil. From this perspective, a 
current account deficit was not necessarily a matter of policy concern since the inflow 
of investment was due to an increase in the 'receptiveness to foreign investment, 
political stability, and domestic economic reform in many of these economies, with a 
resulting rise in the profitability of physical investment' (1981, p. 238). Sachs published 
these findings shortly before the Latin American Debt Crisis of the early 1980s. It is 
noted, however, that the crisis in the Latin American countries could be attributed in 
part to an inability of countries to service debt that was becoming increasingly more 
expensive as global interest rates rose, rather than investments not being as profitable 
as initially believed. Perhaps as a result of this, policy makers have remained cautious 
about managing the current account, and governments still intervene to minimise 
adverse impacts on exchange rates. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff used this rationale to explain the Puzzle, and linked these 
decisions not just to the balance on the current account, but also to the terms of trade 
(2001). Like Sachs, the authors set up a two period model in which whatever is 
borrowed (lent) in the first period must be repaid (recovered) in the second period at 
the world interest rate, r*. Households maximise utility by consuming the goods (C) 
that are available either locally (C//) or imported (Cr) according to a constant elasticity 
of substitution preference function. 
There is no production function. Instead, each country is endowed with one good and 
must trade with other countries to consume other goods. PI and P2 represent the 
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average price that prevails in the home country in time periods 1 and 2, based on the 
willingness of consumers to substitute imported and locally available goods at prices 
PF and PH respectively. PI is defined in each period t as: 
( 2 . 1 9 ) + 
This means that the domestic real interest rate is a function of the world interest rate, as 
well as the expected change in the prevailing price between period one and two, which 
in turn is driven by how much of the domestic good (CH) or foreign good (CF) 
households consume (even though the prices of the individual goods do not change). 
This means that the domestic interest rate is: 
(2.20) + = + 
Obstfeld and Rogoff introduced 'iceberg costs' (T) into the model, where T % of 
whatever is traded is lost or expires in transit. If households wish to consume more of 
the locally available good than their endowment, they will need to import it from the 
rest of the world. This means that the domestic price of the local good (PH) varies 
according to how much of it is consumed in relation to how much of it is locally 
available. If more of the good must be imported, then the local price will be higher than 
the world price (P H) due to the iceberg costs associated with import. If households 
consume less than what is available, the rest is exported and the domestic price is 
lower than in the rest of the world. And if households consume what is locally 
available and 
no more, then the domestic price falls somewhere between the export 
and import prices: 
(2-21) 
If the locally available good is exported in the first period, then it must be imported in 
the second and vice versa. This is what affects the domestic interest rate. As shown in 
equation (2.20), the real domestic interest rate is the world interest rate, after it is scaled 
by expected changes in domestic prices. Substituting equation (2.19) for the home 
P A G E 50 
INCOME, INVESTMENT AND SAVING 
country's prices in periods 1 and 2 in equation (2.20) gives the following expression for 
the real domestic interest rate: 
(2.22) 
I 
The price level varies according to whether the local good is imported or exported, 
which means that the real domestic interest rate also varies according to consumption 
and import decisions. If there is a current account surplus in the first period, there 
must be a current account deficit in the second period, which means that the domestic 
price level will be lower in the first period than in the second one, and so the real 
domestic interest rate will be lower than the world interest rate. The opposite is true if 
the country runs a deficit in the first period and a surplus in the second, as shown: 
(2.23) ( l + / ) 
. / \ n i - f I 
\-0 
< ( l + / ) < ( l + r ' ) 
nl-e 
1 - 0 
Depending on the values of the various parameters, the difference between the real 
domestic and the world interest rate could be trivial, or substantial. Since the current 
account imbalance applies equally in both periods — albeit in opposite directions — a 
larger gross imbalance will lead to a more substantial difference between the world, 
and the real domestic interest rates. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff used this rationale to explain why rates of saving and investment 
are so similar, since running either a large current account surplus or deficit would 
move the real domestic interest rate further away from the world interest rate. The 
authors used the following values - r* = 0.05, T = 0.1, 0 = 6, and PH*=PF*=^ - to show 
that the real domestic interest rate could be anything from +0.20 to -0.08. This means 
that a current account that is significantly unbalanced results either in borrowing being 
prohibitively expensive, or in lending being ruinously unprofitable. The authors noted 
that observed real domestic interest rates in O E C D countries stay well within these 
bounds and that this, combined with the observed close correlation between rates of 
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investment and saving, explained why observed current account balances in OECD 
countries are small, with respect to GDP and GNI (2001, p. 20). Further, the authors 
regressed the inflation adjusted three-month interest rates of OECD countries against 
their current account balance to GDP ratios, and found that there is a negative 
relationship — as predicted by the model. 
An important caveat is that their analysis was limited to OECD countries, which are 
large economies. Movements in the current account balances of some of these countries 
would affect global interest rates as well as individual domestic interest rates. Were 
this to happen, the impact would be similar to that predicted in the 'large country bias' 
criticism of Feldstein and Horioka's results. This does not invalidate Obstfeld and 
Rogoff's model, however, since a lower current account balance would lead to higher 
interest rates for both large and small economies. For large economies, this increase 
would apply to both the world and the domestic interest rate, while for small 
economies, it would be a purely domestic effect. 
More problematic, however, is the fact that Obstfeld and Rogoff's model only 
addresses saving, and not investment. There is no role for investment in the model, 
since the local good is endowed in each period rather than produced. Since there is no 
capital in the model, interest rates cannot in any way be affected by considerations of 
the return on capital — the model does not allow for the net import or export of capital 
in response to different rates of return across countries. For example, running a current 
account deficit may increase the cost of borrowing as evidenced by the real domestic 
interest rate, however, if the return on the investment is sufficiently high, then it makes 
sense for countries to borrow from the rest of the world. Nevertheless, even with this 
shortcoming, the model provides a rationale for the observed lack of net capital flows, 
and in addition, can explain three of the other macroeconomic puzzles identified by the 
authors to some extent — the home bias in trade, the home bias in equity portfolios, 
and the low international consumption correlations. Added to which, the authors 
noted that the observed weakening in the correlation between rates of investment and 
saving over time could be linked to improvements in transportation technology, and 
reductions in tariffs and other barriers to trade, which would reduce the iceberg costs 
that drive the outcome in the model. 
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2 . 4 . 2 INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENT 
Lucas (1990) used the properties of the Solow-Swan model to motivate international 
capital flows by defining the marginal product of capital in terms of output: 
(2.24) r = 
Using a=0.4 for both the USA and for India, Lucas argued that the marginal product of 
capital in India was roughly 58 times the marginal product of capital in the USA (1990, 
p. 92), and that if there truly were cross-country differentials in the marginal product of 
capital of this magnitude, then almost no investment should take place in rich 
countries at all. After allowing for differences in human capital accumulation and 
defining the marginal product in terms of output per effective worker, Lucas found 
that the marginal product of capital in India was still three times higher than that in the 
USA. The difference in marginal products of capital between the two countries was 
further reduced to 1.04 when the spill-over effects associated with human capital 
accumulation were controlled for, altering the specification of the marginal product of 
capital to: 
(2.25) r = 
Lucas used a smaller a'=0.25 together with y=0.36 in order to obtain a marginal product 
of capital for India that was only 1.04 times greater than that of the USA — a 
considerable reduction from 58. Lucas also discussed the difference in risk, and the 
way in which contracts are enforced, between different countries. He explored a 
scenario in which capital flows only occurred between rich and poor countries where 
the former was the colonial power that administrated the latter. Further, he suggested 
that restricting capital flows to colonies would keep wages low, and that this was profit 
maximising behaviour for rich countries, since they had monopoly power over the 
goods produced by their colonies. This is not explored further here, since colonial 
arrangements and the 'monopoly power' condition are not as prevalent as in the 
scenario Lucas was exploring. Nevertheless, the colonial arrangement to some extent 
offset concerns about institutional quality and contract enforcement in poor 
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countries— in the absence of the former, the latter (increased political risk in poor 
countries) could explain the lack of capital flow. 
Recent work by Caselli and Feyrer (2007) built on the idea that the marginal product of 
capital may not necessarily be higher in poor countries than in rich, and that a large 
part of the difference between marginal products of capital across countries could be 
attributed to incorrect measurement. Rather than specify a production function, the 
authors calculated the marginal product of capital using national accounts aggregates, 
in the following specification: 
(2.26) MPK = 
K 
Y is GDP, taken from the Penn World Tables (2002). K is the stock of reproducible 
capital and UK is the capital share of income, which is effectively measured as one less 
the labour share of GDP, or one less the proportion of GDP made up by wages or the 
compensation of employees. When calculated in this way, and plotted against income 
per capita, there is a negative correlation between income and the marginal product of 
capital. The authors then constructed a corrected estimate of the marginal product of 
capital, denoted here as MPKCF: 
(2.27) 
KP, 
The major changes are the inclusion of a price correction (PY and PK), and an 
adjustment to the capital share of income. In this specification, PY and PK are the prices 
of consumption and capital goods, since the relativities of these vary considerably 
between rich and poor countries. The authors do this to estimate the marginal product 
of a given value of capital, rather than the marginal product of a given number of 
capital items, which is done by scaling the unadjusted marginal product of capital by 
the ratio of consumption to capital good prices. This gives a result that more closely 
approximates a monetary return on a given value of investment — two countries may 
produce the same volume of output using the same volume of capital, but if the capital 
costs more relative to the value of the output in one country, the monetary return on 
capital in this country is lower than in the other. 
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The larger correction to the estimate was to the way in which the capital share of 
income was estimated and used. Instead of the capital share of income (O K^), the 
corrected estimate used the reproducible capital share of income (CVRK) SO that the 
return on or depletion of non-reproducible assets such as land, minerals, forests, and 
other forms of natural wealth would not overstate the true return on reproducible 
capital. The authors assumed that the ratio of the share of income attributable to 
reproducible capital to the share of income attributable to non-reproducible capital was 
the same as the ratio of the total stock of reproducible capital to the total stock of non-
reproducible capital. Here, N is the country's stock of non-reproducible, natural 
capital, estimated by the World Bank (2006): 
(2.28) 
K 
{K + N) 
In recognition of the fact that the capital share of income (ax) is often overstated in 
poorer countries, Caselli and Feyrer use a corrected capital share of income (aKi) which 
is derived using an alternative estimate of the labour share of income. 
From an income perspective, GDP has three components — compensation of 
employees (COE), gross operating surplus (GOS) and gross mixed income (GMI — 
returns to labour and capital used in unincorporated enterprises). Poorer countries 
generally have a higher share of GMI than richer countries, because a larger share of 
people in poorer countries are self-employed (Gollin, 2002). Using just the share of 
COE of GDP would underestimate the labour share of income in countries that have a 
large share of self-employed workers, which would in turn overstate the capital share 
of income and through it, the marginal product of capital. Bernanke and Giirkaynak 
advanced two methods of correction, depending on the availability of data (2001). The 
first was to subtract GMI and indirect taxes from GDP, and to calculate COE as a share 
of what was left: 
COE 
(2.29) a , 
^ ' GDP-Indirect Taxes-GMI 
An alternative correction was to scale the labour share of income by the proportion of 
employees to total workers: 
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(2.30) a , = COE 
^ GDP - Indirect Taxes ^  
Workers 
Employees 
Caselli and Feyrer argued that once these adjustments were made, differences in the 
marginal product of capital across countries were largely eliminated. As Figure 2.2 
shows, the difference between MPK and MPKCF is much greater in poorer countries 
than in rich, although MPKCF is smaller than MPK for almost all countries. The authors 
concluded that the reason that capital does not flow from rich to poor countries was 
satisfactorily explained. Further, they argued that since MPKCF was similar in 
magnitude across rich and poor countries, capital was efficiently allocated across 
countries, and '[djeveloping countries are not starved of capital because of credit-
market frictions. Rather, the proximate causes of low capital-labor ratios in developing 
countries are that these countries have low levels of complementary factors, they are 
inefficient users of such factors (as Lucas [1990] suspected), their share of reproducible 
capital is low, and they have high prices of capital goods relative to consumption 
goods. As a result, increased aid flows to developing countries are unlikely to have 
much impact on capital stocks and output, unless they are accompanied by a return to 
financial repression, and in particular to an effective ban on capital outflows in these 
countries' (Caselli and Feyrer, 2007, p. 565). 
While this conclusion may be the correct one, it is not supported by the data. The 
dispersion of estimates of MPKCF across countries may appear smaller than that for the 
estimated MPKs when plotted on the same axes, however. Table 2.4 shows that for 
both sets of estimates, the mean is roughly double the magnitude of the standard 
deviation. This implies that the dispersion of MPKCF relative to the mean is roughly the 
same as for MPK. Further, if MPKCF is taken to represent the true rental rate of physical 
capital, then the difference between countries with the most and the least productive 
capital is even greater than when comparing MPKs. For example, the country with the 
highest MPK in 1996 was El Salvador (0.491), which was roughly seven times higher 
than the lowest MPK — Switzerland (0.067). Using the revised estimate of MPKCF, El 
Salvador still had the most productive capital (0.165), however, an investment in El 
Salvador was implied to pay a return more than sixteen times the return that could be 
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earned in Burundi (0.010), which was the country with the second lowest MPKCF (Hong 
Kong had the lowest MPKCF, estimated to be zero). 
FIGURE 2.2 M A R G I N A L P R O D U C T S OF CAPITAL, 1996 
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Source: (Caselli and Feyrer, 2007) 
T A B L E 2.4 M A R G I N A L PRODUCT OF CAPITAL, 1996 
MPK MPKCR 
Mean 0, . 201 0 . ,074 
Standard Deviation 0 .105 0. ,033 
Min. Switzerland : : 0 .067 Hong Kong 0. ,000 
Burundi 0. ,010 
Max. El Salvador : : 0 . 491 El Salvador 0. ,165 
Source: (Caselli and Feyrer, 2007) 
Caselli and Feyrer's own estimates do not prove the case for marginal products of 
capital being identical across countries, and subsequently, their findings cannot be 
used to resolve the Puzzle. Even if marginal products of capital estimated according to 
Caselli and Feyrer's method were truly identical, it would only neutralise one of the 
many factors that investors take into consideration when deciding whether to invest 
domestically or overseas. Caselli and Feyrer's model does not control for differences in 
political risk, definition and/or protection of property rights, infrastructure for contract 
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enforcement, and so on across countries. Further, the direction of imphed capital flows 
for countries does not align with Caselli and Feyrer's estimates of these countries' 
marginal products of capital. All else being equal, a country with a relatively high 
marginal product of capital should be running a current account deficit. El Salvador, 
which had both the highest unadjusted and revised marginal products of capital, has 
run a current account deficit in recent years, but one that is usually less than 5 % of its 
GDP (The World Bank, 2008). Botswana and Singapore, which had the second highest 
revised marginal products of capital (0.144) have both run current account surpluses in 
recent years — usually greater than 5 %, in the case of Botswana, and usually greater 
than 10 % in the case of Singapore (The World Bank, 2008). Hong Kong, with a 'true' 
marginal product of capital of zero has run a current account surplus in recent years, 
however, Burundi (next lowest at 0.010) has run a current account deficit in recent 
years, as has the Republic of Congo (0.024) (The World Bank, 2008). 
Part of this apparent inconsistency between the marginal product of capital and the 
direction of net capital flows can be attributed to the estimates of MPK and MPKCF 
being representative of a snapshot in time. A country's marginal product of capital 
may be relatively higher compared to other countries because that country exports 
capital to the rest of the world for other reasons. There are a number of conditions that 
can cause this sort of capital flight, such as the lack of coordination across investment 
projects, poor health in the labour force, insufficient domestic demand for the goods or 
services being produced, and so on. It is also necessary to consider which sector is 
actually exporting capital. Economic models are based on a characterisation of the 
behaviour of a 'representative household', but when there is considerable inequality 
across households in incomes or wealth, then the behaviour of a country — which 
reflects the actions of a small percentage of elite households that control a significant 
share of that country's income and/or wealth — is not representative of the actions of 
the average household. Even worse is when the observed behaviour of a country is 
entirely driven by the actions of the executive or the ruling elite, and where money is 
misappropriated out of a country. Collier (2007) provides examples of this, with banks 
in the USA having been found 'holding huge deposits from the president of Equatorial 
Guinea' and banks in London receiving 'massive cash deposits' from the family of a 
former Nigerian, military dictator. Given the complexities involved, it is no surprise 
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that the question of why capital does not flow from rich to poor countries, and whether 
or not international capital markets allocate capital efficiently, is still under debate. 
Kraay and Ventura (2000) addressed the Puzzle directly, and analysed differences in 
the current account balance to GNI ratio across countries, compared to differences in 
their rates of saving. Regressing the current account to GNI ratio against the rate of 
saving using the specification in equation (2.17), averaged from 1973-95 for 13 OECD 
countries," they estimated a coefficient on the rate of saving of yi = 0.23 (s.e. 0.029) 
(2000, p. 1140). This gives an indirect confirmation of Feldstein and Horioka's results, 
since a current account that does not respond to saving implies that most of the 
variation in saving is captured by the variation in investment. In Kraay and Ventura's 
model, households were assumed to allocate the marginal unit in the same way as the 
average unit of saving. Based on this model, they tested the following specification: 
(2.31) 
f CAB^ 
i 
f ^ ( F A ^ 
[ G N P J YGNPJ / [TAJ i __ 
The rate of saving was interacted with the proportion that domestically owned foreign 
assets (FA) made of total domestically owned assets (TA). Estimating this specification 
gives y i = 0.95 (s.e. 0.078). This is interpreted to mean that following an income shock, 
the marginal unit of saving is allocated between foreign and domestic investment in 
the same way as the average unit of saving. Since Kraay and Ventura use flows of 
saving and the current account balance that are averaged over a twenty-two year 
period, the long-term behaviour captured in these averages will be similar to the 
information contained in the stock of domestically owned foreign assets as a 
proportion of total domestically owned assets. In addition, Kraay and Ventura use a 
data set that is once again restricted to the OECD countries — due to data availability 
— to test a theoretical model of small, open economies. It therefore has limited 
applicability to the behaviour of developing countries. 
" The countries included in this study were Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Finland, Franco, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 
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2 . 5 CONCLUSION 
The theoretical literature shows that when economies are open and capital movement 
is unrestricted, investment should flow to wherever it is most profitable, which means 
that countries' rates of investment need not necessarily be linked to their rates of 
saving. The theory also implies that capital should flow from capital rich to capital 
poor countries. Both of these predictions are broadly unsupported by the available data 
— countries do not leave their current accounts unbalanced unchecked, and capital 
appears to be flowing from poor countries to rich countries. Outside of the economic 
growth theory, models of saving allocation and the current account have been 
developed to rationalise the Puzzle. Two of these models — Sachs', and Obstfeld and 
Rogoff's — rely on the terms of trade, and the price of imports to motivate a 
household's desire to keep international financial transactions to a minimum. Caselli 
and Feyrer's and Lucas' work is based on seeking to demonstrate that countries' 
marginal products of capital are not so different to one another, when the marginal 
product of capital is correctly measured. Kraay and Ventura's model assumes that 
households have allocated their saving between domestic and foreign investment, and 
that they maintain these proportions as their savings vary. Nevertheless, the summary 
of the literature on the Puzzle shows that it has weakened over time, which means that 
in order to test whether the simple saving trap is the primary barrier to growth to 
today's poor countries, it is necessary to analyse the relationship between these 
countries' rates of investment and saving. 
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3 AN EXTENSION OF FELDSTEIN AND HORIOKA 
3 . 1 INTRODUCTION 
The earlier chapters set out the apparent contradiction between the theory and the 
evidence. In a different way of examining the date. Figure 3.1 shows that not only is 
capital mobile, but that high income O E C D countries are borrowing from the rest of 
the world — particularly the lower middle income countries.^" It is not clear from the 
snapshot presented whether the borrowing is used to finance investment or 
consumption. This flow of funds from poor countries to rich is consistent with the 
observations from Lucas' and Caselli and Feyrer's work, however, it is at odds with the 
Puzzle, as well as much of the subsequent work that built on the original study. More 
than that, it suggests that the saving trap is not by itself a barrier to growth. If 
developing countries are lending to developed countries, then the low rate of 
investment in these countries is due more to an inability to attract and retain 
investment, rather than an inability to forgo consumption by saving. 
This chapter examines the relationships between income, investment and saving in 
developing countries, and presents new evidence on the Puzzle. The first section 
analyses the relationship between saving, investment and income across countries. The 
second section extends Feldstein and Horioka's study to analyse the relationship 
between rates of investment and saving in as many countries as there are data for, and 
from 1970 to 2005. Finally, the third section summarises and concludes. 
Classifications of countrie.s by income is based on the World Bank's 2006 classifications, which define 
low income countries as those Gross National Income per capita (GNIPC) of $905 or less, lower-middle 
income countries as those with GNIPC of $906 - $3,595, upper-middle income countries as those with 
GNIPC of $3,596 - $11,115, and high income countries as those with GNIPC of $11,116 or more. 
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FIGURE 3.1 CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES - SELECTED COUNTRIES 
2010 
OECD 
Upper middle income 
Low income 
High income (non-OECD) 
Lower middle income 
(The World Bank, 2009) 
3 . 2 INCOME AND PRODUCTION EFFECTS 
Table 3.1 through to Table 3.4 show the relationships between saving and investment, 
and income and production, for a cross-section of countries in 1971 and 2000.^' While 
the rates of investment and saving are calculated using WDI data,^ the estimates of 
GDP and GNI per capita that are shown in Table 3.1 through to Table 3.4 are taken 
from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2006), details of which are also contained in 
the appendix to this chapter, so that cross-country comparisons can be made in PPP 
adjusted terms. Table 3.1 shows that the rate of domestic saving was positively 
1971 is the first year for which data are available for OECD countries in the WDI database. 2000 was 
the 'benchmark' year for the Penn World Tables version 6.2, and is the year in which data are available 
for all countries in the database. 
^ As a point of clarification, all 'rates' are implicitly referred to as percentages (i.e., a rate of domestic 
saving of 30 means that domestic saving accounts for 30 % of GDP) - further details are provided in 
the appendix to this chapter. The data used to calculate rates of investment and saving are taken from 
the World Development Indicators (WDI) online database. 
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correlated with G D P per capita in botii 1971 and 2000. Table 3.2 shows that the same is 
true of the rate of national saving as a proportion of GNI. In addition, the estimated 
coefficients when the rate of saving is regressed on GDP or GNI are similar to one 
another in magnitude. Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 show the same for the rate of investment 
as a proportion of, and plotted against, GDP and GNI per capita respectively. 
On average, poorer countries have lower rates of saving and investment than richer 
countries, validating the hypothesis that simple affordability (or the lack of it) may be 
part of the barrier to growth faced by poor countries. Table 3.5 shows that the average 
rate of saving across non-OECD countries (from around 15 to 19 %) has been 
consistently lower than the average rate of saving across the OECD countries (from 
around 23 to 28 %). Secondly, the table also shows that, while the average rate of 
investment was higher across O E C D countries than non-OECD countries in 1971, this 
gap had significantly reduced by 2000, as the average rate of investment across the 
O E C D countries fell from around 28 % to around 22 %. 
Rates of saving were strongly positively correlated with income and with production 
across countries, both in 1971 and in 2000 — although the coefficients on income and 
on production are much smaller in 2000. Rates of investment, on the other hand, were 
strongly positively correlated with income and production in 1971, which is consistent 
with the Puzzle, since the same is true of saving. By 2000, however, not only has the 
magnitude of the correlation between income/production and investment diminished, 
but the statistical significance of the coefficient has also fallen. This supports the fact 
that the Puzzle has weakened in recent years, and that affordability is not as important 
a driver of rates of investment across countries in 2000 as it was in 1971. It could be 
argued that investment in physical capital remains low due to scale effects, which in 
turn is due to limits on affordability, and the inability of poorer countries to make the 
'big push' into a modern economy. There is no reason, however, for scale effects to 
limit the physical capital accumulation of an open economy where capital is freely 
mobile. If scale effects were the primary barrier to growth, domestic saving should be 
retained as domestic investment in addition to capital inflows from the rest of the 
world to make up the difference — the rate of investment would not necessarily be the 
same as the rate of saving, proving that the saving trap is not the primary barrier to 
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growth. Low rates of investment in countries in 2000 must be due to something more 
than affordabihty or scale effects. 
Including a squared term in the regressions produces a result that implies that rates of 
saving and investment rise with income and production up to a point, and then 
decline, as the coefficient on the squared term is negative in every instance. This is 
consistent with the evidence from Figure 3.1 that both the poorest countries and the 
richest countries are borrowing from the rest of the world in order to finance 
consumption or investment. Nevertheless, it appears that only the very poorest 
countries have negative rates of saving, and — by implication — are forced to borrow 
from the rest of the world in order to pay for either consumption, investment or both. 
There are also far more countries in 2000 that have a negative rate of saving than there 
were in 1971, which could be attributed in part to the relative ease with which poor 
countries are now able to borrow from the rest of the world. 
Table 3.5 also shows that between 1971 and 2000, the variance of the rate of saving 
across all countries increased — both for rates of both domestic and national saving — 
while the variance of both of the rates of investment across the same countries fell over 
the same period. For the group of OECD countries, the change was even more 
dramatic. The variance for the rates of saving and investment across countries in 1971 
was around 5 for national measures, and 8 for domestic measures. In 2000, both 
national and domestic rates of saving have roughly the same variances that they did in 
1971, however, the variances of the rates of investment across OECD countries has 
fallen significantly — particularly in the case of the rate of investment as a proportion 
of GDP. For non-OECD countries, the pattern is the same as for the group of all 
countries — the variance of the rate of saving across countries increases between 1971 
and 2000, while the variance of the rate of investment falls, for the same group of 
countries and over the same interval of time. 
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T A B L E 3.1 T H E R A T E O F D O M E S T I C S A V I N G A N D G D P P E R C A P I T A 
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TABLE 3.2 THE RATE OF NATIONAL SAVING AND GNI PER CAPITA 
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T A B L E 3 .3 T H E R A T E O F I N V E S T M E N T A N D G D P P E R C A P I T A 
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TABLE 3.4 THE RATE OF INVESTMENT AND GNI PER CAPITA 
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TABLE 3.5 RATES OF INVESTMENT AND SAVING - SUMMARY STATISTICS 
NATIONAL DOMESTIC 
1971 2000 1971 2000 
V a a P a P a 
ALL COUNTRIES 
IRATE 
SRATE 
2 3 . 1 8 . 5 
1 8 . 7 9 . 4 
2 1 . 7 5 . 6 
2 0 . 0 1 0 . 7 
2 2 . 3 9 . 2 
1 9 . 2 1 2 . 8 
2 1 . 1 6 . 1 
1 9 . 5 1 4 . 2 
OECD 
IRATE 
SRATE 
2 7 . 5 5 . 1 
2 7 . 1 5 . 1 
2 2 . 5 3 . 1 
2 3 . 4 5 . 6 
2 8 . 7 7 . 9 
2 8 . 2 7 . 5 
2 2 . 4 2 . 6 
2 5 . 0 7 . 5 
NON-OECD 
IRATE 
SRATE 
2 1 . 2 8 . 8 
1 5 . 0 8 . 5 
2 1 . 4 6 . 4 
1 8 . 6 1 2 . 0 
2 0 . 4 8 . 8 
1 6 . 6 1 2 . 8 
2 0 . 8 6 . 7 
1 7 . 9 1 5 . 3 
Source: (The World Bank, 2009) 
This simple analysis has two major implications. The first is that in 1971, the rate of 
investment demonstrated the same correlation with income and production that the 
rate of saving did. This supports the saving trap argument — low investment caused 
by low saving caused by low incomes. The second major implication is that, while the 
relationship between rates of saving and income and production across countries has 
remained roughly similar between 1971 and 2000, they have weakened with respect to 
rates of investment. This means that while there may have been evidence for a saving 
trap as a barrier to growth in 1971, there is less evidence to make a case for it in 2000, 
since rates of investment are no longer statistically significantly correlated with income 
and production. Further, this suggests that the correlation between rates of saving and 
rates of investment may also not be as strong in recent years as it was in the 1970s and 
1980s, which is consistent with the more recent analysis of the Puzzle. There is further 
support for this when considering the fact that overall, the variance in rates of saving 
across countries has increased, while the variance in rates of investment across 
countries has fallen over the thirty year period. 
3 . 3 E S T I M A T I O N RESULTS 
Even if the correlation between countries' rates of saving and investment falls short of 
one-to-one, a strong, positive correlation indicates that countries on average retain a 
significant proportion of saving as domestic investment. This thesis analyses the 
relationship between rates of investment and saving using a model similar to the one 
specified in equation (2.15), in that only a coefficient on rates of saving and a constant 
are estimated to explain the variation in the rate of investment across countries. This is 
done over a thirty-five year period, from 1971 to 2005. Estimates have been obtained 
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for each year individually, rather than using averages over a period of years. This is 
because the primary purpose of this analysis is to examine saving retention year by 
year, rather than whether or not capital is internationally mobile in the long run. 
Depending on the measure of saving used, data are available for all of the years 
betv^een 1971 and 2005 for up to 99 countries. Rather than estimating equation (2.15) 
thirty-five times, the following model is used: 
f i\ 
(3.1) 
2005 2005 = X z A y 
, (=1971 
YEAR,-
Dummy variables (YEARi) were created for each year in the sample, and these 
dummies were interacted with the rate of saving. The coefficient estimates and 
standard errors for )5o,( and Pi t generated in this way are identical to the estimates that 
would be generated for the same parameters if thirty-five individual cross sections 
were regressed instead. 
Equation (3.1) was used to estimate seventy parameters — thirty-five year dummies, 
and thirty-five interacted terms — for all countries, all OECD countries, all of the 
countries in the original Feldstein and Horioka study, all non-OECD countries, and 
non-OECD, non-oil exporting countries.^ Further information on the countries in the 
analysis is provided in the appendix to this chapter, and the numbers of countries 
included in each group are shown in Table 3.6. 
TABLE 3.6 COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS 
DOMESTIC SAVING NATIONAL SAVING 
All Countries 99 68 
Feldstein and Horioka sample 16 15 
OECD countries 23 21 
Non-OECD, non-oil exporting countries 69 44 
Non-OECD, oil exporting countries 7 3 
Source: (The World Bank, 2008) 
Figure 3.2 summarises the regression output for the group of all countries, showing the 
change in the estimated constants (/3o,() and the estimated coefficients ()Si,t) from 1971 to 
2005. Results are summarised both for the correlation between the rates of gross 
The definition of 'oil exporting countries' for the purposes of this classification is given in the appendix 
to this chapter. 
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domestic saving and investment (as proportions of GDP) and rates of gross national 
saving and investment (as proportions of GNI). As well as the coefficient estimates, the 
figures in Figure 3.2 also show the maximum and minimum values for the 95 % 
confidence intervals around the parameter estimates for each year. From this, it is clear 
that on average, for all of the countries in the sample, rates of gross domestic saving 
and investment are not statistically significantly correlated with one another over 
nearly the entirety of the period studied. From 1979 onwards, P u is not statistically 
significantly non-zero with the exception of the years 2000 and 2001. The correlation 
between rates of gross national saving and investment is stronger than for domestic — 
coefficient estimates are statistically significantly non-zero in all but three years. The 
coefficients on the rates of saving, however, are never statistically significantly close to 
one for either national or domestic saving in the period analysed. 
F I G U R E 3.2 A L L C O U N T R I E S 
Gross Domestic Saving — 
-95% 
•95% 
Gross Domestic Saving — 
--v ^ 
\/ \ 
\ , 
A w V\ 
\/ 
9^0 
.95% — Estimate .»% 
Gross National Saving — j3o,t 
A 
/ r \ / * '' 
95% 
.95% 
Gross National Saving — Pi,t 
\J V A r^' \ 
\ Av — \ / . \ ' A 
-95% — Estifnate 
.95% 
Notes: Confidence intervals have been corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
Detai led regression output tables, containing the data for all of the charts in this chapter, are in the 
appendix to this chapter . 
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There is a decline in the correlation between rates of saving and investment for the 
group of all countries over time. The estimated coefficient on the rate of domestic 
saving in 1971 is 0.39 (t = 3.82) - by 2005, it has diminished to just 0.05 (t = 0.88). For 
the rate of national saving, the decline is from 0.65 (t = 7.67) in 1971 to 0.21 (t = 1.82) in 
2005. The movement in the estimated constants for each year are almost precisely the 
mirror image of the movement in the estimated coefficient on the rate of saving over 
time. As the variation in the rate of saving explains less and less of the variation in the 
rate of investment over time, the magnitude and the statistical significance of the 
constant grows over time. To allow comparison between the estimates for the group of 
all countries and Feldstein and Horioka's results, the relationship between rates of 
saving and investment is shown in Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 using five year averages of 
rates of investment and saving,^" and the regressions are estimated for every five years 
from 1971-75 to 2001-05 using the same specification used by Feldstein and Horioka 
shown in equation (2.15). The averaged estimates show the same increase in the 
magnitude and statistical significance of the constant, and the decline in the magnitude 
and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients on the averaged rates of saving. 
TABLE 3.7 ALL COUNTRIES - FIVE YEAR AVERAGE IMPACT, DOMESTIC 
Po.t t-stat -95% +95% Pl.t t-stat -95% +95% 
1 9 7 5 * 1 5 . 8 9 7 . 3 4 1 1 . 5 9 2 0 . 1 9 0 . 3 5 2 . 9 6 0 . 1 2 0 . 5 9 0 . 3 1 
1 9 8 0 * 1 9 . 7 9 7 . 6 4 1 4 . 6 5 2 4 . 9 4 0 . 2 3 1 . 8 9 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 4 7 0 . 2 0 
1 9 8 5 * 1 9 . 5 3 6 . 7 1 1 3 . 7 5 2 5 . 3 1 0 . 1 8 1 . 2 0 - 0 . 1 2 0 . 4 8 0, . 1 3 
1 9 9 0 * 1 8 . 8 2 5 . 1 8 1 1 . 6 1 2 6 . 0 4 0 . 1 4 0 . 7 5 - 0 . 2 3 0 . 5 1 0, . 0 8 
1 9 9 5 * 1 8 . 4 9 4 . 7 1 1 0 . 7 0 2 6 . 2 9 0 . 1 8 0 . 9 3 - 0 . 2 1 0 . 5 8 0, . 08 
2 0 0 0 * 1 8 . 0 6 6 . 3 3 1 2 . 4 0 2 3 . 7 2 0 . 1 9 1 . 4 8 - 0 . 0 6 0 . 4 4 0, . 14 
2 0 0 5 * 1 9 . 1 6 1 2 . 6 5 1 6 . 1 5 2 2 . 1 7 0 . 1 2 1 . 8 2 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 2 6 0, . 0 9 
TABLE 3.8 ALL COUNTRIES - FIVE YEAR AVERAGE IMPACT, NATIONAL 
1 9 7 5 * 
1 9 8 0 * 
1 9 8 5 * 
1 9 9 0 * 
1 9 9 5 * 
2 0 0 0 * 
2 0 0 5 * 
-55% +95% 
1 1 . 8 4 
1 4 . 0 2 
1 5 . 0 7 
1 3 . 9 1 
1 5 . 4 1 
1 3 . 8 1 
1 4 . 4 5 
6.08 
5 . 9 0 
6 . 8 7 
7 . 3 7 
4 . 9 0 
8 . 5 4 
8 . 4 9 
7 . 9 5 
9 . 2 8 
1 0 . 6 9 
1 0 . 1 4 
9 . 1 3 
1 0 . 5 8 
1 1 . 0 5 
1 5 . 7 2 
1 8 . 7 7 
1 9 . 4 5 
1 7 . 6 8 
2 1 . 6 8 
1 7 . 0 3 
1 7 . 8 5 
Pl.t -95% 
0 . 5 8 
0 . 5 2 
0 . 4 3 
0 . 4 2 
0 . 3 6 
0 . 4 2 
0 . 3 7 
6 . 4 1 
4 . 7 8 
4 . 0 7 
4 . 8 9 
2 . 3 2 
6 . 0 8 
4 . 5 8 
0 . 4 0 
0 . 3 0 
0.22 
0 . 2 5 
0 . 0 5 
0 . 2 8 
0 . 2 1 
+95% 
0 . 7 6 
0 . 7 4 
0 . 6 4 
0 . 5 9 
0 . 6 7 
0 . 5 5 
0 . 5 3 
Notes: * indicates correction for lieteroskedasticity. 
0.60 
0 . 4 9 
0 . 3 8 
0 . 4 6 
0 . 3 4 
0 . 4 1 
0 . 3 6 
Five year averaged impacts on sub-groups of countries are provided in the appendix to this chapter. 
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This decline in the magnitude and statistical significance of ( iu can be attributed to the 
weakening over time in the relationship between rates of investment and saving in the 
group of O E C D countries (see Figure 3.3). It is implied that in 1971, roughly 90 % 
(t = 4.92) of domestic saving was retained as investment in O E C D countries, falling to 
only 5 % in 2005 (t = 0.54). The coefficient on rates of domestic saving is statistically 
significantly close to one, from 1971 to 1986 — overlapping the period studied by 
Feldstein and Horioka — but by 1995, the coefficient on rates of domestic saving is no 
longer statistically significantly non-zero. The relationship between rates of gross 
national saving and investment shows a similar decline, but the estimated coefficients 
are larger, and statistically significantly non-zero for longer. The estimated constant for 
both the domestic and national version of the analysis rises over time, mirroring the 
decline in the coefficient on saving. This validates Feldstein and Horioka's result for 
the start of the series, but from the mid-1990s and onward it is clear that there is no 
longer a correlation between rates of investment and saving in O E C D countries. 
F I G U R E 3.3 O E C D C O U N T R I E S 
Gross Domestic Saving — Po,t Gross National Saving — fio.t 
95% — Estimate 
•95% 
Gross Domestic Saving — /3i,t Gross National Saving — Pi,t 
95% — Estimate 
495% 
95% — Estimate 
>95% 
Notes: Confidence intervals have been corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
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The sample analysed contains twenty-three of the twenty-four OECD countries when 
analysing domestic saving and investment, and twenty-one of the twenty-four when 
analysing national saving and investment^^ Figure 3.4 summarises the estimated 
constants and coefficients for just the sixteen OECD countries included in the original 
Feldstein and Horioka study. The coefficient on both the rates of domestic and national 
saving start out as being statistically significantly close to one in 1971 and this is 
maintained until around 1990, after which the correlation between rates of investment 
and saving declines, falling to zero from the mid-1990s onwards. These results are 
similar to the ones obtained by Helliwell (2004), which were discussed in chapter 2. 
The decline in the correlation between rates of investment and saving in OECD 
countries is also captured in the analysis of five-year averages of rates of saving and 
investment, which is shown in the appendix to this chapter. 
FIGURE 3.4 FELDSTEIN AND HORIOKA COUNTRIES 
Gross Domestic Saving — fio.t Gross National Saving — [io,t 
1970 1980 2000 2010 
-95% Estimate 
•95% 
T X C t t 
»95% 
Domestic Saving — Gross National Saving — 
„ r\ 2 
-A /\ 
1970 1960 9^0 2000 2010 1970 1980 VA'l 2000 2010 
95% 
"95% 
95% — Estimate 
. 9 5 % 
Notes: Confidence intervals do not require any correction for heteroskedasticity. 
Turkey does not have the necessary data for all thirty-five years. 
Greece, Luxembourg and Turkey do not have the necessary data for all thirty-five years. 
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The decline in the coefficient on the rate of saving calls into doubt some of the 
assumptions around the theoretical models developed to explain the Puzzle. The 
models should still be able to explain the data if the Puzzle no longer applies — as is 
the case from the mid-1990s and onward. This can be addressed to some extent by 
acknowledging that as a sub-sample, the O E C D countries are not representative of the 
small economies characterised by the theoretical models. Not only are many of the 
O E C D countries large economies in terms of GDP per capita, but the domestic 
currencies of many of the O E C D countries have historically been in strong demand by 
much of the rest of the world as reserve currencies.^' These include the UK's pound 
sterling, the Japanese yen, the euro (and the Deutsch mark prior to the creation of the 
euro), and the US dollar. In addition to being the most widely held reserve currency, 
the US dollar was historically the currency against which the countries that 
participated in the Bretton Woods system officially linked their currencies to until 1971. 
Even after 1971, several O E C D countries continued to formally link their currencies to 
others' . A policy of fixed exchange rates would mean that governments must directly 
manage foreign exchange reserves, and this can affect countries' current account 
balances. This means that the international flow of capital — or lack thereof — is not 
motivated purely by profit maximising investors. In any case, the relationship between 
rates of investment and saving in developed countries that characterised the Puzzle is 
no longer evident, and has not been for close to fifteen years. 
For the non-OECD countries, the story is very different. As Figure 3.5 shows, the 
correlation between rates of investment and saving in non-OECD countries is never 
close to one, implying that developing countries had greater international capital 
mobility than the O E C D countries for the 1970s and 1980s. Unlike the O E C D countries, 
however, the correlation between rates of investment and saving in the developing 
countries did not decline over time. This means that from the late 1990s onwards, the 
All countries that trade internationally hold foreign exchange reserves in order to pay for imports or to 
accept payment for exports. A reserve currency is one that is in strong demand, and is held in 
significant amounts by other countries as part of their foreign exchange reserves. 
PAGE 75 
I N C O M E , I N V E S T M E N T A N D S A V I N G 
correlation between rates of investment and saving for developing countries was 
greater than for the OECD countries. 
F I G U R E 3.5 N O N - O E C D C O U N T R I E S 
Gross Domestic Saving — fio.t Gross National Saving — Po.t 
i\ /-I ' \ 
, \ I \ f\A V /v / \ I J ^ \ /\ I 
-95% Estimate 
. 9 5 % 
-95% 
»95% 
Gross Domestic Saving — Gross National Saving — 
^ 
-95% — Estimate 
. 9 5 % 
95% — Estimate 
. 9 5 % 
Notes: Confidence intervals have been corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
The same is true when oil exporting countries are excluded from the sample, as shown 
in Figure 3.6. Rather than characterising a puzzle, the higher (but still less than one) 
coefficient identified in developing countries can be attributed to their having financial 
and capital markets that are less than perfectly integrated internationally, and that 
some developing countries peg their currencies to those of other countries' — 
particularly the US dollar. 
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FIGURE 3.6 NON-OECD, NON-OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
Gross Domestic Saving -
a 
Gross National Saving - Po.t 
9 5 % 
>95% 
95% 
•95% 
Gross Domestic Saving — Pi.t Gross National Saving — /3i,t 
95% — Estimate 
•95% 
V 
1970 1980 i? 2000 2010 
-95% E I t 
- - * 9 5 % 
Notes: Confidence intervals have been corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
3 . 4 CONCLUSION 
The analysis in this chapter confirmed the findings in recent studies that showed that 
the close correlation between rates of investment and saving in OECD countries is no 
longer observed in the most recent data. Not only is the perfect, one-to-one correlation 
no longer evident, but the coefficient estimates for the most recent years are not even 
significantly non-zero. Secondly, subsequent studies that included developing and/or 
non-OECD countries generally found that the estimated coefficients on rates of saving 
in developing countries were lower than for O E C D countries, and therefore lower than 
the global average. The analysis in this chapter showed that if the sample of non-OECD 
countries is constant over time, there has been no significant change in the average 
saving retention for this group of countries over this thirty year period — this is a new 
finding that has not been discussed in the literature to date. It suggests that the 
variables that drove the decline in the estimated coefficient for the group of O E C D 
countries — such as improvements in transport technology or reductions in tariffs as 
suggested by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) or the move away from fixed exchange rates 
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and capital controls in the early 1970s — have not affected the non-OECD countries in 
the same way. Since the non-OECD countries are not homogenous in the way that the 
OECD countries arguably are, the reasons for this vary. For example, not all countries 
shed or reduced capital controls in the 1970s — many of the major Asian economies, 
for example, still had fixed exchange rates well into the 1990s and China and India 
continued to maintain strong capital control until relatively recently. Secondly, some 
non-OECD countries lack financial sophistication, having no central exchange for 
portfolio capital to be transacted through, or modern financial instruments or 
accessible financial market information, which means that the knowledge or the ability 
to meet the expense of international transactions can only be met by a minority elite, 
rather than the bulk of the population. 
Thirdly, this chapter compared the coefficient estimates generated using both gross 
domestic and gross national saving rates, and found that while the magnitude and the 
statistical significance of the coefficient estimates is stronger when gross national 
saving is used, the overall pattern in the value of the estimates over time is roughly the 
same, regardless of which measure of saving is used. Finally, this chapter 
demonstrated that the Puzzle does not apply to today's countries regardless of whether 
they are groups of rich or poor countries. The rate of investment is not solely 
determined by the rate of saving, although the rate of saving appears to have more 
influence on the rate of investment in developing than developed countries. This is 
unsurprising, given that the capital markets of developing countries are more likely to 
have restrictions than those of the rich countries. In any case, the next question — 
particularly for the developing countries — is: if the rate of domestic investment is not 
solely a function of the rate of domestic or national saving, what is it a function of? An 
alternative model is developed in Chapter 4 and tested in Chapter 5. 
3 . 5 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
As discussed in chapter 2, both domestic and national saving are estimated as residuals 
— domestic saving is estimated with GDP as the starting point, and national saving 
with GNI as the starting point. Since it is the same value of final consumption that is 
subtracted from both to give saving, the difference between national and domestic 
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sav ing is the same as the dif ference between G D P and G N I - the sum of net factor 
p a y m e n t s to non-res idents , and net capital transfers to the rest of the world. 
Feldstein and Hor ioka ' s analysis looked at the impacts of both domestic and national 
rates of saving on countr ies ' rates of investment, however , their focus was on domest ic 
saving. T h e subsequent w o r k by others has focussed on the relationship between rates 
of national saving and investment , and largely ignored domest ic saving. Feldstein and 
Hor ioka themselves selected domest ic saving as the superior measure , but did not 
e laborate as to why, only saying that ' the identity of national saving and investment 
does not imply equali ty of domestic saving and investment. Because of international 
capital f lows, domest ic saving and investment can differ for long periods of t ime. For 
e x a m p l e , during m u c h of the nineteenth century, British domestic saving exceeded 
domest i c investment while Britain invested abroad' (1980, p. 320). This does not 
establ ish either national or domest ic saving as being superior to the other, since the 
reasons given for w h y domest ic saving is preferable apply equally to national saving 
— the existence of international capital f lows means that national saving and 
inves tment can also vary, even if this w a s not observed for the countries in the sample 
at the t ime. 
G D P reflects the country in which income is generated, whereas GNI reflects the 
country to which that income belongs. As a result, a country 's G D P does not 
necessari ly indicate the total funds available for consumption, investment or saving. 
G D P in that country will be higher than G N I if payments on foreign owned capital are 
o w e d , or lower than G N I if aid is received. G N I fully captures the total funds available 
to a country , however , s o m e of the components of G N I may reflect decisions that have 
already been m a d e with respect to where to m o v e capital. For example , foreign owned 
f irms have the option of paying dividends to their overseas shareholders, or 
re invest ing their earnings in the country in which they were generated. If a decision is 
m a d e to reinvest because the firm bel ieves that there are profitable opportunit ies for 
inves tment in that country, then the domest ic saving is retained as investment. If not, 
then the earnings are ei ther paid out to shareholders , or they may be invested in 
another country in which the firm operates - effectively, an export of capital. The 
decision to reinvest earnings or not, depending on the opportunit ies available to the 
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foreign firm in the domestic country, should be made using similar criteria to any other 
investor deciding whether to invest domestically or overseas. 
Since neither domestic nor national saving is an unambiguously superior candidate for 
analysing the relationship between investment and saving, both are used and 
discussed in this thesis. A related issue that is less problematic is the question of 
whether to analyse the relationship between gross or net rates of income and saving. 
This thesis uses gross investment and saving, because using net saving and investment 
assumes that the value of a country's capital stock that depreciated in a given period is 
replaced or upgraded out of domestic or national saving, before investment allocation 
decisions are made about the remainder. Secondly, estimates of depreciation in a 
country's national accounts are imputed using the perpetual inventory method of 
capital stock valuation, and generally do not accurately reflect true depreciation. 
Feldstein and Horioka focussed on gross saving and investment, because they felt that 
the gross estimates more accurately reflected the saving available to allocate across 
foreign and domestic investments. They also generated results using net saving and 
investment, since net investment is a truer reflection of the increase to a country's stock 
of capital, and noted that the estimated coefficient on the rate of net saving was also 
close to one (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980). 
T H E D A T A 
RATES OF INVESTMENT AND SAVING 
Data for estimating the rates of investment and saving used in this chapter are taken 
from the World Development Indicators online database. Rates of investment and 
saving are calculated in the following way, where Z indicates the rate, X is the level of 
saving or investment, and Y is the level of GDP or GNI: 
(3 .2 ) = IOOX 
fx 
Different aggregates are substituted for X and Y, to obtain the rates of investment and 
saving shown in the table. 
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T A B L E 3.9 R A T E S O F I N V E S T M E N T A N D S A V I N G 
z X Y 
SFIATEd Gross domestic saving GDP 
SRATEN Gross national saving GNI 
IRATEi, Gross capital formation GDP 
IRATEn Gross capital formation GNI 
Notes: The aggregates used are current price values, denominated in the local currency of the individual country. 
COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS 
These are the sixteen countries that formed the sample in the original Feldstein and 
Horioka study. They were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Siveden, United 
Kingdom, and United States. All sixteen countries had data for all of the years between 
1971 and 2005 to estimate rates of gross domestic saving and investment as a 
proportion of GDP. Greece was the only one of the sixteen that did not have all of the 
data necessary to estimate rates of gross national saving and investment as a 
proportion of GNI. 
For reasons of data availability and consistency, these other OECD countries were not 
included in the original Feldstein and Horioka study. Turkey is the only OECD country 
that does not have data to calculate rates of gross domestic saving and investment as a 
proportion of GDP for all of the years from 1971 to 2005. The OECD countries that do 
are: France, Iceland, Luxembourg, Nonvay, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland. 
Luxembourg was the only one of these countries that does not have all of the data 
necessary to estimate rates of gross national saving and investment as a proportion of 
GNI. 
The classification 'oil exporting countries' is based on whether or not countries were 
categorised as having fuel as 5 0 % or more of their total exports between 1988 and 
1992. The information for this classification has been the Global Development Network 
Growth Database (Easterly, 2001). The oil exporting countries that have the necessary 
data to estimate rates of gross domestic saving and investment as a proportion of GDP 
for all of the years from 1971 to 2005 are: Algeria, Congo (Republic), Gabon, Iran 
(Islamic Republic), Saudi Arabia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela, RB. Of these 
seven countries, only Algeria, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela, RB have the 
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necessary data to estimate rates of gross national saving and investment as a 
proportion of GNI for all of the years from 1971 to 2005. 
The classification 'non-OECD countries' is used to categorise all of the countries for 
which the necessary data are available, and which are also not OECD countries. The 
non-OECD, non-oil exporting countries that have the necessary data to estimate rates 
of gross domestic saving and investment as a proportion of GDP for all of the years 
from 1971 to 2005 are: Argentina, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, 
Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic), Costa Rica, Cote d'lvoire, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Arab Rep., El Salvador, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong (China), Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, 
Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, Rep., Kuivait, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, 
Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Papua Neiv Guinea, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Uruguay, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
The non-OECD, non-oil exporting countries that have the necessary data to estimate 
rates of gross national saving and investment as a proportion of GNI for all of the years 
from 1971 to 2005 are: Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, China, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic), Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, 
Hong Kong (China), India, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea (Republic), Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian 
Arab Republic, Thailand, Uganda, and Uruguay. 
INCOME AND PRODUCTION 
The data on income and production used in the regressions and the figures in this 
chapter are taken from the Penn World Tables version 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006). GDP 
per capita uses the series cgdp, which is denominated in nominal (current), purchasing 
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power parity adjusted units. From this, GNI is calculated using the series cgnp as 
shown: 
(3.3) 
100 
Both GDP and GNI per capita are divided by 1,000 to give GDP per 1,000 people. This 
is so that, when they are used in a regression with the rate of investment, the coefficient 
estimates can be seen within the first two decimal places of the regression output. 
PAGE 83 
INCOME, INVESTMENT AND SAVING 
D E T A I L E D R E G R E S S I O N O U T P U T 
ANNUAL IMPACT OF RATES OF SAVING ON RATES OF INVESTMENT 
TABLE 3.10 ALL COUNTRIES - RATES OF INVESTMENT AND DOMESTIC SAVING 
n 3 4 6 5 0 . 9 0 Prob>F 0 
Po.t t-stat 95% +95% fi l . t t-stat -95% +95% 
1 9 7 1 1 4 7 7 1 7 9 1 1 . 0 5 1 8 . 4 9 0 . 6 5 1.61 0 . 4 9 0 . 8 2 
1 9 7 2 1 3 8 5 6 7 0 9 . 8 0 1 7 . 9 0 0 . 6 1 5 . 7 8 0 . 4 0 0 . 8 2 
1 9 7 3 1 4 3 0 4 3 4 7 . 8 4 2 0 . 7 5 0 . 5 3 4 . 7 8 0 . 3 1 0 . 7 5 
1 9 7 4 1 7 8 9 1 0 0 4 1 4 . 4 0 2 1 . 3 9 0 . 4 6 5 . 2 9 0 . 2 9 0 . 6 3 
1 9 7 5 18 6 6 8 7 8 1 4 4 9 2 2 . 8 2 0 . 4 9 5 . 6 8 0 . 3 2 0 . 6 6 
1 9 7 6 1 9 0 5 5 5 4 1 2 31 2 5 . 8 0 0 . 4 5 5 . 1 1 0 . 2 8 0 . 6 2 
1 9 7 7 1 9 3 5 7 4 3 1 4 2 4 2 4 . 4 5 0 . 4 3 3 . 4 5 0 . 1 8 0 . 6 7 
1 9 7 8 1 7 5 1 7 2 1 1 2 7 5 2 2 . 2 7 0 . 6 0 4 . 2 2 0 . 3 2 0 . 8 9 
1 9 7 9 1 9 8 7 7 3 4 1 4 5 6 2 5 . 1 8 0 . 5 6 4 . 5 0 0 . 3 2 0 . 8 1 
1 9 8 0 2 0 5 8 9 2 9 1 6 2 4 2 4 . 9 2 0 . 4 5 5 . 5 9 0 . 2 9 0 . 6 1 
1 9 8 1 2 0 . 5 3 8 . 2 7 1 5 . 6 6 2 5 . 4 1 0 . 4 7 5 . 5 3 0 . 3 0 0 . 6 3 
1 9 8 2 2 0 . 4 3 6 . 4 7 1 4 . 2 4 2 6 . 6 3 0 . 3 4 2 . 6 1 0 . 0 8 0 . 6 0 
1 9 8 3 1 8 , . 5 2 7 . 3 3 1 3 .51 2 3 . 4 7 0 . 4 2 4 . 3 4 0 . 2 3 0 . 6 0 
1 9 8 4 1 8 , . 2 2 5 . 8 9 1 2 . 1 5 2 4 . 2 8 0 . 4 0 3 . 3 3 0 . 1 6 0 . 6 4 
1 9 8 5 1 8 , . 6 5 5 . 6 5 1 2 . 1 7 2 5 . 1 2 0 . 4 7 4 . 1 1 0 . 2 5 0 . 7 0 
1 9 8 6 1 8 , . 5 1 5 , . 4 0 1 1 . 7 9 2 5 . 2 4 0 . 4 8 5 . 1 4 0 . 3 0 0 . 6 7 
1 9 8 7 1 8 , . 4 9 6 , . 0 5 1 2 , . 4 9 2 4 . 4 8 0 . 3 8 4 . 4 2 0 . 2 1 0 . 5 5 
1 9 8 8 1 9 , . 1 8 5 , . 6 4 1 2 , . 5 2 2 5 . 8 4 0 . 2 7 2 . 0 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 5 2 
1 9 8 9 1 8 , . 4 1 4 , . 9 3 1 1 , . 0 9 2 5 . 7 2 0 , . 2 8 1 . 8 0 - 0 . 0 3 0 . 5 8 
1 9 9 0 1 8 , . 4 3 4 , . 5 6 1 0 , . 5 0 2 6 . 3 7 0 , . 5 7 8 . 9 3 0 . 4 4 0 . 6 9 
1 9 9 1 2 1 , . 0 7 6 , . 4 5 1 4 , . 6 6 2 7 . 4 8 0 , . 3 3 2 . 3 0 0 . 0 5 0 . 6 2 
1 9 9 2 1 7 , . 7 7 4 , . 5 8 1 0 , . 1 6 2 5 . 3 8 0 , . 2 1 1 . 3 8 - 0 . 0 9 0 . 5 1 
1 9 9 3 1 6 , . 3 8 4 . . 3 5 8 , . 9 9 2 3 . 7 7 0 . . 4 1 2 . 2 0 0 . 0 4 0 . 7 7 
1 9 9 4 1 8 . . 3 8 6 . . 1 4 1 2 . . 5 1 2 4 . 2 5 0 . . 5 5 4 . 5 5 0 . 3 1 0 . 7 9 
1 9 9 5 1 9 . . 1 8 4 . , 7 1 1 1 . , 1 9 2 7 . 1 6 0 . , 4 6 4 . 1 0 0 . 2 4 0 . 6 7 
1 9 9 6 1 6 . . 4 4 4 . , 0 8 8 . , 5 3 2 4 . 3 4 0 . , 6 1 4 . 1 2 0 . 3 2 0 . 9 0 
1 9 9 7 1 7 . . 8 1 5 . , 1 4 1 1 . , 0 1 2 4 . 6 1 0 . , 4 5 4 . 6 8 0 . 2 6 0 . 6 4 
1 9 9 8 1 9 . . 0 0 6 . , 3 8 1 3 . , 1 6 2 4 . 8 4 0 . , 4 2 5 . 7 3 0 . 2 7 0 . 5 6 
1 9 9 9 1 7 . , 8 6 6 . , 8 3 1 2 . , 7 3 2 2 . 9 8 0 . , 4 1 5 . 3 7 0 . 2 6 0 . 5 5 
2 0 0 0 1 8 . , 5 1 1 1 . , 1 4 1 5 . , 2 5 2 1 . 7 7 0 . , 3 2 5 . 4 4 0 . 2 0 0 . 4 3 
2 0 0 1 1 7 . , 9 7 1 0 . , 8 6 1 4 . , 7 2 2 1 . 2 1 0 . , 3 5 5 . 3 6 0 . 2 2 0 . 4 7 
2 0 0 2 1 7 . , 5 7 9 . 6 9 1 4 . 0 2 2 1 . 1 3 0 . 4 4 5 . 0 8 0 . 2 7 0 . 6 1 
2 0 0 3 1 8 . 7 2 1 1 . 3 0 1 5 . 4 7 2 1 . 9 6 0 . 4 1 4 . 3 8 0 . 2 2 0 . 5 9 
2 0 0 4 1 9 . 9 4 1 2 . 3 8 1 6 . 7 8 2 3 . 1 0 0 . 3 6 3 . 3 6 0 . 1 5 0 . 5 7 
2 0 0 5 2 1 . 5 1 1 5 . 2 4 1 8 . 7 4 2 4 . 2 8 0 . 2 1 1 . 8 2 - 0 . 0 2 0 . 4 3 
Estimates have been corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
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I N C O M E , I N V E S T M E N T A N D S A V I N G 
T A B L E 3 .11 A L L C O U N T R I E S - R A T E S O F I N V E S T M E N T A N D N A T I O N A L S A V I N G 
n 2 3 8 0 0 . 95 Prob>F 0 
Po.t t-stat -95% +95% P, t t-stat -95% +95% 
1 9 7 1 1 4 . 7 7 7 . 7 9 1 1 0 5 1 8 . 4 9 0. 3 9 3 . 8 2 0. , 1 9 0 . 6 0 
1 9 7 2 1 3 . 8 5 6 . 7 0 9 8 0 1 7 . 9 0 0 . 4 1 3 . 6 3 0. , 1 9 0 . , 6 3 
1 9 7 3 1 4 . 3 0 4 . 3 4 7 8 4 2 0 . 7 5 0 . 3 8 2 . 1 2 0. , 0 3 0 . 7 4 
1 9 7 4 1 7 . 8 9 1 0 . 0 4 1 4 4 0 2 1 . 3 9 0 . 3 0 3 . 1 5 0 , , 1 1 0 . 4 8 
1 9 7 5 1 8 . 6 6 8 . 7 8 1 4 4 9 2 2 . 8 2 0 . 2 9 2 . 5 2 0 . , 0 6 0 . 5 1 
1 9 7 6 1 9 0 5 5 . 5 4 1 2 3 1 2 5 . 8 0 0 . 2 7 1 . 6 9 - 0 , , 0 4 0 . 5 9 
1 9 7 7 1 9 3 5 7 4 3 1 4 2 4 2 4 . 4 5 0 . 2 5 2 . 0 8 0 , , 0 2 0 . 4 9 
1 9 7 8 1 7 5 1 7 2 1 1 2 7 5 2 2 . 2 7 0 . 3 6 3 . 0 8 0 . , 1 3 0 . 5 8 
1 9 7 9 1 9 8 7 7 3 4 1 4 5 6 2 5 . 1 8 0 . 2 0 1 . 6 4 - 0 . , 0 4 0 . 4 4 
1 9 8 0 2 0 5 8 9 2 9 1 6 2 4 2 4 . 9 2 0 . 1 9 1 . 8 8 - 0 . , 0 1 0 . 3 9 
1 9 8 1 2 0 5 3 8 2 7 1 5 6 6 2 5 . 4 1 0 . 2 2 1 . , 7 8 - 0 . , 0 2 0 . 4 6 
1 9 8 2 2 0 4 3 6 4 7 1 4 2 4 2 6 . 6 3 0 . 2 1 1. , 2 7 - 0 . , 1 1 0 . 5 3 
1 9 8 3 1 8 5 2 7 3 3 1 3 5 7 2 3 . , 4 7 0 . 2 0 1 . , 5 3 - 0 , . 0 6 0 . 4 7 
1 9 8 4 1 8 2 2 5 8 9 1 2 1 5 2 4 . , 2 8 0 . , 1 9 1 . , 2 4 - 0 , . 1 1 0 . 5 0 
1 9 8 5 1 8 . , 6 5 5 . . 6 5 1 2 , , 1 7 2 5 . , 1 2 0 . , 1 6 0 . , 9 2 - 0 , . 1 8 0 . , 4 9 
1 9 8 6 1 8 . . 5 1 5 . . 4 0 1 1 , . 7 9 2 5 . , 2 4 0 . , 1 5 0 . , 8 4 - 0 , . 2 0 0 . , 5 1 
1 9 8 7 1 8 . . 4 9 6 . . 0 5 1 2 , . 4 9 2 4 . , 4 8 0 . , 1 3 0 . , 8 0 - 0 , . 1 8 0 . , 4 4 
1 9 8 8 1 9 , . 1 8 5 . . 6 4 1 2 , . 5 2 2 5 . . 8 4 0 , , 1 3 0 , . 7 8 - 0 , . 2 0 0 . , 4 6 
1 9 8 9 1 8 , . 4 1 4 . . 9 3 1 1 , . 0 9 2 5 , . 7 2 0 . . 1 7 0 , . 9 2 - 0 , . 1 9 0 . , 5 3 
1 9 9 0 1 8 , . 4 3 4 . . 5 6 1 0 , . 5 0 2 6 , . 3 7 0 , . 1 8 0 , . 8 9 - 0 . 2 2 0 . , 5 8 
1 9 9 1 2 1 . 0 7 6 , . 4 5 1 4 . 6 6 2 7 , . 4 8 0 , . 0 5 0 , . 3 1 - 0 . 2 8 0 . , 3 8 
1 9 9 2 1 7 . 7 7 4 . 5 8 1 0 . 1 6 2 5 . 3 8 0 , . 2 2 1, . 1 2 - 0 . 1 7 0 . . 6 2 
1 9 9 3 1 6 . 3 8 4 . 3 5 8 . 9 9 2 3 . 7 7 0 , . 2 7 1 , . 4 2 - 0 . 1 0 0 , . 6 5 
1 9 9 4 1 8 . 3 8 6 . 1 4 1 2 . 5 1 2 4 . 2 5 0 . 1 9 1 . 3 8 - 0 . 0 8 0 , . 4 7 
1 9 9 5 1 9 . 1 8 4 . 7 1 1 1 . 1 9 2 7 . 1 6 0 . 1 6 0 . 8 5 - 0 . 2 1 0 , . 5 3 
1 9 9 6 1 6 . 4 4 4 . 0 8 8 . 5 3 2 4 . 3 4 0 . 2 7 1 . 4 6 - 0 . 0 9 0 , . 6 3 
1 9 9 7 1 7 . 8 1 5 . 1 4 1 1 . 0 1 2 4 . 6 1 0 . 2 2 1 . 4 3 - 0 . 0 8 0 . 5 3 
1 9 9 8 1 9 . 0 0 6 . 3 8 1 3 . 1 6 2 4 . 8 4 0 . 1 8 1 . 2 9 - 0 . 0 9 0 . 4 5 
1 9 9 9 1 7 . 8 6 6 . 8 3 1 2 . 7 3 2 2 . 9 8 0 . 1 7 1 . 4 8 - 0 . 0 6 0 . 4 0 
2 0 0 0 1 8 . 5 1 1 1 . 1 4 1 5 . 2 5 2 1 . 7 7 0 . 1 4 2 . 0 7 0 . 0 1 0 . 2 8 
2 0 0 1 1 7 . 9 7 1 0 . 8 6 1 4 . 7 2 2 1 . 2 1 0 . 1 8 2 . 5 0 0 . 0 4 0 . 3 2 
2 0 0 2 1 7 . 5 7 9 . 6 9 1 4 . 0 2 2 1 . 1 3 0 . 1 6 1 . 9 5 0 . 0 0 0 . 3 3 
2 0 0 3 1 8 . 7 2 1 1 . 3 0 1 5 . 4 7 2 1 . 9 6 0 . 1 2 1 . 6 3 - 0 . 0 2 0 . 2 7 
2 0 0 4 1 9 . 9 4 1 2 . 3 8 1 6 . 7 8 2 3 . 1 0 0 . 1 1 1 . 5 5 - 0 . 0 3 0 . 2 4 
2 0 0 5 2 1 . 5 1 1 5 . 2 4 1 8 . 7 4 2 4 . 2 8 0 . 0 5 0 . 8 8 - 0 . 0 6 0 . 1 6 
Note: Rates are calculated as a proportion of GNl. 
Estimates have been corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
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INCOME, INVESTMENT AND SAVING 
TABLE 3.12 OECD COUNTRIES - RATES OF INVESTMENT AND DOMESTIC SAVING 
n 8 0 5 0 . 9 8 Prob>F 0 
Po.t t-stat -95% +95% P l,t t-s tat - 95% +95% 
1 9 7 1 2 82 0 57 - 6 89 12 . 5 4 0 . 9 2 4 . 9 2 0 . 5 5 1 . 2 9 
1 9 7 2 1 40 0 2 5 - 9 51 12 , . 3 1 0 . 9 4 4 . 3 8 0 . 5 2 1 . 3 6 
1 9 7 3 - 0 19 - 0 05 - 7 99 7, . 6 1 1 . 0 1 6 . 7 5 0 . 7 1 1 . 3 0 
1 9 7 4 10 16 1 41 - 4 00 2 4 , . 3 2 0 . 7 2 2 . 5 4 0 . 1 6 1 . 2 8 
1 9 7 5 1 51 0 46 - 5 00 8, . 03 1 . 0 1 8 . 0 5 0 . 7 6 1 . 2 5 
1 9 7 6 2 57 0 68 - 4 80 9, . 9 5 0 . 9 6 6 . 5 3 0 . 6 7 1 . 2 5 
1 9 7 7 13 35 2 43 2 55 2 4 , . 1 5 0 . 5 1 2 . 2 2 0 . 0 6 0 . 9 5 
1 9 7 8 11 57 3 04 4 09 19 , . 0 6 0 . 5 2 3 . 3 7 0 . 2 2 0 . 8 2 
1 9 7 9 7 79 1 88 - 0 37 15 , . 94 0 . 7 1 4 . 3 0 0 . 3 8 1 . 0 3 
1 9 8 0 11 54 2 96 3 90 19 , . 1 9 0 . 5 7 3 . 6 5 0 . 2 6 0 . 8 8 
1 9 8 1 7 43 1 91 - 0 2 1 15 . .07 0, . 7 2 4 . 6 3 0 . 4 2 1 . 0 3 
1 9 8 2 11 32 2 49 2 39 2 0 , . 2 5 0, . 5 6 3 . 0 5 0 . 2 0 0 . 9 2 
1 9 8 3 12 24 4 91 7 35 1 7 . , 14 0, . 44 4, . 1 2 0 . 2 3 0 . 6 5 
1 9 8 4 4 . 9 6 0, . 8 0 - 7 . 2 6 1 7 , ,18 0, .77 2 , . 7 8 0 . 2 3 1, . 3 1 
1 9 8 5 3 . 4 8 0, . 5 4 - 9 . 2 5 1 6 . ,22 0, . 82 2 , . 7 5 0 . 2 3 1, . 4 1 
1 9 8 6 5 . 5 1 0, . 8 8 - 6 . 7 2 1 7 . ,74 0, . 7 3 2 , . 5 5 0 . 1 7 1, . 3 0 
1 9 8 7 7 . 2 0 4, . 1 3 3 . 7 8 1 0 . , 63 0, . 6 6 7 , .67 0 . 4 9 0 . . 8 3 
1 9 8 8 11 . 6 5 3, . 1 1 4 . 3 0 1 9 . , 0 1 0 . . 50 3 . . 2 0 0 . 1 9 0 . . 80 
1 9 8 9 13 . 2 6 3, . 4 0 5 . 6 0 2 0 . ,92 0 . . 44 2 . . 6 5 0 . 1 1 0 . ,77 
1 9 9 0 13 . 7 2 3, . 9 7 6 . 9 3 2 0 . , 5 1 0 . . 4 1 2 . . 80 0 . 1 2 0 . , 70 
1 9 9 1 11 . 6 6 3, . 6 8 5 . 4 5 1 7 . ,88 0 . . 4 6 3 . , 4 8 0, . 2 0 0 . ,72 
1 9 9 2 13 . 4 8 4, . 9 0 8 . 0 8 1 8 . ,88 0 . , 3 3 2 . , 59 0, . 0 8 0 . ,58 
1 9 9 3 13 . 7 2 5, . 2 7 8 . 6 1 1 8 . ,82 0 . ,27 2 . , 2 3 0, . 0 3 0 . 50 
1 9 9 4 15 . 8 4 6, . 3 0 10 , . 9 0 2 0 . ,77 0 . , 19 1 . ,72 - 0 , . 0 3 0 . 41 
1 9 9 5 18 . 0 2 6, . 9 8 12 , . 9 5 2 3 . ,09 0 . , 1 1 0 . ,97 - 0 , . 1 1 0 . 33 
1 9 9 6 18 . 0 6 7 , . 8 7 13 , . 5 5 2 2 . , 56 0 . ,10 1 . ,03 - 0 . . 0 9 0 . 30 
1 9 9 7 17 . 6 9 7 , . 8 8 13 , . 2 8 2 2 . 10 0 . ,14 1 . 66 - 0 . . 0 3 0 . 32 
1 9 9 8 18 . 9 4 8, . 90 14 , . 7 6 2 3 . 12 0 . ,13 1 . 68 - 0 . . 02 0 . 28 
1 9 9 9 19 . 7 8 11 , . 0 9 16 , .27 2 3 . 28 0 . , 09 1 . 49 - 0 . , 0 3 0 . 2 1 
2 0 0 0 22 . 2 5 10 , . 4 3 18 , . 0 6 2 6 . 44 0 . 00 0 . 06 - 0 . .14 0 . 15 
2 0 0 1 20 . 3 5 8, . 5 4 15 , . 6 8 2 5 . 03 0 . ,05 0 . 58 - 0 . ,12 0 . 22 
2 0 0 2 19 . 3 4 8, . 9 8 15 , . 1 1 2 3 . 57 0 . ,05 0 . 7 1 - 0 . , 09 0 . 20 
2 0 0 3 18 . 7 8 9, .47 14 , . 8 9 2 2 . 67 0 . 08 1 . 18 - 0 . , 0 6 0 . 22 
2 0 0 4 20 . 3 1 9, . 64 16 , .17 2 4 . 45 0 . 04 0 . 55 - 0 . , 1 1 0 . 19 
2 0 0 5 20 . 8 2 8, . 62 16 , .07 2 5 . 56 0 . 05 0 . 54 - 0 . ,13 0 . 22 
Estimates have been corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
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I N C O M E , I N V E S T M E N T A N D S A V I N G 
T A B L E 3 .13 O E C D C O U N T R I E S - R A T E S O F I N V E S T M E N T A N D N A T I O N A L S A V I N G 
n 7 3 5 0 . 99 Prob>F 0 
Pc.t t-stat -95% +95% Pi ,t t-stat -95% +95% 
1 9 7 1 2 . 97 1 . 60 - 0 . 67 6 . 61 0 . 90 1 2 . 90 0 . 77 1 . 04 
1 9 7 2 4 . 19 2 . 95 1 . 40 6 . 99 0 . 82 14 . 83 0 . 71 0 . 93 
1 9 7 3 4 . 10 1 . 87 - 0 . 21 8 . 41 0 . 85 1 0 . 58 0 . 70 1 . 01 
1 9 7 4 1 0 . 27 2 . 68 2 . 76 1 7 . 78 0 . 73 5 . 60 0 . 47 0 . 98 
1 9 7 5 3 . 73 0 . 77 - 5 . 79 1 3 . 2 5 0 . 93 4 . 22 0 . 50 1 . 37 
1 9 7 6 1 0 . 44 2 05 0 . 43 2 0 . 45 0 . 65 2 . 83 0 . 20 1 . 10 
1 9 7 7 1 1 . 78 2 53 2 . 62 2 0 . 94 0 . 59 2 . 83 0 . 18 1 . 01 
1 9 7 8 1 1 . 14 2 49 2 . 35 1 9 . 92 0 . 57 2 . 96 0 . 19 0 . 94 
1 9 7 9 1 4 . 66 2 20 1 60 2 7 . 72 0 . 46 1 . 73 - 0 . 06 0 . 99 
1 9 8 0 1 0 . 46 2 39 1 86 1 9 . 07 0 . 66 3 . 70 0 . , 31 1 . 00 
1 9 8 1 12 34 2 77 3 59 2 1 . 10 0 . 56 2 . 98 0 . ,19 0 . 92 
1 9 8 2 10 49 2 99 3 59 1 7 . 38 0 . ,64 3 . 95 0 . ,32 0 . 96 
1 9 8 3 9 64 3 62 4 41 1 4 . 87 0 . , 6 1 4 . 73 0 . , 36 0 . 87 
1 9 8 4 13 76 6 99 9 90 1 7 . ,63 0 . ,42 5 . 09 0 . . 26 0 . 59 
1 9 8 5 1 2 . ,44 6, . 6 6 8 . ,77 1 6 . , 1 1 0 . ,47 6 . ,10 0 . .32 0 . ,62 
1 9 8 6 9 . .77 4, . 0 3 5 . . 00 1 4 . , 5 3 0 . . 5 9 5 . , 16 0 . .37 0 . ,82 
1 9 8 7 8 . . 54 4 . 5 0 4 . 8 1 1 2 . . 2 6 0 . . 6 5 6 . ,93 0, .47 0 . ,84 
1 9 8 8 7 , . 6 5 3 . 5 1 3 . .37 11 . . 92 0 . . 7 1 6 . ,82 0, . 5 0 0 . , 91 
1 9 8 9 8, . 4 9 4 . 5 3 4, . 8 1 12 , . 1 7 0, . 6 9 8 . . 06 0 . 52 0 . , 8 6 
1 9 9 0 8, . 4 0 6 . 2 0 5 . 7 4 11 . 0 5 0 . 6 9 10 . . 4 6 0 . 5 6 0 . . 82 
1 9 9 1 9 . 2 8 4 . 8 1 5 . 4 9 13 . 0 7 0 . 6 1 6, . 5 5 0 . 4 3 0 . . 8 0 
1 9 9 2 9 . 9 1 5 . 5 3 6 . 3 9 13 . 4 3 0 . 5 5 5 . 7 8 0 . 3 6 0, . 74 
1 9 9 3 9 . 4 3 4 . 0 8 4 . 8 9 13 . 9 7 0 . 5 2 4 .27 0 . 2 8 0 . 7 6 
1 9 9 4 10 . 6 7 4 . 1 1 5 . 5 7 15 . 7 7 0 . 4 7 3 . 8 2 0 . 2 3 0 . 7 1 
1 9 9 5 12 . 7 5 3 . 6 4 5 . 8 8 19 . 6 3 0 . 3 8 2 . 4 0 0 . 0 7 0 . 6 9 
1 9 9 6 13 . 4 0 3 . 6 6 6 . 2 2 20 . 5 9 0 . 3 4 2 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 0 . 6 7 
1 9 9 7 15 . 0 2 4 . 3 9 8 . 3 1 2 1 . 7 3 0 . 2 8 1 . 9 4 0 . 0 0 0 . 5 7 
1 9 9 8 16 . 2 9 4 . 5 2 9 . 2 1 23 . 3 6 0 . 2 7 1 . 7 2 - 0 . 0 4 0 . 5 7 
1 9 9 9 19 . 8 2 5 . 7 6 13 . 0 7 2 6 . 5 8 0 . 1 1 0 . 7 1 - 0 . 1 9 0 . 4 0 
2 0 0 0 22 . 5 3 7 . 3 2 16 . 4 9 28 . 5 8 0 . 0 0 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 2 5 0 . 2 4 
2 0 0 1 20 . 8 7 5 . 5 4 13 . 4 8 28 . 2 7 0 . 0 4 0 . 2 2 - 0 . 2 7 0 . 3 4 
2 0 0 2 18 . 1 4 4 . 6 6 10 . 4 9 25 . 7 9 0 . 1 2 0 . 6 8 - 0 . 2 2 0 . 4 5 
2 0 0 3 17 . 8 1 5 . 2 7 11 . 1 7 24 . 4 4 0 . 1 3 0 . 8 4 - 0 . 1 8 0 . 4 5 
2 0 0 4 2 1 . 4 8 6 . 5 4 15 . 0 3 27 . 9 2 0 . 0 0 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 2 8 0 . 2 8 
2 0 0 5 22 . 9 8 6 . 6 4 16 . 1 8 29 . 7 8 - 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 2 3 - 0 . 3 2 0 . 2 5 
Note: Rates are calculated as a proportion of GNI. 
Estimates have been corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
P A G E 8 7 
INCOME, INVESTMENT AND SAVING 
TABLE 3.14 FELDSTEIN AND HORIOKA SAMPLE COUNTRIES - RATES OF INVESTMENT 
AND DOMESTIC SAVING 
n 5 6 0 0 . 9 9 P r o b > F 0 
Bo.t t-stat 95% +95% P l,t t-stat - 95% +95% 
1 9 7 1 - 0 07 - 0 02 - 5 33 5 . 1 9 1 . 0 3 1 1 . 0 6 0 . 8 4 1 . 2 1 
1 9 7 2 - 1 92 - 0 67 - 7 54 3 . 7 0 1 . 0 7 1 0 . 6 3 0 . 8 7 1 . 2 7 
1 9 7 3 - 2 10 - 1 18 - 5 62 1 . 4 1 1 . 1 0 2 0 . 0 7 0 . 9 9 1 . 2 0 
1 9 7 4 4 48 2 28 0 62 8 . 3 4 0 . 9 5 14 . 8 0 0 . 8 2 1 . 0 8 
1 9 7 5 -0 27 - 0 12 - 4 46 3 . 9 3 1 . 0 8 13 . 6 6 0 . 9 3 1 . 2 4 
1 9 7 6 0 5 1 0 2 6 - 3 3 6 4 . 3 8 1 . 0 5 14 . 9 7 0 . 9 1 1 . 1 9 
1 9 7 7 12 43 2 67 3 28 2 1 . 5 8 0 . 5 4 2 . 7 4 0 . 1 5 0 . 9 3 
1 9 7 8 8 94 2 98 3 05 14 . 8 3 0 . 6 3 4 . 7 7 0 . 3 7 0 . 8 9 
1 9 7 9 6 49 3 27 2 59 10 . 3 9 0 . 8 0 9 . 1 8 0 . 6 3 0 . 9 7 
1 9 8 0 9 14 3 30 3 69 14 . 5 9 0 . 6 8 5 . 4 5 0 . 4 3 0 . 9 2 
1 9 8 1 5 35 2 84 1 65 9 . 0 6 0 . 8 1 9 . 4 1 0 . 6 4 0 . 9 8 
1 9 8 2 3 38 0 78 - 5 19 1 1 . 9 5 0 . 9 0 4 . 6 3 0 . 5 2 1 . 2 8 
1 9 8 3 8 0 9 2 2 9 1 14 15 . 0 4 0 . 6 3 3 . 8 3 0 . 3 1 0 . 9 6 
1 9 8 4 - 2 . 7 8 - 0 , . 8 4 - 9 . 2 7 3, . 7 1 1 . 1 2 8 . 3 6 0 . 8 6 1 . 3 8 
1 9 8 5 - 3 . 7 2 - 1 , . 1 5 - 1 0 , . 0 6 2 , . 62 1 . 1 6 8 . 7 8 0 . 9 0 1 . 4 2 
1 9 8 6 - 0 . 9 7 - 0 , . 2 4 - 8 , . 8 6 6, . 9 1 1 . 0 3 6 . 0 4 0 , . 7 0 1, . 3 7 
1 9 8 7 5 . 8 0 2 , . 0 7 0 , . 3 0 1 1 , . 2 9 0, . 7 1 5, . 6 0 0, . 4 6 0 , . 96 
1 9 8 8 7 . 3 2 1 , . 5 7 - 1 , . 8 7 1 6 , . 5 1 0 , . 6 6 3 , . 3 5 0 , . 2 7 1 , . 0 5 
1 9 8 9 9 . 2 3 2 , . 3 4 1 , . 4 6 1 6 , . 9 9 0 , . 6 1 3 , . 7 2 0 , . 2 9 0 , . 9 4 
1 9 9 0 10 . 0 8 2 . . 7 4 2 , . 8 6 1 7 , . 3 1 0 , . 5 6 3 , . 6 3 0 . , 2 6 0 . , 8 7 
1 9 9 1 5 . 4 2 1 , . 3 6 - 2 . . 4 0 1 3 . . 2 5 0 , . 7 3 4 . 1 7 0 . , 3 9 1 . , 0 7 
1 9 9 2 8 . 9 9 2 . , 6 2 2 . . 2 4 1 5 . , 7 4 0 , . 5 3 3 . , 3 6 0 . , 2 2 0 . , 8 4 
1 9 9 3 10 . 2 9 2 , , 9 6 3 . . 4 6 1 7 . , 1 3 0 . , 42 2 . , 6 8 0 . , 1 1 0 . , 7 4 
1 9 9 4 11 . 6 9 2 . , 7 7 3 . , 3 9 1 9 . , 9 9 0 . , 3 8 2 . , 0 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 75 
1 9 9 5 15 . 1 8 3 . , 8 7 7 . , 4 7 2 2 . , 8 9 0 . , 2 3 1 . , 4 0 - 0 . 10 0 . 57 
1 9 9 6 15 . 0 9 3 . , 9 4 7 . , 5 7 2 2 . , 6 2 0 . , 2 3 1 . 40 - 0 . 0 9 0 . 5 5 
1 9 9 7 15 . 7 9 4 . , 2 9 8 . , 5 5 2 3 . 03 0 . , 2 2 1 . 43 - 0 . 08 0 . 52 
1 9 9 8 1 6 . 8 3 4 . , 7 0 9 . , 7 9 2 3 . 87 0 . 19 1 . 28 - 0 . 10 0 . 48 
1 9 9 9 1 7 , . 8 9 5 . , 5 9 1 1 . , 6 0 2 4 . 17 0 . 15 1 . 1 1 - 0 . 1 1 0 . 40 
2 0 0 0 1 9 , . 2 4 6 . 03 1 2 . 97 2 5 . 52 0 . 1 1 0 . 84 - 0 . 14 0 . 3 6 
2 0 0 1 1 8 , . 4 7 6 . 09 1 2 . 51 2 4 . 43 0 . 10 0 . 83 - 0 . 14 0 . 34 
2 0 0 2 1 8 , . 0 7 6 . 14 1 2 . 2 9 2 3 . 85 0 . 09 0 . 7 4 - 0 . 15 0 . 33 
2 0 0 3 17 , . 1 6 5 . 7 1 1 1 . 2 6 2 3 . 07 0 . 14 1 . 15 - 0 . 10 0 . 39 
2 0 0 4 17 , . 3 4 5 . 58 1 1 . 2 3 2 3 . 45 0 . 15 1 . 17 - 0 . 10 0 . 40 
2 0 0 5 1 5 , . 9 1 5 . 23 9 . 93 2 1 . 89 0 . 2 3 1 . 8 3 - 0 . 02 0 . 48 
Note: Rates are calculated as a proportion of GDP, 
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I N C O M E , I N V E S T M E N T A N D S A V I N G 
T A B L E 3 .15 F E L D S T E I N A N D H O R I O K A S A M P L E C O U N T R I E S - R A T E S OF I N V E S T M E N T 
A N D N A T I O N A L S A V I N G 
n 525 0 . 9 9 Prob>F 0 
Po.t t-stat -95% +95% Pl.t t-stat -95% +95% 
1 9 7 1 3 . 3 9 0 . 92 - 3 . 8 8 1 0 . 6 7 0 . 8 7 6 . 33 0 . 60 1 . 1 5 
1 9 7 2 3 . 4 8 0 . 86 - 4 . 4 5 1 1 . 4 0 0 . 8 4 5 . 55 0 . 54 1 . 1 4 
1 9 7 3 4 . 3 9 1 . 03 - 4 . 0 3 1 2 . 8 2 0 . 8 3 5 . 27 0 . 52 1 . 1 5 
1 9 7 4 9 . 9 9 2 . 98 3 . 4 1 1 6 . 5 7 0 . 7 2 5 . 68 0 . 47 0 . 9 6 
1 9 7 5 3 . 3 6 0 . 82 - 4 . 6 5 1 1 . 3 7 0 . 9 2 5 . 30 0 . 58 1 . 2 6 
1 9 7 6 8 . 4 7 1 . 80 - 0 . 7 9 1 7 . 7 3 0 . 7 1 3 . 55 0 . 32 1 . 1 0 
1977 1 0 . 2 7 2 . 22 1 . 1 7 1 9 . 3 7 0 . 6 3 3 . 16 0 . 24 1 . 0 2 
1 9 7 8 1 0 . 1 4 2 . 20 1 . 0 8 1 9 . 2 1 0 . 6 1 2 . 98 0 . 21 1 . 0 0 
1 9 7 9 1 4 . 7 0 3 45 6 . 3 4 2 3 . 0 7 0 . 4 7 2 . 53 0 . 10 0 . 8 3 
1 9 8 0 9 . 8 7 2 77 2 . 8 6 1 6 . 8 7 0 . 6 8 4 . 24 0 . ,37 1 . 0 0 
1 9 8 1 1 1 . 5 6 3 57 5 . 2 1 1 7 . 9 2 0 . 5 7 3 . 82 0 . ,28 0 . 8 7 
1982 8 . 0 5 2 23 0 . 9 6 1 5 . 1 3 0 . 7 2 4 . 23 0 . ,39 1 . 0 6 
1 9 8 3 7 . 1 9 1 92 - 0 . 1 5 1 4 . 5 3 0 . 7 2 4 . 00 0 . ,37 1 . 0 8 
1984 1 2 . 2 4 2 . ,96 4 . 1 0 2 0 . 3 7 0 . 5 0 2 . 62 0 . ,12 0 . 8 7 
1 9 8 5 1 1 . 1 0 3 . , 06 3 . 9 6 1 8 . 2 3 0 . 5 5 3 . ,25 0 . .22 0 . 8 9 
1 9 8 6 1 0 . 0 9 2 . .84 3 . 1 0 1 7 . 0 8 0 . 5 8 3 . ,47 0 . .25 0 . 9 1 
1987 8 . 1 0 2 . . 0 6 0 . 3 5 1 5 . 8 5 0 . 6 6 3 . ,60 0, .30 1 . 0 2 
1 9 8 8 6 . 1 8 1. . 59 - 1 . 4 4 1 3 . 8 0 0 . 7 5 4, .38 0, . 41 1 . 0 9 
1 9 8 9 8 . 1 5 2, .22 0 . 95 1 5 . 3 6 0 . 7 1 4 , .44 0, . 40 1 . 0 3 
1 9 9 0 7 . 4 1 2 . 08 0 . 4 1 14 . 4 0 0 . 7 4 4, .64 0 .42 1 . 0 5 
1 9 9 1 7 . 7 1 2 . 56 1 . 7 8 1 3 . 6 4 0 . 6 9 4, . 76 0 . 40 0 . 9 7 
1992 8 . 7 2 3 . 1 5 3 . 2 9 1 4 . 1 5 0 . 6 2 4 . 4 6 0 .34 0 . 8 9 
1 9 9 3 8 . 1 2 2 . 7 4 2 . 3 0 1 3 . 9 4 0 . 5 9 4 . 05 0 . 3 1 0 . 8 8 
1994 9 . 4 5 2 . 6 2 2 . 3 5 1 6 . 5 5 0 . 5 3 3 . 10 0 . 2 0 0 . 8 7 
1 9 9 5 1 2 . 8 2 3 . 0 5 4 . 5 5 2 1 . 1 0 0 . 3 8 1 . 98 0 . 0 0 0 . 7 6 
1 9 9 6 1 1 . 0 9 2 . 6 5 2 . 8 6 1 9 . 3 2 0 . 4 5 2 . 3 3 0 .07 0 . 8 3 
1997 1 2 . 5 5 3 . 0 3 4 . 4 2 2 0 . 6 8 0 . 3 9 2 . 1 6 0 . 0 3 0 . 7 5 
1 9 9 8 1 2 . 3 3 2 . 77 3 . 5 7 2 1 . 0 9 0 . 4 2 2 . 1 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 8 1 
1 9 9 9 1 5 . 5 5 3 . 8 0 7 . 5 1 2 3 . 6 0 0 . 2 8 1 . 5 5 - 0 . 0 8 0 . 6 3 
2 0 0 0 1 5 . 0 4 3 . 7 8 7 . 2 1 2 2 . 8 7 0 . 3 1 1 . 8 0 - 0 . 0 3 0 . 6 5 
2 0 0 1 1 3 . 3 2 3 . 2 3 5 . 2 0 2 1 . 4 3 0 . 3 5 1 . 9 3 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 7 0 
2 0 0 2 1 3 . 6 9 3 . 3 6 5 . 6 9 2 1 . 6 9 0 . 3 0 1 . 6 6 - 0 . 0 6 0 . 6 6 
2 0 0 3 1 2 . 3 6 3 . 1 3 4 . 6 0 2 0 . 1 1 0 . 3 8 2 .12 0 . 0 3 0 . 7 3 
2 0 0 4 1 5 . 7 2 4 . 1 3 8 . 2 4 2 3 . 2 0 0 . 2 4 1 . 4 1 - 0 . 0 9 0 . 5 7 
2 0 0 5 1 5 . 7 0 4 . 4 1 8 . 7 0 2 2 . 7 0 0 . 2 7 1 . 68 - 0 . 0 5 0 . 5 8 
Note: Rates are calculated as a proportion of GNl. 
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I N C O M E , I N V E S T M E N T A N D S A V I N G 
T A B L E 3 . 1 6 N O N - O E C D C O U N T R I E S - R A T E S O F I N V E S T M E N T A N D D O M E S T I C S A V I N G 
n 2 6 6 0 0 . 8 9 P r o b > F 0 
fio.t t-stat -95% +95% P t-stat - 95% +95% 
1 9 7 1 15 77 9 28 12 44 1 9 , . 1 0 0 . 2 8 2 . 8 2 0 . 0 9 0 . 4 8 
1 9 7 2 14 52 7 92 10 93 1 8 , . 1 1 0 . 33 2 . 8 2 0 . 1 0 0 . 5 6 
1 9 7 3 1 6 77 7 07 12 12 2 1 . 4 2 0 . 1 8 1 . 1 9 - 0 . 1 2 0 . 4 8 
1 9 7 4 17 9 6 12 03 15 04 2 0 , . 8 9 0 . 2 3 2 . 8 0 0 . 0 7 0 . 3 8 
1 9 7 5 19 32 10 59 15 74 2 2 , . 9 0 0 . 2 3 2 . 1 6 0 . 0 2 0 . 4 4 
1 9 7 6 19 69 6 37 13 63 2 5 , . 7 6 0 . 2 1 1 . 4 0 - 0 . 0 9 0 . 5 2 
1 9 7 7 19 42 7 53 14 37 2 4 , . 4 7 0 . 2 5 2 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 4 9 
1 9 7 8 17 99 7 2 1 13 10 2 2 , . 8 8 0 . 3 7 2 . 9 7 0 . 1 2 0 . 6 1 
1 9 7 9 2 0 60 8 08 15 60 2 5 , . 5 9 0 . 1 7 1 . 4 6 - 0 . 0 6 0 . 4 0 
1 9 8 0 2 0 91 9 40 1 6 55 2 5 , . 2 7 0 . 1 8 1 . 7 2 - 0 . 0 2 0 . 3 8 
1 9 8 1 2 1 59 9 13 1 6 95 2 6 , . 2 2 0 . 2 0 1 . 6 0 - 0 . 0 4 0 . 4 4 
1 9 8 2 20 74 6 60 14 58 2 6 , . 8 9 0 . 2 1 1 . 2 2 - 0 . 1 3 0 . 5 6 
1 9 8 3 18 80 7 47 13 87 2 3 , . 7 3 0 . 2 1 1 . 4 7 - 0 . 0 7 0 . 4 8 
1 9 8 4 18 . 4 4 6 . , 4 3 1 2 , . 8 1 2 4 , . 0 7 0 . 1 6 1 . 0 3 - 0 . 1 4 0 . 4 6 
1 9 8 5 19 . 0 3 6 . , 1 9 1 3 , . 0 0 2 5 , . 0 6 0 . 12 0 . 67 - 0 . 2 2 0 . 4 5 
1 9 8 6 18 . 7 9 5 . , 8 3 1 2 , . 4 6 2 5 , . 11 0 . 1 2 0 . 6 3 - 0 . 2 5 0 . 4 8 
1 9 8 7 18 . 8 9 6 . . 5 6 1 3 , , 2 5 2 4 , . 5 3 0 . 0 9 0 . 5 6 - 0 . 2 2 0 . 4 0 
1 9 8 8 19 . 2 3 5 . , 8 7 1 2 , . 8 1 2 5 , . 6 5 0 . 1 1 0 . 6 1 - 0 , . 2 4 0 . 4 5 
1 9 8 9 18 . 4 5 5 . , 0 9 1 1 , . 3 4 2 5 , , 5 6 0 . 1 4 0 . 7 1 - 0 , . 2 4 0 . 5 1 
1 9 9 0 18 . 5 5 4 , 6 0 1 0 , . 6 4 2 6 , , 4 6 0 . 1 6 0 . 7 2 - 0 , . 2 7 0 , . 5 9 
1 9 9 1 2 1 . 2 4 6 . , 6 6 1 4 , . 9 8 2 7 , . 5 0 0, . 0 4 0 , . 2 1 - 0 , . 3 1 0 , . 3 8 
1 9 9 2 18 . 0 9 4 . , 4 8 1 0 , . 1 8 2 6 , , 0 1 0 , . 2 4 1, . 0 9 - 0 , , 1 9 0 , , 6 8 
1 9 9 3 16 . 7 8 4 . , 2 9 9 , , 1 1 2 4 , . 4 6 0, . 3 0 1, . 4 3 - 0 , , 1 1 0 , . 7 2 
1 9 9 4 18 . 8 0 6 . , 0 5 1 2 , , 7 1 2 4 , . 8 9 0 , . 2 1 1 , , 4 3 - 0 . , 0 8 0 . , 5 1 
1 9 9 5 19 . 4 5 4 . , 5 5 1 1 , , 0 7 27 , . 8 2 0 , , 1 8 0 , . 9 0 - 0 . , 2 2 0 , . 5 9 
1 9 9 6 16 . 6 8 4 . , 0 0 8 , , 5 1 2 4 , . 8 5 0 , . 2 9 1 , . 5 1 - 0 . , 0 9 0 . . 6 7 
1 9 9 7 17 . 9 6 4 . , 9 2 1 0 , . 8 1 2 5 . , 1 1 0 , , 2 5 1 , . 4 7 - 0 . , 0 8 0 . , 5 9 
1 9 9 8 19 . 0 4 6 . . 0 5 1 2 , . 8 7 2 5 . , 2 1 0 , , 2 0 1 , , 2 8 - 0 . , 1 1 0 . , 5 1 
1 9 9 9 17 . 7 4 6 . , 3 4 1 2 , , 2 6 2 3 . , 2 2 0 , , 1 8 1 , , 3 8 - 0 . , 0 8 0 . , 4 3 
2 0 0 0 18 . 3 0 1 0 . , 3 9 14 , . 8 4 2 1 . , 7 5 0 , , 1 5 1 . , 9 8 0 . , 0 0 0 . , 3 0 
2 0 0 1 17 . 8 8 1 0 . , 2 2 14 , . 4 5 2 1 . , 3 1 0 , . 2 0 2 . , 5 1 0 . , 0 4 0 . , 3 5 
2 0 0 2 17 . 5 2 9 . , 1 2 1 3 . . 7 5 2 1 . , 2 9 0 . . 1 8 1 . , 9 6 0 . , 0 0 0 . , 3 6 
2 0 0 3 18 . 7 9 1 0 . , 7 9 1 5 , , 3 8 2 2 . , 2 1 0 , , 1 3 1 . , 6 2 - 0 . , 0 3 0 . , 3 0 
2 0 0 4 2 0 . 0 6 1 1 . , 8 2 1 6 . , 7 3 2 3 . , 39 0 , , 1 2 1 . , 6 2 - 0 . , 0 2 0 . , 2 7 
2 0 0 5 2 1 . 6 6 1 4 . , 5 3 1 8 . , 7 4 2 4 . , 5 8 0 , , 0 6 0 . , 9 0 - 0 . , 0 7 0 . , 1 8 
Note: Rates are calculated as a proportion of GDP. 
Estimates have been corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
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I N C O M E , I N V E S T M E N T A N D S A V I N G 
T A B L E 3 .17 N O N - O E C D C O U N T R I E S - R A T E S O F I N V E S T M E N T A N D N A T I O N A L S A V I N G 
n 1 6 4 5 0 . 9 3 Prob>F 0 
Pc.t t-stat -95% +95% Pl.t t-stat -95% +95% 
1 9 7 1 1 0 . 6 9 4 . 6 2 6 . 1 5 1 5 . 2 4 1 0 . 7 0 4 . 7 0 0 . 4 1 1 . 0 0 
1 9 7 2 1 0 . 5 5 3 . 7 8 5 . 0 7 1 6 . 0 4 0 . 6 1 3 . 6 5 0 . 2 8 0 . 9 3 
1 9 7 3 1 2 . 8 0 4 . 8 5 7 . 6 2 1 7 . 9 7 0 . 4 6 3 . 1 5 0 . 1 8 0 . 7 5 
1 9 7 4 1 5 . 2 9 8 . 2 0 1 1 . 6 4 1 8 . 9 5 0 . 3 7 3 . 8 3 0 . 1 8 0 . 5 6 
1 9 7 5 1 4 . 6 1 8 . 8 7 1 1 . 3 8 1 7 . 8 4 0 . 4 5 4 . 4 1 0 . 2 5 0 . 6 5 
1 9 7 6 1 5 . 0 4 7 . 9 1 1 1 . 3 2 1 8 . 7 7 0 . 4 2 4 . 2 7 0 . 2 3 0 . 6 2 
1 9 7 7 1 6 . 0 0 5 . 5 9 1 0 . 3 9 2 1 . 6 2 0 . 4 2 3 . 0 5 0 . 1 5 0 . 6 9 
1 9 7 8 1 2 . 4 3 3 . 9 4 6 . 2 5 1 8 . 6 1 0 . 6 6 4 . 0 6 0 . 3 4 0 . 9 8 
1 9 7 9 1 2 . 9 4 4 . 2 7 7 . 0 0 1 8 . 8 8 0 . 5 8 4 . 2 7 0 . 3 2 0 . 8 5 
1 9 8 0 1 6 . 4 4 8 . 2 1 1 2 . 5 1 2 0 . 3 8 0 . 4 6 5 . 2 1 0 . 2 9 0 . 6 3 
1 9 8 1 1 6 . 2 5 8 . 2 7 1 2 . 4 0 2 0 . 1 1 0 . 5 0 5 . 3 3 0 . 3 2 0 . 6 9 
1 9 8 2 1 8 . 4 0 6 . 5 1 1 2 . 8 6 2 3 . 9 4 0 . 3 5 2 . 4 2 0 . 0 7 0 . 6 3 
1 9 8 3 1 4 . 8 1 7 . 2 1 1 0 . 7 8 1 8 . 8 4 0 . 4 2 3 . 9 7 0 . 2 1 0 . 6 3 
1 9 8 4 1 4 . 6 7 5 . 3 5 9 . 2 9 2 0 . 0 4 0 . 4 2 2 . 9 7 0 . 1 4 0 . 6 9 
1 9 8 5 1 2 . 7 2 4 . 8 2 7 . 5 4 1 7 . 8 9 0 . 4 8 3 . 5 8 0 . 2 2 0 . 7 5 
1 9 8 6 1 2 . 0 7 6 . 0 3 8 . 1 4 1 6 . 0 0 0 . 4 6 4 . 2 4 0 . 2 5 0 . 6 8 
1 9 8 7 1 4 . 5 9 8 . 8 5 1 1 . 3 5 1 7 . 8 2 0 . 3 5 3 . 5 2 0 . 1 6 0 . 5 5 
1 9 8 8 1 7 . 7 0 6 . 1 6 1 2 . 0 6 2 3 . 3 3 0 . 2 4 1 . 7 9 - 0 . 0 2 0 . 5 0 
1 9 8 9 1 7 . 4 8 5 . 1 1 1 0 . 7 7 2 4 . 1 9 0 . 2 5 1 . 5 3 - 0 . 0 7 0 . 5 6 
1 9 9 0 1 1 . 2 8 8 . 2 5 8 . 6 0 1 3 . 9 6 0 . 5 5 7 . 5 3 0 . 4 1 0 . 7 0 
1 9 9 1 1 6 . 4 1 5 . 5 3 1 0 . 5 9 2 2 . 2 2 0 . 3 3 2 . 1 6 0 . 0 3 0 . 6 3 
1 9 9 2 1 9 . 3 9 6 . 3 0 1 3 . 3 5 2 5 . 4 3 0 . 2 1 1 . 3 6 - 0 . 0 9 0 . 5 1 
1 9 9 3 1 4 . 9 2 3 . 9 2 7 . 4 5 2 2 . 3 9 0 . 4 3 2 . 1 8 0 . 0 4 0 . 8 1 
1 9 9 4 1 2 . 4 8 4 . 6 6 7 . 2 2 1 7 . 7 3 0 . 5 7 4 . 6 8 0 . 3 3 0 . 8 1 
1 9 9 5 1 3 . 8 1 5 . 9 1 9 . 2 3 1 8 . 4 0 0 . 4 9 4 . 2 3 0 . 2 6 0 . 7 2 
1 9 9 6 1 0 . 1 3 3 . 1 5 3 . 8 1 1 6 . 4 4 0 . 6 5 4 . 2 8 0 . 3 5 0 . 9 5 
1 9 9 7 1 3 . 4 5 5 . 8 4 8 . 9 3 1 7 . 9 6 0 . 5 1 4 . 9 5 0 . 3 1 0 . 7 1 
1 9 9 8 1 4 . 3 3 8 . 3 5 1 0 . 9 7 1 7 . 7 0 0 . 4 5 5 . 8 2 0 . 3 0 0 . 6 0 
1 9 9 9 1 3 . 4 4 7 . 4 4 9 . 8 9 1 6 . 9 8 0 . 4 5 5 . 6 1 0 . 2 9 0 . 6 0 
2 0 0 0 1 5 . 0 0 1 0 . 8 9 1 2 . 3 0 1 7 . 7 1 0 . 3 5 5 . 8 2 0 . 2 3 0 . 4 7 
2 0 0 1 1 4 . 7 9 9 . 7 9 1 1 . 8 3 1 7 . 7 6 0 . 3 8 5 . 9 0 0 . 2 6 0 . 5 1 
2 0 0 2 1 2 . 3 5 7 . 7 5 9 . 2 2 1 5 . 4 7 0 . 4 9 5 . 8 2 0 . 3 2 0 . 6 5 
2 0 0 3 1 3 . 1 0 7 . 1 6 9 . 5 1 1 6 . 6 9 0 . 4 4 4 . 7 2 0 . 2 6 0 . 6 2 
2 0 0 4 1 4 . 7 5 5 . 5 6 9 . 5 5 1 9 . 9 5 0 . 4 1 3 . 7 2 0 . 1 9 0 . 6 2 
2 0 0 5 1 1 8 . 7 9 6 . 1 8 1 2 . 8 2 2 4 . 7 5 0 . 2 4 1 . 9 4 0 . 0 0 0 . 4 8 
Note: Rates are calculated as a proportion of GNI. 
Estimates have been corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
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I N C O M E , I N V E S T M E N T A N D S A V I N G 
T A B L E 3 . 1 8 N O N - O E C D , N O N O I L E X P O R T I N G C O U N T R I E S - R A T E S O F I N V E S T M E N T A N D 
D O M E S T I C S A V I N G 
n 2 4 1 5 0 . 8 9 P r o b > F 0 
/3o,t t - s t a t -95% +95% P I,t t-stat - 95% +95% 
1 9 7 1 15 18 7 89 11 41 18 , . 9 5 0 . 3 0 2 . 2 8 0 . 0 4 0 . 5 5 
1 9 7 2 14 01 7 33 10 26 1 7 . . 7 6 0 . 3 2 2 . 4 7 0 . 0 7 0 . 5 7 
1 9 7 3 14 75 7 80 11 04 18 , . 4 5 0 . 3 0 2 . 5 7 0 . 0 7 0 . 5 2 
1 9 7 4 18 12 10 96 14 88 2 1 , . 3 6 0 . 2 0 1 . 9 4 0 . 0 0 0 . 4 1 
1 9 7 5 19 33 11 85 16 13 2 2 . . 52 0 . 1 9 1 . 9 1 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 3 8 
1 9 7 6 20 57 8 51 15 83 2 5 . . 3 1 0 . 1 0 0 . 7 7 - 0 . 1 5 0 . 3 5 
1 9 7 7 20 06 9 97 16 12 2 4 . , 0 1 0, . 1 5 1 . 5 7 - 0 . 0 4 0 . 3 5 
1 9 7 8 18 22 7 36 13 36 2 3 . . 0 8 0, . 3 2 2 . 4 0 0 . 0 6 0 . 5 8 
1 9 7 9 20 83 8 35 15 94 2 5 . . 7 3 0, . 1 4 1 . 1 2 - 0 . 1 1 0 . 3 9 
1 9 8 0 20 67 8 25 15 75 2 5 . . 5 8 0, . 1 8 1 . 3 1 - 0 . 0 9 0 . 4 5 
1 9 8 1 2 1 47 8 32 16 41 2 6 . . 5 3 0, . 19 1, . 1 9 - 0 . 1 2 0 . 4 9 
1 9 8 2 2 1 36 7 33 15 65 2 7 . .08 0, . 1 3 0, . 6 9 - 0 . 2 3 0, . 4 8 
1 9 8 3 18 99 8 43 14 57 2 3 . , 40 0, . 1 5 1, . 1 0 - 0 . 1 2 0, . 4 3 
1 9 8 4 1 8 , . 5 1 6, . 8 3 13 . 1 9 2 3 . , 82 0, . 12 0, . 7 4 - 0 . 2 0 0 , . 44 
1 9 8 5 1 9 , . 40 6, . 9 7 13 . 9 4 2 4 . , 8 6 0, . 0 6 0, . 34 - 0 . 2 7 0 , . 3 8 
1 9 8 6 1 8 , . 64 6, . 0 7 12 . 6 2 2 4 . , 66 0, . 0 9 0, . 4 8 - 0 . 2 6 0 . . 44 
1 9 8 7 1 8 , .87 6, . 6 8 13 . 3 3 2 4 . , 40 0 . . 0 8 0, . 5 0 - 0 . 2 3 0 . . 3 9 
1 9 8 8 19 , . 3 6 6, . 0 7 13 . 1 1 2 5 . , 61 0, . 0 9 0 . . 5 0 - 0 . 2 5 0 . ,42 
1 9 8 9 18 , . 44 4, . 9 8 11 . 1 8 2 5 . , 70 0, . 1 5 0 . . 7 3 - 0 . 2 5 0 . ,54 
1 9 9 0 18 , . 5 3 4, . 4 2 10 . 3 2 2 6 . , 7 5 0 . . 1 8 0 . . 7 3 - 0 , . 3 0 0 . , 6 5 
1 9 9 1 2 1 , . 32 7, . 0 1 15 . 3 6 2 7 . , 29 0 . . 00 0 . . 0 3 - 0 , . 3 5 0 . , 36 
1 9 9 2 18 , . 3 1 4 . 5 3 10 . 3 8 2 6 . ,24 0 . . 22 0 . , 92 - 0 , . 2 5 0 . ,68 
1 9 9 3 16 , .87 4 . 2 4 9 . 0 7 2 4 . , 6 6 0 . . 30 1 . , 3 1 - 0 , . 1 5 0 . , 7 5 
1 9 9 4 18 . 5 5 5 . 6 3 12 . 0 9 2 5 . , 0 1 0 . , 2 5 1 . , 4 5 - 0 , . 0 9 0 . ,58 
1 9 9 5 19 . 4 6 4 . 2 7 10 . 5 2 2 8 . , 4 1 0 . , 19 0 . ,77 - 0 , . 2 9 0 . , 66 
1 9 9 6 16 . 4 8 3 . 6 6 7 . 6 6 2 5 . , 30 0 . , 3 3 1 . , 39 - 0 , . 14 0 . 79 
1 9 9 7 17 . 8 9 4 . 3 8 9 . 8 8 2 5 . , 90 0 . , 2 6 1 . , 19 - 0 , .17 0 . 68 
1 9 9 8 19 . 4 0 6 . 3 5 13 . 4 1 2 5 . , 39 0 . ,14 0 . ,88 - 0 , .17 0 . 46 
1 9 9 9 17 . 9 8 5 . 95 12 . 0 6 2 3 . , 9 1 0 . , 1 5 0 . , 9 6 - 0 , . 1 6 0 . 46 
2 0 0 0 17 . 9 4 8 . 7 6 13 . 9 2 2 1 . , 96 0 . ,18 1 . , 7 3 - 0 , . 02 0 . 38 
2 0 0 1 17 . 8 6 9 . 0 6 14 . 0 0 2 1 . ,73 0 . , 19 1 . ,82 - 0 , . 02 0 . 40 
2 0 0 2 17 . 6 1 8 . 1 4 13 . 3 7 2 1 . , 86 0 . ,17 1 . , 39 - 0 , .07 0 . 41 
2 0 0 3 18 . 9 7 9 . 5 4 15 . 0 7 2 2 . ,87 0 . ,12 1 . ,04 - 0 , . 1 0 0 . 34 
2 0 0 4 20 . 0 4 10 . 4 0 16 . 2 6 2 3 . ,83 0 . .12 1 . ,22 - 0 , . 0 8 0 . 32 
2 0 0 5 21 . 5 2 12 . 5 4 18 . 1 5 2 4 . ,88 0 . ,07 0 . , 79 - 0 , . 1 0 0 . 25 
Note: Rates are calculated as a proportion of GDP. 
Estimates have been corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
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INCOME, INVESTMENT AND SAVING 
TABLE 3.19 NON-OECD, NON OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES - RATES OF INVESTMENT AND 
NATIONAL SAVING 
n 1 5 4 0 0 . 9 3 P r o b > F 0 
Po.r t - s t a t -95% +95% Pi t - s t a t -95% +95% 
1 9 7 1 1 1 . 10 4 . 2 6 5 . 99 1 6 . 2 0 0 . 65 3 . 5 1 0 . 2 9 1 . 02 
1 9 7 2 1 1 . 03 3 . 65 5 . 10 1 6 . 9 6 0 . 55 2 . 77 0 . 16 0 . 93 
1 9 7 3 1 3 . 55 5 . 04 8 . 28 1 8 . 82 0 . 40 2 . 40 0 . 07 0 . 72 
1 9 7 4 1 5 . 27 7 . 3 5 1 1 . 2 0 1 9 . 3 5 0 . 37 3 . 1 1 0 . 14 0 . 61 
1 9 7 5 1 5 . 16 8 . 60 1 1 . 7 1 1 8 . 62 0 . 40 3 . 54 0 . 18 0 . 63 
1 9 7 6 1 6 . 02 9 . 12 1 2 . 58 1 9 . 4 6 0 . 34 3 . 85 0 . 17 0 . 52 
1 9 7 7 1 7 . 7 6 6 . 8 1 1 2 . 64 2 2 . 87 0 . 28 2 . 41 0 . 05 0 . 50 
1 9 7 8 1 3 . 80 4 . 68 8 02 1 9 . 58 0 . 5 5 3 . 50 0 . 24 0 . 85 
1 9 7 9 1 3 . 45 4 . 32 7 34 1 9 . 5 6 0 . 54 3 . 61 0 . 2 5 0 . 84 
1 9 8 0 1 6 . 46 7 73 12 28 2 0 . 64 0 . 4 6 4 . 38 0 . , 2 6 0 . 67 
1 9 8 1 15 93 7 54 1 1 78 2 0 . 08 0 . 54 4 . 83 0 . , 32 0 . 7 6 
1 9 8 2 18 7 0 6 53 13 08 2 4 . 32 0 . 3 1 2 . 02 0 . , 0 1 0 . 60 
1 9 8 3 15 2 1 7 2 9 11 12 1 9 . 2 9 0 . 39 3 . 5 6 0 . . 1 7 0 . 60 
1 9 8 4 1 4 . , 9 5 5 . , 3 6 9 . , 4 8 2 0 . 42 0 . , 3 9 2 . 67 0 . . 1 0 0 . , 6 7 
1 9 8 5 1 3 . , 0 7 4 . , 9 0 7 , . 8 3 1 8 . , 3 1 0 . , 4 6 3 . , 3 0 0 , . 1 9 0 . , 7 3 
1 9 8 6 1 1 . . 9 3 5 . , 8 7 7 , . 9 4 1 5 . , 9 2 0 . , 4 5 4 . , 0 8 0 , . 2 3 0 . , 6 6 
1 9 8 7 1 4 , . 5 4 8 . . 8 4 11 . 3 1 1 7 . , 7 6 0 , . 3 4 3 . , 4 0 0 , . 1 4 0 . , 5 4 
1 9 8 8 1 7 , . 6 9 6 , . 1 1 12 . 0 1 2 3 . . 3 8 0 , . 2 3 1 . . 7 4 - 0 , . 0 3 0 , . 4 9 
1 9 8 9 17 . 5 7 5 , . 1 1 10 . 8 2 2 4 , . 3 2 0 , . 2 5 1 , . 5 3 - 0 . 0 7 0 , . 5 6 
1 9 9 0 1 1 . 1 7 8 . 2 7 8 . 5 2 1 3 , . 8 2 0 . 5 9 9, . 0 2 0 . 4 6 0 , . 7 2 
1 9 9 1 16 . 6 2 5 . 6 2 10 . 8 2 2 2 . 4 2 0 . 3 2 2 . 0 5 0 . 0 1 0, . 6 3 
1 9 9 2 19 . 5 4 6 . 4 4 13 . 5 8 2 5 . 5 0 0 . 2 0 1 . 3 0 - 0 . 1 0 1 0 . 5 0 
1 9 9 3 15 . 0 9 3 . 93 7 . 5 7 22 . 6 2 0 . 4 2 2 . 1 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 8 1 
1 9 9 4 12 . 65 4 . 7 4 7 . 4 1 17 . 8 9 0 . 5 7 4 . 7 0 0 . 3 3 0 . 8 1 
1 9 9 5 13 . 8 4 5 . 8 7 9 . 2 1 18 . 4 6 0 . 5 0 4 . 1 6 0 . 2 6 0 . 7 3 
1 9 9 6 9 . 8 9 3 . 1 3 3 . 7 0 1 6 . 0 9 0 . 6 9 4 . 4 8 0 . 3 9 0 . 9 9 
1 9 9 7 13 . 1 2 5 . 5 3 8 . 4 7 17 . 7 7 0 . 5 3 4 . 8 0 0 . 3 1 0 . 7 4 
1 9 9 8 14 . 4 0 8 . 3 1 1 1 . 0 1 17 . 8 0 c . 4 2 5 . 4 6 0 . 2 7 0 . 5 7 
1 9 9 9 13 . 5 3 7 . 4 2 9 . 9 5 17 . 1 1 0 . 4 4 5 . 2 1 0 . 2 7 0 . 6 0 
2 0 0 0 14 . 6 5 10 . 5 0 11 . 91 17 . 3 9 0 . 3 9 5 . 8 4 0 . 2 6 0 . 5 1 
2 0 0 1 14 . 7 2 9 . 3 5 1 1 . 63 17 . 8 0 0 . 3 9 5 . 3 0 0 . 2 4 0 . 5 3 
2 0 0 2 12 . 1 9 7 . 2 8 8 . 9 0 15 . 4 7 0 . 5 0 5 . 3 8 0 . 3 2 0 . 6 9 
2 0 0 3 12 . 5 3 6 . 4 1 8 . 7 0 1 6 . 3 7 0 . 4 8 4 . 6 6 0 . 2 8 0 . 6 9 
2 0 0 4 14 . 1 5 5 . 0 0 8 . 6 0 19 . 7 1 0 . 4 5 3 . 7 6 0 . 2 2 0 . 6 9 
2 0 0 5 18 . 1 6 5 . 2 1 11 . 3 3 2 5 . 0 0 0 . 2 9 1 . 9 2 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 5 8 
Note: Rates are calculated as a proportion of GNl. 
Estimates have been corrected for heteroskcdasticity. 
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INCOME, INVESTMENT AND SAVING 
LONG RUN IMPACT OF RATES OF SAVING ON RATES OF INVESTMENT 
TABLE 3.20 OECD COUNTRIES - LONG RUN IMPACT OF DOMESTIC SAVING ON 
INVESTMENT 
Pc , t t-stat 95% +95% 1 Si.t t-stat -95% +95% R' 
1 9 7 5 * 2. 94 0 . 58 - 7 . 6 1 1 3 . , 4 9 0 . 9 3 4 . , 6 7 0 . 5 1 1 . 3 4 0 , . 7 4 
1 9 8 0 1 6 . , 6 3 4 . 14 8 . 2 7 24 . , 9 9 0 . 3 5 2 . , 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 7 0 0 , . 1 3 
1 9 8 5 1 3 . , 8 8 3 . , 9 5 6 . 5 7 2 1 . , 1 9 0 . 4 1 2 . , 7 0 0 . 0 9 0 , . 7 2 0 , . 2 2 
1 9 9 0 * 1 2 . , 1 4 3 . , 2 4 4 . 3 5 1 9 . , 9 3 0 . 4 7 2 . , 8 8 0 . 1 3 0 , . 8 0 0 , . 4 3 
1 9 9 5 * 1 4 , , 8 8 5 . , 1 2 8 . 8 4 2 0 . , 9 3 0 . 2 6 1 . , 9 9 - 0 . 0 1 0 , . 5 2 0 . , 2 2 
2 0 0 0 * 1 9 . , 5 4 1 0 , , 3 2 1 5 . 6 1 2 3 . , 4 8 0 . 0 9 1 . , 2 7 - 0 . 0 5 0 , , 2 3 0 . , 0 5 
2 0 0 5 * 1 9 . , 8 9 9 . , 8 2 1 5 . 68 24 , , 1 1 0 . 0 6 0 . 78 - 0 . 0 9 0 . . 2 1 0 . , 0 2 
TABLE 3.21 OECD COUNTRIES - LONG RUN IMPACT OF NATIONAL SAVING ON 
INVESTMENT 
1 3o,t t-stat 95% +95% Pl.t t-stat -95% +95% R' 
1 9 7 5 * 4. , 5 1 2. , 1 8 0 . 1 9 8 , . 8 4 0 . 8 7 1 0 , . 3 2 0 . 6 9 1 . 0 4 0 . 7 6 
1 9 8 0 1 0 . , 9 7 3 . , 0 8 3 . 5 2 1 8 , . 4 2 0 . 6 2 4 , . 1 3 0 . 3 0 0 . 9 3 0 . 4 5 
1 9 8 5 1 2 , , 2 3 3 . , 9 4 5 . 7 4 1 8 , , 7 3 0 . 5 2 3 , , 69 0 . 2 2 0 . 8 1 0 . 3 9 
1 9 9 0 * 8, . 5 4 5 . , 5 5 5 . 3 2 1 1 , . 7 6 0 . 6 7 8 . . 7 4 0 . 5 1 0 . 8 3 0 , . 7 3 
1 9 9 5 * 9, , 90 4 , , 2 4 5 . 0 2 1 4 , . 7 8 0 . 5 3 4 , , 5 2 0 . 2 8 0 . 7 7 0 , . 5 8 
2 0 0 0 1 7 , . 7 0 5 . , 4 9 10 . 9 5 2 4 , , 4 5 0 . 1 8 1 . . 3 1 - 0 . 1 1 0 . 4 8 0 , . 0 3 
2 0 0 5 2 0 , . 2 5 5 , , 8 2 12 . 9 7 2 7 . . 5 2 0 . 0 5 0 , , 3 3 - 0 . 2 7 0 . 3 7 - 0 , . 0 5 
TABLE 3.22 FELDSTEIN AND HORIOKA SAMPLE COUNTRIES - LONG RUN IMPACT OF 
DOMESTIC SAVING ON INVESTMENT 
/ 3o,t t-stat -95% +95% I.t t-stat 95% +95% R' 
1 9 7 5 - 0 . , 3 0 - 0 , . 1 3 - 5 . 0 9 4 . , 5 0 1 , . 0 6 1 3 . , 8 7 0 . 8 9 1 . , 2 2 0 , . 9 3 
1 9 8 0 * 1 3 . , 8 4 2 , . 4 3 1 . 6 1 2 6 . , 0 7 0 , . 4 7 1 . , 9 9 - 0 . 0 4 0 . , 9 8 0 , . 4 1 
1 9 8 5 7 . . 0 7 1 , . 6 6 - 2 . 0 6 1 6 . , 1 9 0 , . 7 1 3 . , 7 6 0 . 3 1 1 . , 1 2 0 , . 4 7 
1 9 9 0 * 8, , 7 0 2 , . 0 8 - 0 . 2 8 17 . , 6 8 0 , . 6 1 3 . , 5 0 0 . 2 4 0 . , 98 0 , . 5 4 
1 9 9 5 * 1 0 . . 7 2 1 , . 8 3 - 1 . 8 7 2 3 . , 3 1 0 , . 4 4 1 . , 6 3 - 0 . 1 4 1 . , 0 2 0 , . 3 0 
2 0 0 0 1 7 . , 4 3 6, . 1 0 1 1 . 3 0 2 3 . , 5 6 0 , . 1 6 1 . , 3 3 - 0 . 1 0 0 . , 4 1 0, . 0 5 
2 0 0 5 * 1 7 , , 4 0 6, . 2 6 11 . 4 3 2 3 . , 3 6 0 , . 1 4 1 . , 3 8 - 0 . 0 8 0 . , 3 7 0 , . 1 1 
TABLE 3.23 FELDSTEIN AND HORIOKA SAMPLE COUNTRIES - LONG RUN IMPACT OF 
NATIONAL SAVING ON INVESTMENT 
Po.t t-stat -95% +95% ^ I.t t-stat -95% +95% R' 
1 9 7 5 4 . 7 4 1 . 6 2 - 1 . 5 7 1 1 , . 0 4 0 . 8 4 7 . 5 2 0 , . 6 0 1 . 0 9 0 , . 8 0 
1 9 8 0 * 10 . 3 4 2 . 2 5 0 . 4 1 2 0 , . 2 8 0 . 6 3 3 . 4 0 0 , . 2 3 1 . 0 4 0 , . 5 6 
1 9 8 5 * 10 . 1 9 2 . 6 7 1 . 94 1 8 , . 4 4 0 . 6 1 3 . 5 7 0 , . 2 4 0 . 9 7 0 . 4 6 
1 9 9 0 * 8 . 0 3 6 . 1 9 5 . 2 3 1 0 , . 8 4 0 . 6 9 9, . 7 2 0 , . 5 4 0 . 8 4 0 . 7 1 
1 9 9 5 * 8 . 5 4 3 . 5 9 3 . 4 1 1 3 , . 6 8 0 . 6 0 4 , . 9 1 0, . 3 4 0 . 8 6 0 . 6 5 
2 0 0 0 1 3 , . 5 2 3 . 3 7 4 . 8 5 2 2 . , 2 0 0 . 3 6 2 , . 0 2 - 0 , . 0 2 0 . 7 4 0 . 1 8 
2 0 0 5 * 1 3 , . 8 8 3 . 1 0 4 . 2 2 2 3 . , 5 4 0 . 3 2 1, . 5 2 - 0 , . 1 3 0 . 7 7 0 . 1 5 
Notes: * indicates correction for hetoroskedasticity. 
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TABLE 3.24 NON-OECD COUNTRIES - LONG RUN IMPACT OF DOMESTIC SAVING ON 
INVESTMENT 
/ 3o.t t-stat -95% +95% [,t t-stat -95% +95% R' 
1 9 7 5 * 16 . ,77 9 . 8 2 1 3 . 3 7 20 , . 17 0, . 25 2 . . 41 0, .04 0 . 4 6 0 . 2 1 
1 9 8 0 * 19 . ,88 7 . 6 4 1 4 . 7 0 25 , . 07 0, . 23 1. .82 -0 , .02 0 . 4 7 0 .20 
1 9 8 5 * 19 . . 69 6 . 8 2 1 3 . 9 4 25 , . 43 0 . 18 1. . 13 -0 , .14 0 . 5 0 0 . 13 
1 9 9 0 * 18 . . 93 5 . 3 8 1 1 . 9 2 25, . 9 5 0 . 1 1 0, .58 -0 , .27 0 . 5 0 0 . 05 
1 9 9 5 * 18 , . 78 4 . 6 0 1 0 . 6 4 26 .92 0 . 20 0, . 94 -0 . 23 0 . 6 4 0 .10 
2 0 0 0 * 18 . 05 5 . 9 9 1 2 . 0 5 24 . 0 6 0 . 2 1 1, . 48 -0 .07 0 . 4 9 0 . 15 
2 0 0 5 * 19 . 20 1 2 . 0 4 1 6 . 0 2 22 . 38 0 . 1 3 1 . 84 -0 . 0 1 0 . 2 8 0 . 10 
TABLE 3.25 NON-OECD COUNTRIES - LONG RUN IMPACT OF NATIONAL SAVING ON 
INVESTMENT 
Po.t t-stat -95% +95% Pi , t t-stat -95% +95% 
1975 1 2 . 4 4 8 . 17 9 . 3 8 1 5 . 51 0 . 53 6 . 72 0 . 3 7 0 . 69 0 . 49 
1 9 8 0 * 1 4 . 1 0 5 . 63 9 . 0 6 1 9 . 15 0 . 54 4 . 41 0 . 2 9 0 . 78 0 . 48 
1 9 8 5 * 1 5 . 1 7 6 . 43 1 0 . 4 2 1 9 . 92 0 . 45 3 . 79 0 . 2 1 0 . 69 0 . ,38 
1 9 9 0 * 1 4 . 2 2 7 . 21 1 0 . 2 5 1 8 . 19 0 . 40 4 . 27 0 . 2 1 0 . 58 0 . ,42 
1 9 9 5 * 1 6 . 1 0 4 . 95 9 . 5 5 2 2 . 65 0 . 37 2 . 29 0 . 0 5 0 . 70 0 . ,36 
2 0 0 0 * 1 3 . 5 9 7 . 94 1 0 . 1 4 17 . 03 0 . 46 6 . 57 0 . 3 2 0 . ,60 0 . ,48 
2005 1 4 . 2 2 9 . 14 1 1 . 0 9 17 . ,35 0 . 41 6 . ,13 0 . 2 8 0 . ,55 0 . .44 
TABLE 3.: 26 NON-OECD, NON OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES - LONG RUN IMPACT OF 
DOMESTIC SAVING ON INVESTMENT 
Po.t t-stat -95% +95% P: [,t t-stat -95% +95% le 
1 9 7 5 * 1 6 . 2 5 9, .00 1 2 . 6 5 19, . 8 6 0, . 26 2 . 19 0 . 0 2 0, .50 0 .20 
1 9 8 0 * 2 0 . 3 1 8, . 3 6 1 5 . 4 6 25 . 1 6 0 .17 1 . 28 - 0 . 0 9 0 .42 0 . 1 1 
1 9 8 5 * 2 0 . 0 5 7 . 58 1 4 . 7 7 25 . 32 0 .12 0 . 7 3 - 0 . 2 1 0 . 45 0 . 0 6 
1 9 9 0 * 1 8 . 9 8 5 . 50 1 2 . 0 9 25 . 87 0 . 10 0 . 52 - 0 . 2 9 0 . 4 9 0 . 04 
1 9 9 5 * 1 8 . 8 6 4 . 5 0 1 0 . 4 9 27 . 2 3 0 . 20 0 . 8 1 - 0 . 2 9 0 . 68 0 . 08 
2 0 0 0 * 1 8 . 1 4 5 . 5 1 1 1 . 5 6 24 . 7 1 0 . 2 0 1 . 14 - 0 . 1 5 0 . 54 0 . 11 
2 0 0 5 * 1 9 . 1 9 10 . 4 1 1 5 . 5 1 22 . 87 0 . 1 3 1 . 3 1 - 0 . 0 7 0 . 34 0 . 07 
TABLE 3.27 NON-OECD, NON OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES - LONG RUN IMPACT OF 
NATIONAL SAVING ON INVESTMENT 
I 3o,t t-stat -95% +95% Pi ,t t-stat 
-95% +95% R' 
1 9 7 5 * 13 , . 08 5 . 5 0 8 . 2 8 1 7 . 8 7 0 . 48 3 . 19 0 . 1 8 0 . 
78 0 . ,40 
1 9 8 0 * 15, . 03 6 . 0 2 9 . 9 9 2 0 . 0 7 0 . 46 3 . ,67 0 . 2 1 
0 . ,72 0 . ,38 
1 9 8 5 * 15, . 50 6 . 3 9 1 0 . 6 0 2 0 . 3 9 0 . 42 3 . ,36 0 . 1 7 0 . 
,68 0 . .33 
1 9 9 0 * 14 . 29 7 . 2 1 1 0 . 2 9 1 8 . 2 9 0 . ,39 4 . ,20 0 . 2 0 
0. .58 0, .42 
1 9 9 5 * 16 . 28 5 . 0 3 9 . 7 5 2 2 . 8 2 0 . ,37 2 , . 25 0 . 0 4 
0, .70 0 . 3 6 
2 0 0 0 * 13 . 4 9 1.16 9 . 9 8 1 7 . 0 0 0 . .47 6, . 29 
0 . 3 2 0, . 62 0 . 47 
2005 13 . 6 6 8 . 4 0 1 0 . 3 8 1 6 . 9 4 0 , . 46 6, . 0 9 0 . 3 1 
0 . 6 1 0 . 4 6 
Notes: * indicates correction for heteroskedasticity. 
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4 M O T I V A T I N G D O M E S T I C I N V E S T M E N T 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that the Puzzle no longer applies to OECD countries, and has 
never applied strongly to developing countries. The fact that capital is internationally 
mobile is now supported by evidence of the non-zero current account balances of most 
countries, and the non-unity correlation between rates of investment and saving across 
countries. The previous chapter also showed that the coefficient on the rate of saving is 
higher for the sample of developing countries than for OECD countries, which implies 
that on average, a developing country is more likely to retain saving as domestic 
investment. This is consistent with poorer countries having less sophisticated financial 
markets than richer countries. The fact that poorer countries are exporting any capital 
at all to the OECD countries, however, is at odds with the diminishing marginal 
returns to capital that characterise the neo-classical model. The fact that this is 
happening shows that, as with empirical tests of the neo-classical growth model, it is 
necessary to control for variables other than income and the rate of saving when 
seeking to understand what determines a country's rate of investment. 
Figure 4.1 shows the relationship between rates of gross domestic saving and 
investment in some of the OECD countries. As is consistent with Figure 3.1, some of 
these countries import capital, despite having relatively high levels of GDP per capita. 
Luxembourg, which was omitted from Feldstein and Horioka's sample due to issues of 
data consistency, shows a large current account surplus over this thirty-five year 
period. Tesar, who extended Feldstein and Horioka's analysis to 1986 found that 
including Luxembourg in the sample of countries tended to reduce the estimated 
coefficient on the rate of saving (1991). For other OECD countries — such as the 
Netherlands and the USA as shown - the gap between rates of investment and saving 
has grown over time. Figure 4.2 shows rates of gross domestic saving and investment 
for non-OECD countries. Rates of investment and saving in natural resource intensive 
economies such as Botswana and Lesotho (diamonds) and Saudi Arabia and Venezuela 
(oil) are almost totally independent of one another. In the Asian countries shown, the 
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relat ionships be tween rates of investment and saving are more closely l inked, but even 
then, it is eas ier to see the impact of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis in the sudden fall in 
the rate of inves tment in relatively open economies such as South Korea and Indonesia, 
c o m p a r e d to countr ies that had relatively more restricted foreign investment policies, 
such as India and China . 
F r o m looking only at rates of investment and saving, and levels of income or capital 
per capita, it is not clear w h y some countries retain more of their national or domest ic 
saving as local investment than others. Clearly capital is internationally mobile, but it is 
not possible to m a k e a j u d g e m e n t on whether or not net capital f lows are moving in the 
right direction — that is, out of countries that have relatively low marginal products of 
capital , and into countries that have relatively high marginal products of capital. As the 
discussion in section 2.4.2 showed, the difference in marginal products of capital across 
countr ies — even if corrected for m e a s u r e m e n t errors — does not explain the direction 
of capital f low. Analys ing the direction of capital f low is complicated by the fact that 
m o s t countr ies s imultaneously import and export capital. In addition, as Figure 4.3 
shows, the a m o u n t s of capital that a country exports are similar in magni tude to the 
a m o u n t s of capital that the same country imports . A n y model that seeks to explain 
w h y s o m e countr ies import capital, and other countries export capital, will also need to 
provide a rationale for these s imul taneous in- and outf lows of capital, so that it can 
determine w h y countr ies import or export capital in net terms. Including these 
addit ional var iables in an alternative model will determine what drives investment in 
deve loping countries , given that the variation in rates of investment across these 
countr ies cannot be expla ined by the variation in their rates of saving alone, or the 
variation in their levels of income or product ion. 
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FIGURE 4.1 INVESTMENT AND SAVING RATIOS - SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES 
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FIGURE 4.2 INVESTMENT AND SAVING RATIOS - SELECTED NON-OECD COUNTRIES 
Botswana Lesotho 
Source: (The World Bank, 2009) 
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FIGURE 4.3 INWARD AND OUTWARD FOREIGN INVESTMENT FLOWS, SELECTED 
COUNTRIES FOR 2007 
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Notes: Investment flows are made up of direct investment/" portfolio investment/' and 'other i n v e s t m e n f I t excludes 
changes in the holdings of reserves.'^ 
The 'gravity equation' from the international trade literature is one such model, in that 
it allows for the simultaneous import and export of differentiated varieties of the same 
good. The gravity equation has strong empirical applications, and has been shown to 
"Direct investment is defined as investment that reflects a lasting interest of a resident entity of one 
economy (direct investor) in an entity resident in another economy (direct investment enterprise). It 
covers all the transactions between direct investors and direct investment enterprises. Direct 
investment implies a significant degree of influence by the investor on the management of the direct 
investment enterprise." (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2010) 
"Within portfolio investment the distinction is being made between assets and liabilities. Assets are 
viewed as claims on the rest of the world and liabilities as indebtedness to the rest of the world. 
Portfolio investment covers transactions in equity securities and debt securities. The latter are 
subdivided into bonds, notes, money market instruments and financial derivatives (when the 
derivatives generate financial claims or liabilities)." Ibid. 
"Other investment is a residual category that covers all financial transactions not included under direct 
investment, portfolio investment or reserve assets. Assets and liabilities in this category are classified 
primarily on an instrument basis, such as trade credits, loans, currency and deposits etc." Ibid. 
Reserve assets include "monetary gold, special drawing rights, reserve position in the IMF, foreign 
exchange and other claims" (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2010). 
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predict the magnitude of bilateral trade flows of goods, using the size of the countries' 
economies as explanatory variables. Even in its simple form, the gravity equation has 
been shown to accurately reflect the magnitude of international movement of not only 
goods, but also labour and investment (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). For 
example, Portes and Rey (1998) fitted the gravity model to bilateral trade in equities. In 
addition to countries' GDPs, they included variables for countries' populations, growth 
rates, regional d u m m y variables, and the physical distance between countries."^ The 
authors found that the log of countries' GDPs had strong explanatory power, although 
their primary interest was in the coefficient on distance, and the extent to which 
increased distances led to reduced investment flows. Brenton et. al. fitted the gravity 
model to bilateral flows of foreign direct investment in a sample of European countries, 
and found that ' the key determinants of the growth of FDI to the region will be the 
pace of income growth and the success with which [the] governments [of those 
countries] orient their policies to be conducive to business' (1999, p. 119). 
While the simple gravity equation tests well empirically, it does not provide an 
intuitive explanation for why a country would manufacture and export the same type 
of good that it also imports from the rest of the world. The simple gravity equation was 
expanded upon by Anderson, who allowed for the prices of traded goods to vary 
between the countries doing the trading (1979). This motivated the inclusion of 'border 
effects', to allow for transport costs, tariffs and other distortions to change the price of a 
good depending on where the good is sold. Anderson and van Wincoop noted that the 
inclusion of border effects in empirical work corrects for omitted variable bias, and was 
a better fit for trade data than the simpler gravity equation (2003). Their criticism of the 
simple gravity equation was in relation to the equation as it was applied to 
international capital flows, since most of the explanatory variables (distance, 
population, GDP) were beyond the scope of policy-makers to influence. Introducing 
border effects to a gravity equation analysis of international capital flows meant that it 
would be possible to identify variables that influence households' investment 
With respect to this last, the authors noted that they interpreted 'the effect of distance as representing 
informational asymmetries, currency risk, and institutional differences' (Portes and Roy, 1998, p. 423). 
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decisions, and that could also be directly affected by policy initiatives aimed at 
attracting and retaining investment. 
This chapter considers the extent to which the variables that drive cross-country 
differences in production technology, and which are used in tests of conditional 
convergence, can be used to explain the net movement of capital into or out of a 
country. The gravity equation with border effects from the international trade 
literature is used as a framework to discuss how these variables are expected to affect 
domestic households' investment decisions. Given that capital is internationally mobile 
and unrestricted, capital should flow out of countries with relatively low rates of 
return, and into countries with relatively high rates of return. And if the flow is not 
from rich to poor countries, then controlling for the variables that affect production 
technologies — health, education, institutional quality, and so on — makes it possible 
to infer why this is the case, and what can be done to motivate domestic investment. 
This chapter is split into four sections. This first has provided some background. The 
second describes how the gravity equation can be applied to the international 
movement of capital. The third section builds on the second, and develops a 
framework for analysing the magnitude and direction of the current account. The 
fourth section summarises and concludes. 
4 . 2 T H E GRAVITY EQUATION 
The simultaneous in and outflow of capital from individual countries, where the 
magnitude of the outflow is similar to the magnitude of the inflow, is an outcome of 
conditions that are akin to those of the 'intra-industry trade' model from international 
trade theory. Intra-industry trade occurs when a country exports to the rest of the 
world the same good or service that it also imports from the rest of the world. 
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4 . 2 . 1 INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES 
The rationale for intra-industry trade begins with the gravity equation/' which predicts 
the value of gross trade (the absolute value of exports plus the absolute value of 
imports) between two countries as being a function of the size of their economies. 
Specifically, the volume of trade between two countries is a function of the size of their 
economies as a proportion of the size of the global economy, given by equation (4.1) 
when: trade is balanced; goods can move between countries without price or volume 
restrictions; the preferences and budget constraints that drive the demand for goods 
are identical across countries; and markets are perfectly competitive: 
(4.1) X"+X" = 
y.-
Y'yj 
The total value of trade that the two countries conduct with one another is made up of 
exports from country i to country j (X'i) and imports to country i from country j (X''). 
The gravity equation presents these as a function of each country's GDP, and global 
GDP (Y', Yi and Y ^ . Since trade is balanced and there is no inter-temporal substitution, 
a country's output is equal to its expenditure, which in turn is equal to its income. If 
trade were not balanced, X'i would be the product of country i's production and 
country j's expenditure (and income, in the absence of inter-temporal substitution) 
divided by global GDP (where global GDP is equal to global income, output and 
expenditure), and vice versa for X''. This means that the total value of trade can be 
explained by variables that take into account or that reflect the demand for goods (one 
country's income and expenditure) as well as the supply of goods (the other country's 
production). 
In the same year that Anderson introduced controls for 'border effects' in the gravity 
equation, Krugman developed a model of monopolistic competition for traded goods, 
where firms specialised in differentiated varieties of a particular type of good (1979). 
All of the derivation and description of the model in this section is taken from Feenstra's Advanced 
International Trade: Theory and Evidence (Feenstra, 2004) . 
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Consumer preferences were based on the Dixit and Stiglitz 'love of variety' preference 
function, to motivate international trade in goods between countries that 
manufactured, imported and exported different varieties of the same good (1977). This 
love of variety, combined with the border effects and a monopolistically competitive 
market for goods for firms, produced a variation on the gravity equation that could be 
used to rationalise the simultaneous import and export of differentiated varieties of 
what is essentially the same good. 
4 . 2 . 2 INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
Intra-industry trade is motivated using a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
consumer preference function that implies a love of variety, where a >1 is the 
household's elasticity of substitution between products. ^ Utility for the representative 
household in country j is a function of products consumed, summed over types of 
products (/c), and the countries (/) from which these products originate. 
r N 
-\)la (4.2) 
Feenstra (2004) optimised this preference function against a budget constraint in which 
the value of the products consumed (products C, valued at prices p'i, across the number 
of varieties from country i, N') is set as equal to income (Yi): 
(4.3) 
i=\ 
This gives the following expression for exports from country i to country j: 
(4.4) X"=N'Y' 
The version presented here is once again taken from Feenstra (Feenstra, 2004) , which in turn is based 
on the work of Redding and Venables (Redding and Venables, 2004) . 
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The value of exports from country i to country j is shown as an increasing function of 
the number of varieties of goods produced in country i (N'), income in country j (Yi), 
and the prices of the imported goods (T'ip'), and a decreasing function of domestic 
prices {Pi). The first derivatives for the magnitude of trade with respect to each of the 
variables in the equation are consistent with the intuition for demand for and trade in 
normal goods. The value of exports increases with respect to the number of varieties, 
the importing country's income, and the price of goods in the importing country, and it 
decreases with respect to the prices of the goods being imported, and the iceberg costs 
associated with these goods. 
The gravity equation with border effects in (4.4) is superior to the gravity equation in 
(4.1) because it allows for variables other than simply a country's total income and 
expenditure (V') to affect the value of its imports from another country. In this way, it 
introduces a number of additional relevant variables that were omitted from the simple 
gravity equation. The gravity model with border effects was developed and tested to 
solve the 'home bias in trade' puzzle — another of Obstfeld and Rogoff's (2001) major 
puzzles in macroeconomics — in which it was found that the volume of trade between 
Canadian provinces in 1988 was 22 times greater than the volume of trade between 
Canada and the USA. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) tested the gravity equation 
with border effects for trade flows between the USA and Canada, and found that the 
presence of borders reduced by 44 % compared to what trade between Canada and the 
USA would have been in 1993 if these borders did not exist (2003, p. 171). 
In the case of international capital movement, the simplest way to motivate investment 
across a range of types of capital goods or types of investments is to apply the love of 
variety to an investor's preference function, and have them prefer a larger number of 
types of investment in their portfolio than a smaller number, for the same expected 
return. Assuming that none of the potential investment activities are perfectly 
positively correlated with one another, allocating the same value of investment across a 
greater number of types of investments will reduce the risk associated with the 
expected return on that portfolio, and make the diversified portfolio more appealing to 
a risk-averse investor. 
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On the supply side, the market for investment must be a monopolistically competitive 
one in order to generate the necessary intra-industry trade outcomes. Firms need to 
attract investors to finance the necessary capital inputs for whatever economic activity 
generates output, and through it the return on capital. While the investment 
instruments themselves — debt, equity or currency — are fully fungible, each firm 
proposes to undertake a unique economic activity that uses the capital as an input to 
generate returns for investors. This gives firms some monopoly power over the 
financial instruments they can offer investors, however, firms cannot fully exploit this 
power because investors are risk averse, and one investment instrument can be 
substituted for another with relative ease. An investor will therefore not pay a higher 
price (or accept a lower return) on a financial instrument offered by a firm unless the 
associated risk is also reduced. 
With investors' preferences reflecting a love of variety in their investment portfolios, 
and firms competing for investors' money in a monopolistically competitive market, it 
is possible to apply the gravity equation with border effects distinguishes a country's 
investment from its saving. The application to trade in goods assumed that a country's 
income was equal to its production and consumption, because trade was balanced, and 
the production function required only labour and no capital. This meant that there was 
no saving or investment, and no lending to or borrowing from the rest of the world. In 
the analysis in this thesis, current and capital accounts are permitted to be unbalanced 
at any point in time.'" This allows countries to borrow from and lend to the rest of the 
world on net, and allows income, production, and expenditure to vary. Finally, the 
production function is based on that of the neo-classical growth model, and therefore 
requires both capital and labour as inputs, which means that households' income can 
be either consumed or saved. 
Capital and current accounts are not necessarily balanced in this static analysis. They may, however, be 
balanced dynamically, with deficits in some periods being entirely off-set by surpluses in others, 
although that is not the focus of this thesis. 
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H O U S E H O L D S 
As in the Solow-Swan model, the rate of saving (SH) in the home country (H) is 
exogenous. Once the rate of saving is i<nown, the gravity equation with border effects 
can be applied to predict how much of that saving is invested domestically, and how 
much is exported, as well as how much capital is imported from the rest of the world. 
The level of saving in the home country (SH) is simply the rate of saving multiplied by 
YH, which can be either income or production. SH is the maximum amount that can be 
used as investment. All of the saving in a period is invested either domestically or 
overseas. Investment occurs through the purchase of a single type of financial 
instrument — bonds (B). These bonds constitute a promise to pay, at some specified 
point in the future, by firms who sell them in order to raise capital as inputs for the 
economic activities that generate production. 
Households purchase bonds based on their preferences for the risk associated with an 
investment, their preferences for the type of economic activity they are financing, or 
some combination of the two. The preference function is identical to equation (4.2), 
except that the preference function in equation (4.5) shows that the home country H's 
households' utility (UH) is based on their selection of bonds (BK/N) that finance economic 
activity k in foreign country /, summed across the number of different economic 
activities (N/) in each foreign country/from which the investments originate. 
(4.5) 
/=! k=\ 
As with the market for goods,"' the utility function is simplified to a single summation 
index, to give the following: 
(4.6) 
(<T-|)/<T 
The alternative model is based on the model for international trade in goods from Feenstra 
FEENSTRA, R. C. (2004) Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press. 
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The value of bonds that can be purchased is constrained not by country H's income or 
production (YH), but by the amount of income that has been allocated as saving, which 
has been exogenously determined as SH. Households therefore maximise utility by 
allocating saving across different investments based on the preferences given in 
equation (4.6), and Vk'ith respect to the budget constraint in equation (4.7): 
(4.7) 
/=i 
The total number of country/s bonds (Byw) purchased by country H at price (p/H) for all 
of the number of types of economic activities that the bonds finance ( N / ) can be no 
greater than the total value of the home country's level saving (SH) in any given period. 
If any saving is retained as domestic investment, then country H's investments offshore 
will necessarily be less than total saving. 
F I R M S 
Each firm is assumed to be engaged in a unique type of economic activity (fc), where 
output (Yk) is a function of labour (L), capital ( K ) , and the production technology that is 
particular to that firm (At). While it is not formally specified at this stage, the 
production function is assumed to have the properties of the neo-classical growth 
model. The production technology, and the rate at which it improves, are exogenous. 
(4.8) Y,=F{A„L,K) 
This production function is the one that firms use to convert inputs into final products, 
and is not an analogue to the production function that underpins the supply of traded 
goods in Feenstra's gravity equation with border effects. Since each bond is a promise 
to pay an agreed amount at some specified time in the future, it would seem that the 
bond supply is unlimited, since anybody can write out a promise to pay. Of necessity, 
therefore, this construction of a supply function for bonds departs from that used in the 
gravity equation with border effects for trade in goods. 
Households are assumed to have a non-zero rate of time preference (pn), which is used 
to introduce a minimum rate of return in the market for bonds. Households are also 
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able to evaluate the expected return on investment based on their knowledge of a 
firm's production technology, the amounts of capital and labour that are currently 
used by that firm, as well as some indication of how risky an investment in that firm 
might be. This is enough information to give some indication of the expected return on 
the investment. An investor's willingness to pay for a bond from one firm over that 
firm's competitors therefore depends on the firm's ability to generate a return that 
sufficiently compensates that investor for their patience, and their risk tolerance. If a 
firm employs insufficient labour, and has either no intention or no ability to employ 
additional labour (for example, the country is at full employment, and the firm is not 
able to entice workers away from other firms by offering a higher wage) during the 
year, then the expected return on investment will be low. 
On the other hand, the firm may be able to employ extra labour if there is 
un(der)employed labour, or if the firm is in possession of a production technology that 
will enable it to offer a higher wage, which in turn will enable it to entice the labour it 
needs away from other firms. Or, it may not need to employ any extra labour if the 
capital is intended to replace out dated or run-down existing stock, as a result of which 
there is no net increase to the firm's capital. Unlike in the open economy neo-classical 
models, the international market for capital is monopolistically rather than perfectly 
competitive, and so firms' marginal products of capital are not equal to a global rate of 
interest. Defined in this way, the supply of bonds in the home country (Sn) is not 
formally parameterised, but is an increasing function (G) of labour (LH), the average 
level of technology across all firms (AH), and the depreciated stock of capital that needs 
to be replaced (6KH) — as shown in equation (4.9). 
(4.9) 
Since the production function that firms use is neo-classical, and individual factors of 
production have diminishing marginal products, the availability of labour and 
technology affects the rate of return that a firm can offer for one of its bonds. Assuming 
that bonds have no coupon payments, and that investors pay for a bond that can be 
redeemed at maturity for the face value (FV), the relationship between the price (pn) 
and the return on the bond (rn) is: 
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FV 
(4.10) r 
In order to supply bonds that investors will actually consider, a firm needs to offer a 
return that it is capable of generating, and that is less than or equal to, the expected 
marginal product of its capital {E{MPKH)) as well as more than investors' rate of time 
preference in the most patient country (pmax). The maximum and minimum range for 
bond prices is given by the following inequality: 
(4.11) ^ 
{\ + E{MPK„)) ( l + r „ ) + 
As long as there is a minimum rate of return, or maximum price that a bond can be 
sold for, the supply of bonds is limited by the availability of labour, technology, and 
the level of depreciation, since these variables drive a firm's need for new or additional 
capital. The rate of depreciation is exogenous, and this alternative model treats the 
availability of labour and technology as also being exogenous/^ For a given amount of 
labour and level of technology, the highest value of investment that a country's firms 
can offer, where each investment is associated with a bond that pays a return of at least 
pmax, is 9h by definition. For the entire country, an exogenous increase in labour 
(through increased fertility or decreased mortality and morbidity) or an exogenous 
increase in the level of technology (through the rate of technological progress, and all 
that it encompasses) means that firms can offer higher returns on the same amount of 
capital. For some firms, this may mean that they can now offer a return that is greater 
than or equal to pmax. In this way, the supply of bonds is an increasing function of 
labour and technology — as stated in equation (4.9). 
For empirically testing this alternative model, it will be necessary to control for differences in the 
supply of bonds - and the availability of labour and technology - across countries, or over time. The 
issues associated with doing so are discussed subsequently. 
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E Q U I L I B R I U M 
The price of bonds at equilibrium cannot be solved for in this simple model, as this 
model does not reflect the extensive literature on financial asset pricing, risk 
measurement and management, and portfolio optimisation. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to control for cross-country differences in the price of bonds by including variables that 
determine the return on investment. The highest and the lowest price a firm can 
demand for its bonds are still as they are shown in inequality (4.11), but investors will 
evaluate for themselves — based on their knowledge of the firm's risk profile, access to 
complementary factors of production, and production technology. They will only 
consider a bond for purchase if the return is sufficient to compensate their rate of time 
preference {rn > pn), and if they feel that the firm is capable of successfully generating 
the output necessary to repay the face value of the bond {E{MPK)H > rn). 
Investors are assumed to be risk averse, which is necessary to motivate the preference 
for a diversified investment portfolio. Since the return on capital is repaid entirely to 
investors,"' the price of the bond at the point of sale will be determined by the expected 
return on investment, which is in turn equal to the firm's expected marginal product of 
capital — as shown here: 
FV FV FV FV 
(4.12) - = - - < <• 
Firms that do not have a sufficiently high enough expected marginal product of capital 
will not be able to raise any capital. At the other end of the spectrum, some firms will 
be offering a bond that investors find extremely attractive, to the point where the firm 
can offer a return that is close to the risk-free rate of return, or just enough to meet 
investors' rates of time preference. 
" In a more complex model, the return on capital could be split between those who own the firm, and 
those who operate the firm — doing this would allow for the return on the bond to differ from the 
marginal product of capital of the firm. This complication is not attempted in this model, and it is 
assumed that an investor receives the entire marginal product of capital. 
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The amount of investment that is realised in equilibrium is determined using the 
optimisation problem for investors, and returns to Feenstra's gravity equation with 
border effects. Households maximise utility by solving the optimisation problem given 
in equation (4.6) subject to the budget constraint in equation (4.7). When f = 2, the 
Lagrangian for this optimisation problem is: 
(4.13) 
where (p = ——^ . This gives the following first order conditions: 
a 
(4.14) 
5L 
(4.15) ^ = - AN^p^ = 0 
SB,, 
(4.16) 
SA = SH -^iPiH^iH = 0 
Equation (4.14) can be solved for Bin to give: 
(4.17) 
(P 
Similarly, equation (4.15) can be solved for Bin. The solutions for both Bw and Bin can 
be substituted into equation (4.16) and solved for A. Re- applying the summation across 
foreign countries 1 and 2 gives the following expression for A: 
(4.18) A = <p 
Finally, (4.18) can be substituted into equation (4.17) to give the function for demand 
for Bih with respect to price: 
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(4.19) 
^IFF = P\ 
Simplifying tiiis gives the following expression for the demand for bonds from foreign 
country /purchased by home country H's investors."" 
(4.20) BFH = 
KPHJ 
' P . ^ 
PFH 
The value of saving in home country H that is invested in foreign country / is the 
number of types of bonds issued by firms in foreign country/(Nf), multiplied by the 
price of bonds that are issued in foreign country /fp/j^j and purchased by households in 
home country H, multiplied by the number of types of investments: 
(4.21) •JH 
By substituting equation (4.20) for 6/h in equation (4.21), equation (4.22) shows the 
amount of home country H's saving that is invested in foreign country / a s a function 
of total saving, relative bond prices, and the number of types of investments in foreign 
country/: 
(4.22) 
PM) 
Feenstra noted that it is difficult to estimate N/ directly for empirical purposes (2004), 
however, based on his workaround for trade in goods, the supply of bonds can be 
determined as the total value of different types of bonds, their prices, and the number 
that are on offer: 
PH represents country H's overall price index for bonds purchased from around the world, given by the 
following equation: 
,1/(1-0-) 
L ^ F I P . ^ ) ' 
V/=| 
( | - < T ) 
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(4.23) 
The supply of bonds issued by a foreign country in equilibrium is equal to the number 
of types of bonds multiplied by the price of bonds, multiplied in turn by the number of 
bonds of each type that are issued. For simplicity, it is assumed that each firm issues 
the same number of bonds ( / ) , albeit not at the same price. Unlike the model for the 
trade of goods, the total supply of bonds is not equal to total income or output for the 
foreign country (Y/). Rather, bonds finance the capital that is one of the inputs required 
for YF. After solving equation (4.23) with respect to N/, it can be substituted into 
equation (4.22) to give the following expression: 
(4.24) ^JH -
/ \ 
I 1 
Wrl)] [PJU] 
( 0 - - 1 ) 
As with the trade in goods model, p/w can be unpacked into the components pj — the 
price of the bond in foreign country / — and TJH — the iceberg cost of transporting the 
bond from foreign country / to the home country H. For international trade in capital 
TfH represents anything that differentiates the return on investment from the marginal 
product of capital for a foreign investor — such things include differences between 
taxation requirements for residents of a country and requirements on overseas 
investors, or differences in the costs associated with obtaining information about or 
monitoring the performance of an investment. Importantly, these are costs that only 
apply to international transactions, or that disproportionately affect foreign investors. 
Factors such as taxation regimes more generally, corruption, bribery or political and 
economic instability are assumed to affect domestic and foreign investors equally. 
Effectively, the specification for the amount of saving in home country H that is 
invested in foreign country/is given by: 
(4.25) ^/H -
(prf) 
FLL 
TFU 
(<T- I ) 
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SFH is an increasing function of the amount saved in the home country H (SH) and the 
supply of investment opportunities in foreign c o u n t r y A s long as <T> 1, it is also 
an increasing function of PH — the higher the price of bonds in the home country H 
(and by equation (4.12), the lower the expected rate of return on investment in the 
home country H), the more of country H's saving is invested in foreign country /. By 
the same token, S/H is a decreasing function of both T/H and p/ — the higher the price of 
bonds in foreign country/or the more that the rate of return earned in foreign country 
/ is eroded, the lower the value of the home country H's saving that is invested in 
foreign country/. 
4 . 3 RETAINING SAVING 
4 . 3 . 1 T H E CURRENT ACCOUNT 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a model to analyse bilateral trade flows. To 
do so, equation (4.25) can be used to develop an expression for the current account, 
where the current account is measured as the difference between a country's saving 
and investment: 
(4.26) I „ = S „ - C A B ^ 
= Sf^ — Sf.f^ + Sf^,, 
An expression for home country H's total outward investment in the rest of the world 
(SFH) can be obtained by treating the world as being made up of two countries — the 
home country (H), and the rest of the world (F), which accounts for all foreign 
countries. This gives the expression for capital exported from the home country H to 
the rest of the world: 
(4.27) 
[ ( P ^ - N . 
N ( ( T - I ) 
In the same way, equation (4.28) is an expression for the rest of the world's investment 
in country H (SHF) — simply the mirror image of equation (4.27). 
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(4.28) A 
T V HF y 
(<j-i) 
From this, the current account balance for the home country H can be shown as: 
(4.29) - Sfjj,. Sj^fi 
/ \ 
Sh^F (p ^ (<T-1) / \ [PF^ 
(CT-I) 
Wf-n] . F^H y [iPlH)] T V HF y 
Equation (4.29) provides a framework for analysing why countries import or export 
capital on net. The factors that drive the relative attractiveness of domestic bonds, 
compared to bonds in the rest of the world, are reflected in investors' budgets (S), the 
prices for and rates of return on bonds (P and p), iceberg costs that erode rates of return 
and increase prices (T), and the supply of bonds (5), both at home and abroad. 
Equation (4.30) shows the current account balance as a proportion of the home country 
H's income YH, where YH can be either GDP or GNI, depending on whether domestic or 
national saving and investment are of interest, and dn is defined as the ratio of 9h to 
YH: 
CAB, 
r, \ 
i t - V iPFn) Tfh y 
(o-l) 
Sf 
(PmH) 
A 
T y V HF y 
(o-l) 
(4.30) 
{PIF)) 
3l 
V '^FH J 
(CT-I) 
R 1 [PH' 
(CT-I) 
-0, [ s, ] { PF ] Win] T \ FH y [iPlH)) T V HF y 
T \ HF y 
(<T-1) 
There is nothing in equation (4.30) that is inconsistent with the empirical work 
conducted so far, as it allows for countries' rates of saving and investment to move 
together, as well as for countries to import or export capital on net. Re-arranging 
equation (4.30) gives: 
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(4.31) 
ip^nj 
\ 
PH 
T,H 
((T-1) 
Sj^ 
ViplH)} T HF J 
ip:-F)} 
Yh 
PH + - PF 
J 
(PfF) 
PH 
T 'i-H y 
\(a-l) 
(PMH) 
PjL 
T V HF y 
( 0 - - I ) 
This provides tiie necessary framework for analysing the variables that affect a 
country 's rate of investment, in terms of that country's response to changes in relative 
rates of return, the sizes of the different economies, and the costs of doing business 
across borders. 
4 . 3 . 2 EXPLAINING THE PUZZLE 
There are four ways in which this alternative model can accommodate perfectly 
correlated rates of saving and investment. The first way in which this alternative model 
can generate the paradoxical outcome is if the levels of saving and investment change 
by the same magnitude and in the same direction. This means that on net, there is no 
change to the current account balance, and that a change in the rate of saving is fully 
reflected in a change to the rate of investment at the national level — which is what 
Feldstein and Horioka inferred from their findings. 
The second is through an external shock that directly affects G D P or GNI, but does not 
affect anything else in the model. This has the effect of changing the denominator YH, 
without any changes to the numerators — because saving, investment and the current 
account balance are converted into rates as a proportion of G D P or GNI. This means 
that rates of investment, saving and the CAB to G D P or GNI ratio will all three change 
in the same direction and in the same proportions. In practice, this is unlikely to 
happen with respect to GDP, since the sorts of shocks that affect a country's GDP 
would also affect that country's production technology and through it, that country's 
supply of investment opportunities and the expected return on investment. If the rates 
of investment and saving are calculated as proportions of GNI, however, then it is 
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possible for a country to experience a windfall income gain — such as an inflow of 
foreign aid, or an improvement in the terms of trade — that does not improve the 
production technology, and has no impact on the marginal product of capital. This is 
supported by the fact that rates of national investment and saving, which are 
calculated as proportions of GNI, are consistently more closely correlated than rates of 
domestic investment and saving, which are calculated as proportions of GDP. 
The third way in which this alternative model can generate the paradoxical outcome is 
through a shock to a country's production technology. This will alter GDP, but does 
not leave the other variables in the model untouched. For example, a permanent shock 
can also affect households' budgets for consumption, investment and saving, as well as 
the rate of return that firms can offer on bonds, and the number of bonds that pay a 
return that is at least as high as the rate of time preference. The subsequent work on the 
Puzzle has focussed on this aspect, and suggested that the correlation in rates of 
investment and saving across countries is due to macroeconomic shocks that affect 
GDP and rates of saving, which are fully reflected as changes in the rate of investment. 
Analysing this in the framework of this alternative model, it suggests that countries' 
rates of saving change following an exogenous shock to their GDPs. This is because 
households have a preference for consumption smoothing, and any changes to income 
will be seen in the level of saving rather than the level of consumption. 
While the consumption-smoothing rationale is relatively uncontroversial, what is not 
clear is why a shock to GDP should generate a similar change in the rate of investment. 
The alternative model explains this by increasing the domestic supply of bonds, and 
providing a positive shock to the production technology. To be permanent, the shock 
to a country's production technology must affect the bond supply of the home country 
H. Assuming that it is a positive exogenous shock, a higher level of domestic saving is 
associated with an improved production technology and a higher return on capital. 
This increases the inflow of capital into the home country H from the rest of the world. 
Further, the alternative model shows that some of this domestic saving will be invested 
overseas, except in the unlikely event that the supply of bonds in the rest of the world 
is exhausted {dr = 0). Taken together, the capital outflow from the increased domestic 
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saving could be off-set by the capital inflow from the increased supply of bonds, and 
show a change in the rate of investment that is equal to the change in the rate of saving. 
Naturally, the extent to which a capital outflow is off-set by a capital inflow depends 
on the type of shock that affects the economy, and whether it affects that economy in 
isolation, or if the shock applies to the rest of the world. In her analysis of OECD 
countries, Tesar suggested that there are a number of macroeconomic shocks that could 
generate such results, and noted that 'permanent exogenous shifts in the rate of 
technological progress or population growth with imperfect labour mobility can 
explain the long-run co-movements between savings and investment, although this 
does not explain the short-run movements' (1991, p. 76). Kraay and Ventura (2000) also 
generated similar findings in their analysis of the relationship between OECD 
countries' rates of saving and their CAB to GDP ratios. In this case, an estimated 
coefficient approaching zero on the rate of saving suggests that saving and the current 
account balance are not correlated, and that instead, saving and investment are closely 
correlated. The authors noted that 'since common income shocks or shocks to the rates 
of population and productivity growth simultaneously affect saving and 
investment...the estimate of p [where (i is the coefficient on the rate of saving, and the 
CAB to GDP ratio is the explanatory variable] is biased toward zero' (2000, p. 1156). 
These findings are both consistent with the framework in equation (4.31). 
The fourth and final way in which this alternative model can generate rates of 
investment and saving that are close to one another is if the cost of conducting financial 
transactions across international borders is prohibitively high, in which case there will 
be little capital in or outflow. As TFH moves towards infinity, the proportion of 
domestic saving that is invested overseas tends toward zero. The flow of foreign 
investment into the home country H also tends to zero when THF moves towards 
infinity. The opposite is true the closer iceberg costs are to one. While this does 
generates an outcome that is consistent with the Puzzle, if the lack of international 
capital mobility is due to excessively high transaction costs, then there is no Puzzle 
since these costs form an effective barrier to the free international movement of capital. 
The Feldstein and Horioka result was characterised as a Puzzle because it occurred in 
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spite of a perceived lack of barriers to international capital mobility in the OECD 
countries of that time. 
4 . 3 . 3 IMPLICATIONS FOR POOR COUNTRIES 
The discussion so far has shown the ways in which the Puzzle can be unpacked using 
the framework of the gravity equation. Rates of investment and saving can be perfectly 
correlated for any one or more of the four reasons given above. At the same time, this 
alternative model also provides a rationale for explaining how capital can flow out of 
capital poor countries and into the rest of the world, or into capital rich countries and 
out of the rest of the world. For a country to be able to import capital from the rest of 
the world, it must have a supply of bonds available for sale. If all of its bonds are fully 
subscribed — that is, all reasonably profitable investment opportunities have been 
invested in, and only the risky or unprofitable investments remain — then that country 
will be unable to either import capital from the rest of the world, or to retain any 
increase in domestic saving as domestic investment. The expected return on bonds sold 
by firms in individual countries will also determine whether a country imports or 
exports capital on net. Taking two countries for which everything but the expected 
return on their bonds is identical, this alternative model predicts that the country with 
the higher expected return is more likely to import capital than the country with the 
lower expected return. Since the supply of reasonably profitable bonds is also linked to 
the expected return on bonds, the ability of a country to both attract foreign investment 
and retain domestic saving depends on the variables that the neo-classical model 
associates with different production technologies, and through them, expected rates of 
return. 
This is consistent with the discussion on conditional convergence in the earlier chapters 
— rich countries may have more capital per capita than poor countries, but if they also 
have a superior production technology to poor countries, then the marginal return on 
capital in rich countries is not necessarily lower than in poor countries. Raising the rate 
of saving at low levels of income may not by itself be enough to lift that country out of 
poverty. An increase in the rate of saving in home country H will not fully register as 
an increase in the rate of investment in home country H unless there is a corresponding 
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increase in the supply of bonds offered by country H's firms. If there is nothing left for 
investors to invest in, or if the risk associated with investment is too high, then the rate 
of investment in a poor country will not rise in line with an increase in the rate of 
saving. Inflows of foreign aid or foreign investment may simply crowd out the 
investment that would have been funded out of domestic saving, so that the capital 
imported via foreign aid and investment is off-set by the capital exported via the 
diverted domestic saving. Once again, this comes down to what drives the expected 
rate of return on investment, and the supply of investment opportunities, in different 
countries. 
This in turn is consistent with the empirical work in relation to economic growth 
accelerations and a country's escape from a low-level equilibrium onto a path of 
sustained growth. For example, rather than using a cross-country growth regression, 
Martina (2007) examined the variables common to China, Vietnam, Malaysia, South 
Korea and Taiwan — all countries that had demonstrated sustained economic growth 
over the fifty year period covered by the Penn World Tables. He found that in all of 
these countries, increases in the rate of saving were accompanied by institutional 
reforms, and improvements to the quality of health, both of which laid the foundation 
for the sustained growth in these countries (Martina, 2009, p. 42). Interpreted within 
the context of this alternative model, institutional reforms would directly affect the 
production technology, through a combination of reducing the riskiness associated 
with investments, defining and enforcing property rights, and improving the 
incentives for manufacturers and exporters — all of which are things that would 
increase the amount of output that could be generated for a given amount of capital 
and labour. At the same time, improvements to health would reduce the morbidity 
rate, and increase the availability of labour, which would in turn increase the marginal 
return on capital. And improvements to health would also have positive implications 
for mortality, which in turn would alter the incentives for households to save and to 
accumulate human capital. In this way, this alternative model predicts that the 
combination of increased saving, and improvements to health and institutional quality, 
will lead to a higher rate of investment. 
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Martina's work used an approach similar to the one used by Hausmann et. al. (2005), in 
which the authors identified and analysed growth accelerations in countries. They 
defined a growth acceleration as 'an increase in per-capita growth of 2 percentage 
points or more (with most of the episodes we identify exceeding this threshold by a 
wide margin)...[where],..the increase in growth...[was]...sustained for at least eight 
years and the post-acceleration growth rate...[was]... at least 3.5 percent per year' 
(Hausmann et al., 2005, p. 305). The authors then sought to establish what caused a 
growth acceleration, and more importantly, what sustained a growth acceleration. 
Population health was not one of the variables considered in the analysis, but the 
authors tested variables that controlled for policy changes (for example, economic 
freedom, political coups and civil wars), as well as measures of economic and financial 
market performance (for example, trade, openness, exchange rate movements, financial 
market liberalisation). Overall, the authors concluded that while the data showed that 
growth accelerations occurred relatively frequently, their occurrence was difficult to 
predict, but that external shocks (captured by the movement in the terms of trade) 
were associated with unsustained growth accelerations, while economic reforms were 
associated with sustained growth accelerations. 
Interpreted within the context of this alternative model, Hausmann et al.'s results 
imply that a positive external shock that is a windfall gain in income does not 
necessarily affect the production technology or the availability of labour and capital. 
Such a windfall gain may lead to an increase in the rate of saving, and even an increase 
in the rate of investment if the windfall can be used to finance economic activities that 
make use of labour that is unemployed or underemployed. In the absence of a 
corresponding improvement in production technology or an increase to the supply of 
investment opportunities within the same country, however, there is a limit to the 
extent to which the rate of investment can increase, and as a result, the country will fall 
back toward its low-level equilibrium. Economic reforms (using a measure that 
controls for the openness of the economy, the presence of marketing boards, 
macroeconomic stability, and barriers to international trade) will have the same impact 
on expected rates of return, and on the supply of bonds, as the improvements to 
institutional quality discussed above — both of them being things that will alter the 
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production technology, and increase tiie number of investments warranting an 
investor's consideration. 
It is surprising, however, that Hausmann et. al. do not find any evidence of political 
regime changes and financial market liberalisation being associated with sustained 
growth accelerations, given that positive changes in both of these things would be 
reflected in this alternative model in the same way as the economic reforms. As 
discussed in chapter 1, Easterly (2005) links escapes from poverty traps with 
improvements to institutional quality as measured using indicators from the Polity IV 
database. In earlier work, Devarajan, Easterly and Pack (2003) examined the failure of 
sub-Saharan African countries to sustain economic growth, noting that investment in 
these countries accounted for around 10 % of GDP compared to 16 % in other 
developing countries (Devarajan et al., 2003, p. 547), and argued that 'unless some or 
all of the underlying factors that made investment unproductive in the past are 
addressed, the results [of an investment boom] may be disappointing. W e should also 
be more circumspect about Africa's low savings rate. Perhaps the low savings rate was 
caused by the fact that the returns to investment were so low. And the relatively high 
level of capital flight from Africa may have been a rational response to the lack of 
investment opportunities at home' (Devarajan et al., 2003, p. 568). This conjecture ties 
directly to the alternative model presented in this chapter, since it highlights the need 
for matching increased saving with an increased supply of productive, reasonably 
profitable investments that that saving can be targeted at. 
More recently, this is exactly what has been observed in certain African economies. Six 
of the ten economies that grew fastest between 2001 and 2010 are those of African 
countries — Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique and Rwanda - and seven 
of the top ten economies expected to grow fastest between 2011 and 2015 are also those 
of African countries — Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Ghana, Zambia and Nigeria (The Economist, 2011a). Part of this rapid growth 
can be attributed to the boom in commodity prices — particularly since many of these 
countries have reserves of commodities such as oil (Nigeria), copper (Zambia), 
aluminium (Mozambique) , and diamonds (Democratic Republic of Congo). A recent 
survey of these countries noted, however, that growth rates for African countries did 
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not fall when commodity prices suffered a setback in 2008 as would be expected from 
Devarajan et. al.'s findings. Instead, growth in African incomes and growth in foreign 
direct investment into Africa — which has overtaken foreign aid to Africa and nearly 
quintupled between 2000 and 2010 — was attributed to the uptake of technology and 
to political stability. The survey directly linked the take up of new technologies to 
improvements in health outcomes such as reductions in the rate of infection and 
increases in the number of people receiving effective treatment (The Economist, 2 0 n b ) . 
This in turn complements the wealth of evidence in the growth literature on 
conditional convergence. Improvements in health lead to a labour force that is more 
productive, because less time is spent being afflicted by or recovering from illness. 
They also increase the incentives to households of human capital accumulation 
(Chakraborty, 2004), which further improves the productivity of the labour force by 
increasing the skill of the average worker. Higher stocks of human capital 
accumulation are also associated with an improved ability to absorb new technologies 
or innovations (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994), as well as leading to improvements in 
institutional quality (Glaeser et al., 2007). Improvements in both health and in stocks of 
human capital have the effect of increasing the bond supply in this alternative model, 
because they improve the production technology and increase the expected return on 
capital. When it comes to institutional quality, improvements in this regard not only 
alter the production technology, but can also reduce the risk associated with investing 
in particular countries. 
4 . 4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter uses the gravity equation with border effects to form a rationale for why 
countries import or export capital on net. In addition to the level and rate of saving, 
consideration is given to expected rates of return, cross-border distortions, and 
country-specific effects that drive the rate of long-run growth. Unfortunately in all of 
this, the major implication for poor countries is that the variables that this alternative 
model links to attracting and retaining investment are the same variables that are used 
to control for cross-country differences in production technologies when testing for 
conditional convergence. These variables — health, education, institutional quality — 
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are treated as exogenous in this alternative model. As discussed in ciiapter 1, if these 
variables are different at different levels of income, then they can generate multiple 
equilibria. When this is the case, the saving trap is not the only barrier to growth that a 
poor country might face. As shown in chapter 3, capital is internationally mobile and 
the variation in the rate of saving no longer accounts for all of the variation in the rate 
of investment across countries. By undertaking the same regression analysis as in 
chapter 3, but this time including controls for differences in expected rates of return on 
investment, the supply of bonds and iceberg costs across countries, it is possible to 
answer the following question: is the rate of investment in poor countries low because 
the rate of saving is low, or because poor countries do not have as many profitable 
economic activities for households to invest in? This is done in the next chapter. 
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5 T E S T I N G T H E A L T E R N A T I V E M O D E L 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 summarised neo-classical growth theory and described the simple saving 
trap as being one of a number of types of barriers to growth. Chapter 2 set out the 
contradiction between the theory and the evidence on international capital movements 
that comprised Feldstein and Horioka's Puzzle, which the literature has not resolved. 
Chapter 3 presented new evidence on the Puzzle, showing that it has not characterised 
the investment and saving choices of OECD countries since the mid-1990s, and that it 
has never characterised the investment and saving choices of developing countries in 
the period studied. Chapter 4 drew on the international trade literature to develop an 
alternative model to motivate international capital flows. 
This chapter tests that alternative model. The purpose of the test is to establish the 
following three things. The first is the extent to which the additional variables — the 
controls for rates of return, the supply of bonds and iceberg costs — are statistically 
significant in explaining the variation in the rate of investment across countries. The 
second is the extent to which the inclusion of these additional variables affects the 
coefficient on the rate of saving. Taken together, these first two things will establish the 
third — is the rate of investment in poor countries low because these countries are 
poor, or because richer countries offer relatively more attractive prospects for 
investment? 
The rest of this chapter is split into five sections. The first unpacks the alternative 
model, and discusses the assumptions under which it is tested and the variables used. 
The second section presents the results of a purely cross-sectional regression analysis. 
The third section uses panel analysis to control for country fixed effects that may not 
have been identified in the alternative model, or adequately controlled for in the 
cross-sectional analysis. The fourth section discusses the implications of the findings, 
and the fifth summarises and concludes. 
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5 . 2 UNPACKING THE ALTERNATIVE MODEL 
In the alternative model described in chapter 4, a country's rate of investment is 
determined based on rates of saving, the supply of bonds, expected rates of return, and 
the iceberg costs that erode rates of return across borders. Tests of the gravity equation 
generally involve datasets of bilateral flows and differences in distance or costs 
between pairs of countries. In the alternative model shown in chapter 4, each country 
has only one trading partner, which is defined as the rest of the world. As a result, in 
the test of the alternative model it is only necessary to control for variables specific to 
each country, rather than pairs of variables specific to each country and each of its 
multiple trading partners. Table 5.1 summarises each of the pieces of the alternative 
model, the data that will be used to test additional variables, the codes given to the 
variables in the regression analysis, and — in brackets — the expected sign on the 
coefficient. 
If differences in these variables across countries are controlled for, and a country's rate 
of saving is strongly positively correlated with its rate of investment, then the saving 
trap is still a significant barrier to growth faced by today's poor countries. Conversely, 
if cross-country differences in production technologies are controlled for and the 
correlation between countries' rates of saving and investment remain small or 
statistically insignificant, then it implies that the saving trap is not a barrier to growth. 
T A B L E 5.1 V A R I A B L E S IN T H E A L T E R N A T I V E M O D E L 
Name Data Code 
SH Rate of saving, • Rate of saving • SRATE (+) 
nade up of: 
SH Level of • Gross national saving • Not used 
saving • Gross domestic saving • Not used 
YH Production / • GDP per capita • Not used 
Income • GNI per capita • Not used 
• Foreign aid as a proportion of GNI • AID GNI (-) 
PH Price of (or • Capital to labour ratio • KPERLA (-) 
inverse return • Under 5 mortality rate • MRS (-) 
•n) bonds 
Supply of bonds 
• Labour force with no formal schooling • LU (-) 
• Price of capital goods relative to • PRICE (-) 
consumption goods 
• Property rights and law enforcement • EFW_PR (+) 
• Access to sound money • EFW ES (+) 
Tr„/T„f Iceberg costs • Openness • OPENC 
Note: Sign in bracl<ets is the expected sign on the coefficient when the variable is regressed. 
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The additional variables identified in the alternative model are grouped into three 
broad categories shown in Table 5.1: variables that control for 'affordability', or the 
ability of countries to afford to invest domestically; variables that control for 
'availability', or that determine the prospects for investment in a country and that 
country's ability to attract and retain investment; and 'capital mobility' variables that 
control for economic openness. Affordability is reflected using the rate of saving and 
the receipt of foreign aid. Cross-country differences in the availability of investments 
cannot be directly measured, however, it is possible to control for differences in 
expected rates of return and the supply of bonds across countries. This is done by 
controlling for the variables that explain differences in the price of capital goods, 
differences in production technologies across countries — such as health, education 
and institutional quality — and differences in countries' distances from steady state — 
such as their capital-to-labour ratios. Finally, while it is not possible in this analysis to 
distinguish iceberg costs that affect inflows of capital from those that affect outflows of 
capital, overall iceberg costs can be controlled for more generally by using information 
about a country's economic openness. 
5 . 2 . 1 AFFORDABILITY 
T A B L E 5.2 V A R I A B L E S IN T H E A L T E R N A T I V E M O D E L - A F F O R D A B I L I T Y 
Name Data Code 
SH Rate of saving. • Rate of saving • SRATE (+) tiade up of: 
Sh Level of • Gross national saving • Not used saving • Gross domestic saving » Not used 
Production • GDP per capita • Not used / Income • GNI per capita • Not used 
• Foreign aid as a proportion of GNI • AID GNI (-) 
Note: Sign in brackets is the expected sign on the coefficient when the variable is regressed 
This is the crux of the test of the saving trap — if poor countries had more income, 
would it be invested in their stock of physical capital ? The variables that fall under the 
category of 'affordability' attempt to control for cross-country differences in the extent 
to which the average household can afford investment. Income and production are not 
directly used in the analysis, as was done in Chapter 3. Instead, affordability is 
controlled for using saving as a rate of income or production, and the receipt of foreign 
aid as a proportion of income. It may appear counterintuitive for the expected sign on 
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foreign aid to be negative as in Table 5.2, however, the discussion of the alternative 
model in section 4.3.2 set out how a windfall increase in income, without a 
corresponding increase in the level of saving or improvement in the production 
technology, could lower the rates of both saving and investment. 
Aside from measurement error, from a national accounting perspective, a country's 
saving can only be invested. The question left to answer is how much of that saving is 
invested domestically, and how much in the rest of the world. A country's income, on 
the other hand, can be invested domestically or overseas, or can be consumed as 
expenditure on food or clothing, or investment in education or health.""^ This means 
that the failure of an increase in the level of income to carry through to the level of 
investment does not mean that a country is not caught in a saving trap. As with income 
more generally, foreign aid may also be used to fund domestic investment directly, or 
it may be allocated toward consumption. This means that an inflow of foreign aid may 
not be reflected in an increase in the rate of investment if expenditure on shelter, food 
or medicine is more pressing — as a result, the inclusion of a variable for foreign aid 
cannot by itself test for the existence of a saving trap. 
Interpreting the coefficient on the rate of saving is a more intuitively appealing test of 
the saving trap, because the rate of saving is the total budget that is available to be 
invested in physical capital — either domestically, or in the rest of the world. If an 
increase in a country's rate of saving were fully captured as an increase in that 
country's rate of investment — and other cross-country differences are controlled for 
— then this makes a strong case in favour of the savings trap. If this is not the case, 
then the shortfall must be due to some of that saving being invested in the rest of the 
world — it cannot have been spent on consumption or human capital. 
Expenditure on health and education is classified as consumption in the national accounts. 
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5 . 2 . 2 AVAILABILITY 
TABLE 5.3 VARIABLES IN THE ALTERNATIVE MODEL - AVAILABILITY 
Name Data Code 
PH Price of (or • Capital to labour ratio • KPERLA (-) 
inverse return • Under 5 mortality rate • MRS (-) on) bonds 
• LU (-) Supply of bonds • Labour force with no formal schooling 
• Price of capital goods relative to • PRICE (-) 
consumption goods 
• Property rights and law enforcement • EFW_PR (+) 
• Access to sound money • EFW ES (+) 
Note: Sign in brackets is the expected sign on the coefficient when the variable is regressed. 
The amount of investment that is actually realised in each period can be directly 
observed, but the total supply of potential investment opportunities cannot. After all, 
when attempting to establish whether rates of investment in poor countries are low 
because the rate of saving is low, or because there are insufficiently profitable projects 
to invest in, it is necessary to include variables that reflect the availability of investment 
opportunities across countries. As Table 5.3 shows, differences in the supply of, and 
the expected return on, domestic investment will be controlled for by using variables 
that reflect cross-country differences in the relative price of capital goods {PRICE), 
distance from steady state (KPERLA)," and production technologies (all other variables 
in Table 5.3). As the alternative model assumed, if the average expected rate of return 
across firms rises — due to an improvement in the production technology, an increase 
in the amount of available labour, or a reduction in the riskiness of doing business in a 
country — then that country's supply of investment opportunities also increases, as 
there are now a larger number of firms that are able to offer bonds with expected 
returns that are greater than or equal to the minimum that an investor will accept. 
Country's stocks of human capital are reflected using the proportion of the labour force 
that has no formal education (LU) from Barro and Lee's dataset (2001) — countries 
with a higher proportion of labour with no formal education are expected to attract 
and retain less investment than countries with a lower. An equally important measure 
of human capital is health, rather than education, human capital, which is controlled 
The way in which the capital to labour ratios are derived is discussed in detail in the appendix to this 
chapter. 
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for using the under-five mortality rate (MRS) and is defined as 'the probability per 
1,000 that a newborn baby will die before reaching age five, if subject to current 
age-specific mortality rates' (The World Bank, 2009). The higher the mortality rate, the 
poorer a country's health outcomes and so the less investment that country is expected 
to attract or retain. As a result, the rate of infant mortality is expected to be negatively 
correlated with the rate of investment measured both as a proportion of GDP and GNI. 
Both production technology and the return on investment are also affected by 
institutional quality, as these variables affect the riskiness of doing business in a 
country. Importantly, these distortions are not the same as iceberg costs, even though 
they may erode the return on capital. This is because iceberg costs disproportionately 
affect cross-border transactions, whereas the distortions caused by political and 
economic risk will generally erode the return on investment for domestic and foreign 
investors equally. All other things being equal, countries with better economic and 
political stability, should have relatively superior production technologies, which 
should see them importing capital on net. 
The analysis in this chapter uses indices of economic freedom that focus on the extent 
to which markets are constrained. These variables are taken from the Fraser Institute's 
Economic Freedom of the World index (Gwartney et al., 2009), where 'economic freedom' 
is defined as existing when '...property [that individuals] acquire without the use of 
force, fraud, or theft is protected from physical invasions by others and they are free to 
use, exchange, or give their property as long as their actions do not violate the identical 
rights of others. An index of economic freedom should measure the extent to which 
rightly acquired property is protected and individuals are engaged in voluntary 
transactions' (Gwartney et al., 2006). 'Property rights and law enforcement' {EFW_PR) 
is a measure of how stable and consistent a country's legal infrastructure is. 'Access to 
sound money' reflects rates of inflation and the volatility of these rates, and is an index 
of economic stability {EFW_ES). Both of these measures reflect the risks — political and 
economic — of investing in individual countries, with higher levels of risk affecting the 
expected return on investment and through it, the supply of profitable investments. 
The indices are compiled so that a higher number indicates greater economic freedom. 
Superior institutional quality is expected to be positively correlated with the rate of 
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investment, however, these measures of economic freedom also reflect the extent to 
which capital is mobile. As a result, their impact on the rate of investment in the 
analysis varies. More detail on the indices used is provided in the appendix to this 
chapter. 
5 . 2 . 3 CAPITAL MOBILITY 
TABLE 5.4 VARIABLES IN THE A L T E R N A T I V E M O D E L - CAPITAL MOBILITY 
Name Data Code 
TFH/ T^F Iceberg costs • Openness • OPENC 
Note: Sign in brackets is tlie expected sign on the coefficient when the variable is regressed. 
The third category of variables to control for is the one that reflect cross-country 
differences in capital mobility. Between them, the affordability and availability of 
domestic investment control for the total pool of income that is available for 
investment, and the total supply of investment opportunities. The final aspect of the 
alternative model is the iceberg costs that make cross border transactions more 
expensive than similar transactions conducted within a country. Ideally, the dataset 
would contain variables that distinguished restrictions on inflows of foreign capital 
from restrictions on outflows of domestic capital. This is, after all, the way iceberg costs 
are characterised in the alternative model — TFH reflects the increased cost to domestic 
households, and is positively correlated with the rate of investment, while THF is the 
increased cost to foreign households, and is negatively correlated with the rate of 
investment. Data on capital restrictions, however, generally reflect the extent to which 
capital restrictions apply to financial instruments overall, without distinguishing 
restrictions on inflows from restrictions on outflows. 
A measure of overall 'capital market restrictions' can be used in place of the two sorts 
of iceberg costs, however, it complicates the interpretation of the estimated coefficient. 
This is because two countries can have the same, low (relative to the rest of the world) 
marginal product of capital and the same rate of saving as one another, but a country 
with capital market restrictions will retain more of its saving and therefore have a 
higher rate of investment than the country without the capital market restrictions, 
which will experience capital flight. Under these circumstances, the estimated 
coefficient on economic openness can be expected to be negative — a country's rate of 
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investment is larger under a more restricted capita! market. Conversely, if two 
countries have the same, high (relative to the rest of the world) marginal product of 
capital and the same rate of saving as one another, and one has capital restrictions and 
the other does not, then the country that has capital restriction will have a lower rate of 
investment, because it is unable to import as much capital from the rest of the world as 
the country with the unrestricted capital market. Under these circumstances, the 
estimated coefficient should be positive, since a more open economy means more 
investment flowing to where it is most profitable. 
A commonly used measure of the openness of the economy is derived as the sum of 
the absolute value of its exports and imports as a proportion of its GDP (OPENC). This 
measure is generally more relevant to a consideration of restrictions on the 
international trade in goods than restrictions on the international flow of capital. That 
said, using this measure allows more countries to be included in the analysis, 
compared to an indicator like the Economic Freedom of the World's index of 'freedom 
to trade internationally', which is only available for 12 non-OECD countries in the 
period under analysis. Assuming that a country that has restrictions on the 
international trade of goods is also likely to have restrictions on capital flows — and 
that the differences across countries are roughly proportional — then this measure of 
openness is a reasonable proxy for international capital market freedom.^' 
5 . 3 T H E PREFERRED MODEL 
This section analyses the impact of the variables described using least squares 
regression, according to the following specification (where Z^  is a vector of the 
variables that will be used to control for differences across countries other than their 
rates of saving): 
(5.1) IRA TE, =S + /3,SRA TE, + 
Feldstein and Horioka used this measure of openness to test whether 'small economies that engage in 
substantial international trade will have a much weaker link between domestic saving and domestic 
investment than large and nearly autarchic economies' (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980) . 
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The analysis is done using data for 1980 and 2000, as these were the years that were 
furthest apart from another that also have a reasonable number of countries with the 
necessary data. As the analysis will show, including one or more of the variables in 
Table 5.1 in Z, affects neither the magnitude nor the statistical significance of /?i, the 
coefficient on the rate of saving. This is the case regardless of whether the analysis is 
done for 1980 or 2000, whether the sample includes or excludes the OECD countries, or 
whether rates of investment and saving are calculated as proportions of GDP or GNI. 
The consistent positive, statistically significant estimate of pi under these various 
specifications is strong evidence that a low rate of saving in poor countries can 
partially explain low rates of investment in these countries. It is not the only barrier to 
growth, however, because /5i is never equal to or close to one. The evidence is 
presented in Table 5.6 through to Table 5.11 - Table 5.6 to Table 5.8 consist of 
estimates using data for the sample of all countries, with rates calculated as 
proportions of GDP and GNI respectively. Table 5.9. to Table 5.11 do the same for a 
sample of countries that excludes the OECD countries. 
Where domestic rates of investment and saving are analysed, there are ten sets of 
regressions, with the first five using data for 1980, and the last five using data for 2000. 
The first regression for each year (I) shows estimates for the specification shown in 
equation (2.15), where Z, is empty, and the rate of saving is the only explanatory 
variable. The sample of countries in the first regression is restricted to allow direct 
comparison of results between it and the estimates generated by the second regression 
(II), which is the preferred model. In this second regression, Z, includes the variables 
shown in Table 5.5 (other than SRATE). The preferred model is limited to controls for 
the 'deep determinants' of growth — health, and institutions — and an additional 
control on affordability — receipt of foreign aid as a proportion of GNI. 
T A B L E 5.5 V A R I A B L E S IN T H E P R E F E R R E D M O D E L 
Name Data Code 
SH Rate of saving • Rate of saving • SRATE (+) 
• Foreign aid as a proportion of GNI • AID GNI (-) 
p» Price of {or • Under 5 mortality rate • MRS (-) 
Sh 
inverse return 
on) bonds 
Supply of bonds 
• Property rights and law enforcement 
• Access to sound money 
• EFW_PR (+) 
• EFW ES (+) 
Note: Sign in brackets is the expected sign on the coefficient when the variable is regressed. 
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The fourth regression (IV) for each year shows the output for the 'expanded model', 
where Z^ includes all of the variables set out in Table 5.1 (other than SRATE). As the 
results for the joint F-test will show, these additional variables do not have sufficient 
additional explanatory power, and are dropped from the preferred model. The third 
regression (III) excludes all variables but the rate of saving, where the sample is 
restricted to only those countries that are included in the expanded specification. Once 
again, this is done so that any differences in the estimated coefficient on the rate of 
saving, or the R^ coefficients can be attributed solely to differences in the specification, 
and not to which countries are in or out of the sample. 
The fifth regression (V) uses the same sample of countries as the third and fourth 
regressions, and includes variables that control for interactions between the most 
statistically significant of the variables in Table 5.1. The sixth column (VI) does not 
contain additional regression output, but contains estimates of the overall impact of a 
variable on the rate of saving, which is the sum of its estimated and — where 
applicable — is interacted coefficients, multiplied by the simple mean value of the 
variables it is interacted with. This allows the coefficients generated in the fifth 
regression to be compared against the coefficients estimated in the second and fourth 
regressions. 
For the analysis of national rates of investment and saving, only regressions I to IV are 
analysed for 1980 and 2000. This is because the output from these regressions fails to 
reject the Ramsey regression equation specification error test at the 10 % confidence 
level. This means that the preferred model is appropriately specified for an analysis of 
national rates of saving and investment, and that interactions between variables need 
not be controlled for. This is true of both the sample that includes all countries, and the 
sample that is limited to non-OECD countries. This is not surprising, since the analysis 
in chapter 3 demonstrated that countries' rates of national saving and investment were 
generally more closely correlated than their rates of domestic saving and investment. 
This can be explained by the fact that GNI is more likely to reflect a windfall income 
gain or terms of trade shock that will simply alter the denominator used to generate 
rates of national investment and saving, and move them both in the same direction. By 
contrast, a change in GDP will be associated with a change in production technology 
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that will be reflected in the other variables included in the analysis, and their 
interactions with one another. 
5 . 3 . 1 A L L COUNTRIES 
The analysis shows that is consistently higher when estimated using rates of 
national saving than when using rates of domestic saving, and declines in both 
magnitude and statistical significance between 1980 and 2000. The inclusion of the 
additional variables does not have a significant impact on either the magnitude or the 
statistical significance of however, the regressions that contain the additional 
variables have a higher adjusted R .^ In summary, the evidence in Table 5.6 to Table 5.8 
implies that the rate of investment across all countries is not as affected by 
considerations of affordability in 2000 as it was in 1980. This is demonstrated by the 
coefficient estimates on the rate of saving and foreign aid as a proportion of GNI being 
halved between 1980 and 2000. Nevertheless, the coefficient estimates on the rates of 
saving, and on the receipt of foreign aid are positive and significant. This means that 
while there is still evidence that a country's low rate of saving as a result of low income 
is a barrier to growth, it is much weaker than in 2000 than it was in 1980. 
In general, the additional variables had greater explanatory power in 2000 than in 1980, 
which demonstrates that simple affordability is a weakening barrier to growth. At the 
same time, not all of the additional variables are statistically significant. Contributions 
to the economic growth literature in recent years distinguish between 'proximate 
causes' of growth — that are directly linked with price distortions or the accumulation 
of factors — and 'deep determinants' of growth, which seek to go to the fundamental 
differences between countries that affect rates of growth. The growth literature 
characterises geography, institutional quality, and health outcomes as deep 
determinants of growth, of which only institutional quality and health can be affected 
by policy intervention. Geography is not directly included or tested in the cross-section 
analysis of the preferred model in section 5.3, however, section 5.4 controls for fixed 
effects, which indirectly controls for cross-country differences in geography. 
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T A B L E 5.6 A L L C O U N T R I E S - R A T E S A S A P R O P O R T I O N O F G D P , 1980 
I I I I I I IV V VI 
n 81 81 75 75 75 75 
r' 0 . 2 2 5 0 . 3 5 6 0 . 2 5 8 0 . 4 4 0 0 . 6 1 9 — 
SRATE 0 . 2 6 2 0 . 3 3 4 0 . 3 3 0 0 . 3 8 5 0, . 3 8 6 0 . 5 5 4 
( 4 . 9 3 ) ( 5 . 4 4 ) ( 5 . 1 7 ) ( 4 . 9 6 ) (1. . 8 3 ) — 
MRS :: - 0 . 0 1 9 ( - 1 . 5 3 ) :: - 0 . 0 2 2 ( - 1 . 1 0 ) - 0 , ( - 1 . . 0 2 3 .33 ) - 0 . 0 2 3 
AID_GNI 
j 
0 . 6 7 6 — 0 . 6 5 0 0 . . 4 7 9 0 . 4 7 9 
( 3 . 6 6 ) — ( 3 . 3 1 ) (2 . . 39 ) 1 — 
EFW_ES — 0 . 4 0 3 
( 1 . 1 6 ) :: 0 . 4 9 0 ( 1 . 4 4 ) 2 . (3 . . 4 0 3 .16 ) 0 . 1 8 8 
EFW PR — 0 . 7 5 3 — 0 . 9 9 1 0 . . 4 3 3 1 0 . 6 9 1 
— ( 1 . 7 0 ) — ( 2 . 0 3 ) (0 . . 36 ) 1 — 
KPERLA — — — - 0 . 0 2 1 0 . . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 1 
— — — ( - 1 . 2 9 ) (0 . 
1 
. 06 ) — 
LU — — — 0 . 0 1 8 0 . . 0 5 2 0 . 0 5 2 
— — 
1 
( 0 . 3 4 ) (1 . . 15 ) 1 — 
OPENC — — - j 0 . 0 2 4 0, . 0 3 9 0 . 1 3 1 
— — - ( 1 . 6 4 ) (0, .,3, 1 — 
PRICE - - - 0 . 4 4 8 
( - 0 . 4 0 ) 
- 1 , 
( - 1 
. 157 
. 1 8 ) 
- 1 . 1 5 7 
SRATExAID_GNI — — — — 0 .017 1 — 
— — — — (1 . 5 5 ) — 
SRATExEFW_ES — — — — — — 
SRATExEFM_PR — — — — 0 
(2 
. 0 8 8 
. 4 3 ) 
— 
SRATExMRS — - - — — — — 
EFW ESxEFM_PR — — — — - 0 
( - 3 
. 4 4 0 
. 0 1 ) 
— 
EFW_ESxMR5 - -
SRATExOPENC — - - — - 0 
( - 3 
. 0 0 5 
. 3 8 ) 
EFW PRx OPENC — - - — — 0 
(2 
. 0 1 9 
. 2 8 ) 
CONSTANT 1 8 . 4 7 2 1 0 . 2 3 6 1 7 . 3 6 6 7 . 4 9 5 2 . 0 9 0 2 . 0 9 0 
( 1 4 . 1 4 ) ( 2 . 5 8 ) ( 1 1 . 9 9 ) ( 1 . 8 4 ) (0 . 3 2 ) — 
F-prob 1 
F-prob 2 
0 . 0 0 1 
0 . 0 7 3 
0 . 0 0 1 
0 . 2 6 6 — 
test that all coefficients except for SRATE are zero. F-prob 2 is the p-value for the test that 
KPERLA=LU=OPENC=PRICE=0 for the full regression, and that EFW_ES=EFW_PR=0 for the preferred regression. 
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T A B L E 5.7 A L L C O U N T R I E S - R A T E S A S A P R O P O R T I O N O F G D P , 2000 
I I I I I I IV V VI 
n 108 108 83 83 83 83 
0 . 1 6 8 0 . 2 9 2 0 . 2 1 2 0 . 3 9 4 0 . 4 0 0 — 
SRATE 0 . 1 8 6 0 . 1 4 9 0 . 2 1 0 0 . 1 9 2 - 0 . 4 9 5 0 . 1 2 7 
( 4 . 7 6 ) ( 3 . 3 1 ) ( 4 . 8 0 ) ( 2 . 9 7 ) ( - 1 . 8 6 ) — 
MRS — - 0 . 0 4 3 — - 0 . 0 5 6 - 0 . 2 2 8 - 0 . 0 2 0 
— ( - 3 . 2 4 ) — ( - 2 . 6 0 ) ( - 4 . 1 3 ) — 
AID_GNI — 0 . 2 1 8 — 0 . 2 8 8 0 . 5 9 8 0 . 2 0 8 
— ( 1 . 8 1 ) — ( 2 . 0 9 ) ( 3 . 3 0 ) — 
EFW_ES — 0 . 7 4 0 — 0 . 8 2 9 - 1 . 6 9 6 0 . 4 8 0 
— ( 2 . 4 3 ) — ( 2 . 4 9 ) ( - 1 . 8 0 ) — 
EFW_PR — - 0 . 2 9 5 — 0 . 0 0 9 - 0 . 4 6 5 - 0 . 4 6 5 
— ( - 0 . 8 1 ) — ( 0 . 0 2 ) ( - 0 . 8 4 ) — 
KPERLA — — — - 0 . 0 1 9 0 . 0 2 0 0 . 0 2 0 
— — — ( - 0 . 9 7 ) ( 0 . 9 1 ) — 
LU — — — 0 . 0 4 5 0 . 0 4 9 0 . 0 4 9 
— — — ( 1 . 0 0 ) ( 1 . 1 0 ) — 
OPENC — — — 0 . 0 1 1 0 . 0 1 5 0 . 0 1 5 
— — — ( 0 . 9 2 ) ( 1 . 2 6 ) — 
PRICE — — — 0 . 3 3 6 - 0 . 2 0 8 - 0 . 2 0 8 
— — — ( 0 . 7 6 ) ( - 0 . 3 2 ) — 
SRATExAID_GNI — — — — - 0 . 0 1 9 — 
— — — — ( - 1 . 6 1 ) — 
SRATExEFW_ES — — — — 0 . 0 6 1 — 
— — — — ( 2 . 0 6 ) — 
SRATExEFW_PR — — — — — - -
SRATExMRS — — — — 0 . 0 0 4 — 
— — — — ( 3 . 0 6 ) — 
EFW_ESxEFW_PR — — - - - - — — 
EFW_ESxMR5 — — 0 . 0 1 7 
— — ( 2 . 8 0 ) - -
SRATExOPENC — — — — — - -
EFW_PRxOPENC :: — 
— — — — — 
CONSTANT 1 7 . 5 5 4 1 6 . 0 9 6 1 7 . 1 3 5 1 1 . 4 4 5 3 6 . 3 7 2 3 6 . 3 7 2 
( 1 8 . 8 3 ) ( 5 . 4 6 ) ( 1 6 . 3 0 ) ( 2 . 7 8 ) ( 4 . 1 3 ) — 
F - p r o b 1 — 0 . 0 0 0 — 0 . 0 0 2 — — 
F - p r o b 2 — 0 . 0 5 6 — 0 . 4 4 5 — — 
Note: Figures in brackets are t-statistics. " " indicates correction for heteroskedasticity. F-prob 1 is the p-value for the test 
that all coefficients except for SRATE are zero. F-prob 2 is the p-value for the test that KPERLA=LU=OPENC=PRICE=0 
for the full regression, and that EFW_ES=EFW_PR=0 for the preferred regression. 
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T A B L E 5.8 A L L C O U N T R I E S - R A T E S A S A P R O P O R T I O N O F G N I 
1980 1980 1980 *1980 2000 2000 2000 *2000 
I II III IV I II III IV 
n 62 62 61 61 102 102 79 79 
0 . 5 5 5 0 . 5 9 2 0 . 5 5 5 0 . 7 2 5 0 . 4 4 3 0 . 5 2 0 0 . 5 1 7 0 . 6 3 8 
SRATE 0 . 5 9 6 0 . 6 5 4 0 . 5 9 6 0 . 5 8 6 0 . 3 5 8 0 . 3 3 7 0 . 3 7 7 0 . 3 6 2 
( 8 . 7 8 ) ( 7 . 2 7 ) ( 8 . 7 0 ) ( 6 . 2 4 ) ( 9 . 0 2 ) (7, . 5 3 ) ( 9 . 1 9 ) ( 5 . 9 4 ) 
MR 5 — - 0 . 0 1 4 — - 0 . 0 2 6 — - 0 , . 0 3 9 — - 0 . 0 4 4 
— ( - 1 . 1 5 ) — ( - 1 • 11) — ( - 3 , . 3 8 ) — ( - 2 . 2 1 ) 
AID_GNI — 0 . 6 8 6 — 0, . 5 2 0 — 0, . 2 7 9 — 0 . 3 1 7 
— ( 2 . 6 0 ) — (1. . 9 6 ) — (2 . . 8 1 ) — ( 2 . 2 9 ) 
EFW 3 — 0 . 2 4 2 — 0, . 3 7 8 — 0. . 5 7 2 — 0 . 4 8 0 
— ( 0 . 7 6 ) — (1. . 3 0 ) — (2 . . 21 ) — ( 1 . 8 1 ) 
EFW 2 — 0 . 5 4 4 — 0, . 8 9 8 — - 0 . , 282 — 0 . 1 6 5 
— ( 1 . 2 5 ) — (1. . 9 8 ) — ( - 0 . . 90) — ( 0 . 4 0 ) 
KPERLA - - - 0 
( - 1 . 
. 0 2 5 
. 3 1 ) :: - - - - - 0 . 0 2 9 ( - 1 . 8 2 ) 
LU - 0 , 
( - 0 , 
. 0 0 2 
. 0 3 ) 
- - - - ;; 0 . 0 1 1 ( 0 . 2 9 ) 
OPENC — 0, 
(3, 
. 0 3 5 
. 9 1 ) :: :: 0 . 0 1 4 ( 1 . 8 2 ) 
PRICE :: :: 2, (1. . 0 8 3 . 8 0 ) :: — — 0 . 2 8 8 ( 0 . 8 0 ) 
CONSTANT 1 2 . 8 8 5 6 . 7 9 1 1 2 . 8 7 6 2, . 9 2 3 1 4 . 7 8 4 1 3 . 757 1 4 . 2 6 1 1 0 . 8 6 6 
( 9 . 1 0 ) ( 1 . 8 3 ) ( 9 . 0 1 ) (0, . 7 8 ) ( 1 5 . 9 6 ) (5 . ,40) ( 1 4 . 5 4 ) ( 3 . 8 3 ) 
F - p r o b 1 — 0 . 0 6 2 — 0 . 0 0 0 — 0 . , 0 0 1 — 0 . 0 0 5 
F - p r o b 2 - - 0 . 2 4 7 — 0 . 0 0 0 — 0 . ,092 — 0 . 1 0 5 
Note: Figures in brackets are t-statistics. indicates correction for heteroskedasticity. F-prob 1 is tlie p-value for the test 
that all coefficients except for SRATE are zero. F-prob 2 is the p-value for the test that KPERLA=LU=OPENC=PRICE=0 
for the full regression, and that EEW_ES=EFW_PR=0 for the preferred regression. 
It is no surprise, then, tiiat these deep determinants — such as the mortality rate, and 
both measures of institutional quality — have greater explanatory power than 
proximate causes of growth such as the capital-to-labour ratio, the relative price of 
capital goods or the stock of human capital. For this reason, the preferred model, tested 
down from the expanded model, retains health, property rights and access to sound 
money. Receipt of foreign aid is also retained as a control for affordability — while its 
relative importance has waned, it is still statistically significant in 2000. Across the data 
set, property rights had a greater impact in 1980 while access to sound money was 
relatively insignificant, but by 2000, the opposite was true. As a result, both measures 
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are included in the preferred specification, and the probability values for the f-tests 
show that they are jointly significant at the 10 % level, except in 1980 for rates of 
investment and saving calculated as proportions of GNI. 
Finally, the 'deep determinants', along with the control for economic openness, have 
the greatest explanatory power when interacted with the controls for affordability and 
with one another. Regression V for the analysis of domestic rates of investment and 
saving includes selected interactions of the variables in the expanded model. The 
interpretation of the coefficients on the interacted variables is complicated because 
simply analysing the estimated coefficients implies that the average values of the other 
terms in the interaction are zero. For example, the estimated coefficient on SRATE in 
Table 5.7 is -0.495, which implies that the rate of investment will fall as the rate of 
saving increases. In fact, this would only be the case where the variables that SRATE is 
interacted with are equal to zero — that is, the receipt of foreign aid is zero, access to 
sound money is judged to be so lacking that it scores a zero, and there is no under-five 
mortality. Taking the average values of AID_GNI, EFW_ES and MRS across the sample, 
multiplying them by the estimated coefficient on the appropriate interacted terms and 
adding them to the estimated coefficient on SRATE gives the implied impact, evaluated 
for the average country in the sample, of 0.127. The sixth column in Table 5.6 and Table 
5.7 (as well as in Table 5.9 and Table 5.10 below) shows the overall impact of a change 
in each variable on the rate of investment, calculated in the manner described. The 
proximate causes of growth, on the other hand, have little to no impact on either 
domestic or national rates of investment in either period. 
5 . 3 . 2 N O N - O E C D COUNTRIES 
Table 5.9 through to Table 5.11 show the effects of including the additional variables in 
cross-sections for 1980 and 2000 that exclude the OECD countries. The overall pattern 
is similar to the sample of all countries — the rate of saving is statistically significant in 
all instances, and the rate of national saving continues to have a higher estimated 
coefficient than the rate of domestic saving as was the case with the estimates in 
chapter 3. 
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T A B L E 5.9 N O N - O E C D C O U N T R I E S - R A T E S AS A P R O P O R T I O N O F G D P , 1980 
I I I I I I IV V VI 
n 58 58 53 53 53 
1 
R' 0 206 0 . 4 1 7 0 . 2 2 6 0 . 4 3 8 0 . 5 6 8 
1 
SRATE 0 245 0 . 2 8 0 0 . 3 0 8 0 . 3 3 6 0 . 2 1 0 0 . 4 1 9 
) 
(3 98) (4 . 0 6 ) (4 . 0 2 ) ( 3 . 4 7 ) (0 . 7 3 ) 
1 
MRS — - 0 029 — - 0 . 0 1 9 - 0 . 0 2 6 - 0 . 0 2 6 
— ( - 2 12) — ( - 0 . 7 8 ) ( - 1 . 1 8 ) — 
AID_GNI — 0 593 0 . 6 1 4 0 . 4 6 4 0 . 7 8 0 
— (2 99) 
I 
( 2 . 6 8 ) (2 . 2 0 ) — 
EFW_ES — 0 941 — 0 . 8 7 1 3 . 3 2 4 0 . 5 0 1 
— (2 20) — ( 1 . 7 8 ) (3 . 0 7 ) — 
EFW PR — 1 396 — 1 . 2 5 6 0 . 4 4 3 0 . 9 9 5 
— (2 45) — ( 1 . 9 8 ) (0 . 2 1 ) — 
KPERLA — — — - 0 . 0 1 0 - 0 . 0 0 7 - 0 . 0 0 7 
— — — ( - 0 . 2 0 ) ( - 0 . 1 4 ) — 
LU — — — - 0 . 0 1 2 0 .027 0 . 0 2 7 
— — — ( - 0 . 2 0 ) (0, . 5 0 ) — 
OPENC — — — 0 . 0 2 2 0, . 0 0 8 0 . 0 0 8 
— — — ( 1 . 1 9 ) (0, . 4 5 ) — 
PRICE — — — - 0 . 3 5 0 - 1 , . 0 6 6 ^ - 1 . 0 6 6 
— — — ( - 0 . 2 7 ) ( - 0 , . 90 ) 
1 
SRATExAID GNI — — — — 0, .017 — 
— — — — (1 . . 24 ) — 
SRATExEFW ES — — — — - 0 . .077 — 
— — — — ( - 1 . . 60 ) — 
SRATExEFW_PR — — — — 0. . 1 3 9 — 
— — — — (3 . . 06 ) 
SRATExMRS 
1 
EFW ESxEFW_PR — — — — - 0 , .344 — 
— — — — ( - 1 . . 09 ) — 
EFW_ESxMR5 — — — — — — 
SRATExOPENC — — — — — — 
EFW PRx OPENC — — — — — — 
CONSTANT 18 , . 7 8 0 7, . 7 8 8 17 . 7 9 1 6 . 3 7 6 4 . 424 4 . 4 2 4 
(12 . . 23 ) (1 . . 7 0 ) (10 . . 3 6 ) ( 1 . 1 3 ) (0 . 5 3 ) — 
F - p r o b 1 — 0. . 0 0 0 — 0 . 0 0 4 — — 
F - p r o b 2 — 0. . 007 — 0 . 8 1 9 — — 
Note: Figures in brackets are t-statistics. indicates correction for lieteroskedasticity. F-prob 1 is the p-value for the test 
that all coefficients except for SRATE are zero. F-prob 2 is the p-value for the test that KPERLA=LU=OPENC=PR1CE=0 
for the full regression, and that EFW__ES=ErW_PR=0 for the preferred regression. 
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The increase in the adjusted R^ coefficient once again demonstrates that the additional 
variables do add to the explanation of what drives rates of investment across countries. 
With respect to the saving trap itself, there is strong evidence that rates of investment 
and saving in the non-OECD countries are still positively correlated in 2000, which 
means that at least part of an increase in a country's rate of saving will be retained as 
domestic investment. In addition, there is extremely strong evidence that the inclusion 
of the variables discussed so far does not significantly alter the estimate of /Si. 
Both the preferred and the expanded model are estimated for the sample of non-OECD 
countries. One major difference is that cross-country differences in property rights and 
law enforcement have considerably more explanatory power across non-OECD 
countries in 2000 than when OECD countries were included in the sample. Repeating 
the joint f-tests for the coefficients on access to sound money and property rights and 
law enforcement, there is evidence to support the retention of both variables at a 1 % 
level of significance, compared to 10 % for the sample of all countries. In general, the 
controls for foreign aid, access to sound money, and property rights have a stronger 
effect on countries' rates of investment — both in terms of magnitude and statistical 
significance — when OECD countries are excluded from the sample. Access to sound 
money and property rights have a simple intuitive explanation, since they reflect the 
riskiness associated with investing in a particular country. Access to sound money is 
relatively unimportant as a driver of investment in 1980, but becomes more important 
in 2000. This is in contrast to the coefficient on property rights, which exhibits the 
opposite behaviour. 
In addition, the estimated coefficient on the mortality rate almost doubles in 
magnitude, and becomes statistically significant in 2000. As discussed earlier, a 
healthier workforce can supply more hours of labour due to less time lost to recovering 
from illness, or taking care of family members who are ill. A healthier population also 
increases life expectancy, and through it, the incentive to invest in human capital. 
Martina (2009) makes a strong argument for the importance of improved health 
outcomes to growth in incomes, highlighting the cases of China, Taiwan, South Korea, 
Malaysia and Vietnam, where declines in the rate of infant and under-five mortality 
preceded sustained accelerations in the rate of economic growth. 
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T A B L E 5 .10 N O N - O E C D C O U N T R I E S - R A T E S A S A P R O P O R T I O N O F G D P , 2000 
I I I I I I IV V VI 
n 92 92 67 67 67 67 
R' 0 . 1 7 8 0 . 3 5 1 0 . 2 3 1 0 . 4 1 6 0 . 4 0 4 - -
SRATE 0 . 1 9 3 0 . 1 6 1 0 . 2 2 2 0 . 2 0 9 - 0 . 5 5 0 0 . 1 4 5 
( 4 . 5 6 ) ( 3 . 2 7 ) ( 4 . 5 6 ) ( 3 . 3 1 ) ( - 1 . 8 3 ) — 
MRS — - 0 . 0 4 0 - 0 . 0 5 2 - 0 . 2 4 7 - 0 . 0 2 7 
— ( - 2 . 8 5 ) ( - 2 . 3 7 ) ( - 3 . 7 6 ) — 
AID_GNI — 0 . 2 2 8 0 . 2 9 6 0 . 6 0 2 0 . 2 1 9 
— ( 2 . 1 5 ) — , ( 2 . 0 5 ) ( 3 . 0 4 ) — 
EFW ES — 0 . 8 1 7 — ' 0 . 8 6 0 - 2 . 1 8 2 0 . 4 9 6 
— ( 3 . 1 6 ) ( 2 . 4 9 ) ( - 1 . 9 0 ) — 
EFW_PR — 0 . 1 9 2 0 . 0 7 0 - 0 . 5 4 1 - 0 . 5 4 1 
— ( 0 . 4 8 ) ( 0 . 1 2 ) ( - 0 . 8 0 ) — 
KPERLA — — - 0 . 0 2 0 0 . 0 1 8 0 . 0 1 8 
— — ( - 0 . 5 6 ) ( 0 . 5 2 ) i 
LU — — 0 . 0 4 0 0 . 0 5 0 0 . 0 5 0 
— — ( 0 . 9 1 ) ( 1 . 0 2 ) — 
OPENC — — 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 9 0 . 0 1 9 
— — ( 0 . 7 5 ) ( 1 . 2 3 ) — 
PRICE — — 0 . 4 2 0 - 0 . 1 5 1 - 0 . 1 5 1 
— — — ( 0 . 9 3 ) ( - 0 . 2 1 ) — 
SRATExAID_GNI — — — — - 0 . 0 2 0 - -
— — — ( - 1 . 5 0 ) — 
SRATExEFW_ES — — — 0 . 0 7 0 
1 
— — — ( 2 . 1 0 ) 
SRATExEFW_PR — — — — — 
— — 
i 
— — 
SRATExMRS — — 
i 
0 . 0 0 4 — 
— — — ( 2 . 7 3 ) — 
EFW ESxEFW PR — — — — — 
EFW_ESxMR5 :: :; :: 0 . 0 2 0 - -
— — — ( 2 . 7 3 ) — 
SRATExOPENC — — — — - -
EFW PRxOPENC 
! 
— — — — 
CONSTANT 1 7 . 2 9 4 1 2 . 7 0 7 1 6 . 7 7 5 9 . 9 0 9 3 9 . 5 0 9 3 9 . 5 0 9 
( 1 7 . 1 8 ) ( 3 . 7 4 ) ( 1 4 . 4 5 ) ( 2 . 2 8 ) ( 3 . 7 0 ) — 
F - p r o b 1 — 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 9 — — 
F - p r o b 2 — 0 . 0 0 5 0 . 5 5 2 — — 
Note: Figures in bracl<ets are t-statistics. '*' indicates correction for heteroskedasticity. F-prob 1 is the p-value for the test 
that all coefficients except for SRATE are zero. F-prob 2 is the p-value for the test that KPERLA=LU=OPENC=PR1CE=0 
for the full regression, and that EFW_ES=ErW_PR=0 for the preferred regression. 
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Including interacted variables in the analysis does not alter the overall finding. The 
impact of these variables, when evaluated for the average country in the sample at the 
average, is similar to the impacts estimated in the expanded model — both in 1980 and 
2000. The two exceptions are the variables that control for differences in access to 
sound money and property rights, which have a smaller impact when interacted than 
on their own. Once again, the Ramsey regression equation specification error test fails 
to reject the null hypothesis that the analysis of national rates of investment and saving 
is correctly specified, and so coefficients for interacted variables are not estimated. 
As with the full sample of countries above, the coefficient estimate on the receipt of aid 
is roughly halved between 1980 and 2000 — for rates of investment measured as 
proportions of both GDP and GNI. Excluding OECD countries from the sample does 
not significantly affect the coefficient estimates, but it does reduce the associated 
standard errors. This is unsurprising, since with the exception of Turkey, OECD 
countries do not receive foreign aid. The continued importance of aid and of the rate of 
saving in the regression analysis demonstrates that simple affordability is still a barrier 
to investment in the non-OECD countries. The increased significance of health and 
institutional quality in 2000 compared to 1980 demonstrates that addressing 
affordability alone is not a viable solution. 
Once again, the variables controlling for differences in proximate causes of growth lack 
statistical significance, and a joint F-test for these variables supports excluding them 
from the preferred model for the non-OECD countries. The inclusion of the 
capital-to-labour ratio (KPERLA) is not statistically significant using data for either 
1980 or 2000, which is consistent with the discussion on Lucas' and Caselli and Feyrer's 
work in section 2.4.2 — there is more to investment decisions than simply whether a 
country is capital-rich or capital-poor. The price of capital goods relative to 
consumption goods (PRICE) also does not appear to have any influence on countries' 
rates of investment, which appears peculiar, given Sala-i-Martin et. al.'s findings on the 
importance of this variable in explaining differences in rates of economic growth across 
countries (2004). It is, however, generally categorised as one of the proximate causes of 
growth, and is not included in the preferred model for this reason. 
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T A B L E 5.11 N O N - O E C D C O U N T R I E S - R A T E S A S A P R O P O R T I O N O F G N I 
1980 1980 1980 1980 2000 2000 2000 •2000 
I II III IV I II III IV 
n 41 41 40 40 86 86 63 63 
0 . 5 4 8 0 . 6 9 7 0 . 5 4 7 0 . 7 3 6 0 . 4 9 3 0 . 6 0 0 0 . 5 9 2 0 . 7 0 2 
SRATE 0 . 6 2 3 0 . 5 9 8 0 . 6 2 3 0 . 5 5 9 0 . 3 8 3 0 . 3 6 3 0 . 4 1 0 0 . 3 9 8 
( 7 . 0 4 ) ( 6 . 0 5 ) ( 6 . 9 4 ) ( 5 . 4 8 ) ( 9 . 1 4 ) ( 7 . 9 7 ) ( 9 . 5 5 ) ( 6 . 2 9 ) 
MRS — - 0 . 0 2 6 — - 0 . 0 2 0 — - 0 . 0 3 4 — - 0 . 0 3 7 
— ( - 2 . 0 1 ) — ( - 0 . 8 4 ) — ( - 3 . 0 1 ) — ( - 1 . 7 7 ) 
AID_GNI — 0 . 6 5 3 — 0 . 5 6 5 — 0 . 2 9 3 — 0 . 3 3 6 
— ( 2 . 4 1 ) — ( 2 . 0 8 ) — ( 2 . 9 8 ) — ( 2 . 2 5 ) 
EFW_ES — 0 . 8 5 5 — 0 . 8 0 7 — 0 . 6 4 0 — 0 . 4 1 5 
— ( 2 . 2 4 ) - - ( 1 . 9 6 ) — ( 2 . 4 1 ) — ( 1 . 4 3 ) 
EFW_PR — 1 . 5 9 4 — 1 . 689 — 0 . 4 9 2 — 0 . 1 8 4 
— ( 3 . 0 1 ) — ( 2 . 9 3 ) — ( 1 . 2 3 ) — ( 0 . 3 8 ) 
KPERLA — — — - 0 . 0 3 0 — — - - - 0 . 0 1 2 
— — — ( - 0 . 5 9 ) — — — ( - 0 . 4 1 ) 
LU — — — - 0 . 0 5 0 — — — 0 . 0 0 4 
— — — ( - 0 . 8 2 ) — — — ( 0 . 0 9 ) 
OPENC — — — 0 . 0 3 0 — — — 0 . 0 1 1 
— — — ( 2 . 0 9 ) — — — ( 0 . 9 4 ) 
PRICE — — — 2 . 2 1 5 — — — 0 . 4 8 8 
— — — ( 1 . 9 2 ) — — — ( 1 . 3 3 ) 
CONSTANT 1 2 . 9 7 6 2 . 1 7 6 1 2 . 9 7 7 - 0 . 5 1 4 1 4 . 3 4 1 8 . 7 4 3 1 3 . 6 4 5 9 . 4 1 9 
( 7 . 5 9 ) ( 0 . 5 3 ) ( 7 . 4 8 ) ( - 0 . 1 1 ) ( 1 4 . 7 3 ) ( 3 . 0 2 ) ( 1 3 . 3 0 ) ( 3 . 2 8 ) 
F - p r o b 1 — 0 . 0 0 1 — 0 . 0 0 1 — 0 . 0 0 0 — 0 . 0 0 6 
F - p r o b 2 - - 0 . 0 0 2 - - 0 . 0 9 3 — 0 . 0 1 1 — 0 . 4 5 0 
Note: Figures in brackets are t-statistics. indicates correction for heteroskedasticity. F-prob 1 is the p-value for the test 
that all coefficients except for SRATE are zero. F-prob 2 is the p-value for the test that KPERLA=LU=OPENC=PRICE=0 
for the full regression, and that EFW_ES=EFW_PR=0 for the preferred regression. 
Human capital in the form of education is one of the classic complementary factors of 
production to physical capital, however, the control for the proportion of the 
population that has not been formally educated is not significant in the analysis. This 
lack of explanatory power may be due in part to the fact that the Barro and Lee dataset 
used in this analysis does not control for differences in the quality of education 
received across different countries. In addition, Barro and Lee's own inclusion of 
educational attainment in their conditional convergence analysis generated 
counter-intuitive findings, with female educational attainment having a negative 
estimated coefficient. The authors noted the oddity, and suggested that lower 
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educational attainment was associated with 'backwardness' , which in turn was 
associated with greater distance from a country's steady state — as a result, these 
countries had higher rates of growth (Barro and Lee, 1994). For both of these reasons, 
LU is excluded from the preferred model. 
Interpreting the preferred model without the interacted variables, it seems that 
focussing on health outcomes is a better and more affordable proposition for attracting 
investment than tackling institutional quality. The indices of economic freedom are 
compiled to rate countries from zero to ten, for 123 countries in 2000. The mean and 
standard deviation are 7.6 and 1.9 respectively for access to sound money in 2000, and 
5.8 and 1.9 for property rights and law enforcement. In order to increase the rate of 
investment by one percentage point, the average non-OECD country would need to 
improve its access to sound money score by between 1.2 and 2.4 index points 
depending on the measure of investment used. With respect to property rights, the 
average non-OECD country's score would need to increase by 2 to 15 index points to 
achieve the same one percentage point increase in the rate of investment in 2000. 
Noting that the highest score a country can have is 10, this demonstrates that property 
rights and law enforcement have a weaker economic significance as well as a weaker 
statistical significance compared to access to sound money. 
Health, as measured by the under-five mortality rate, can be seen to have a significant 
impact on countries' rates of domestic and national investment in both years. The 
estimated coefficients are also roughly similar in magnitude when estimated using the 
different data sets, with the implication that in 2000, the average non-OECD country 
would need to reduce its under-five mortality rate from between 19 and 29 children a 
year, in order to generate a one percentage point increase in the rate of investment. 
Since the mean under-five mortality rate for non-OECD countries in 2000 was 68.6, and 
the standard deviation was 63.2, the improvement in health necessary to raise the rate 
of investment by one percentage point is considerably less than the standard deviation 
for this measure, and is far more reasonable to attain than the improvements to 
countries' economic freedom scores necessary to obtain the same effect. 
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5 . 4 CONTROLLING FOR FIXED EFFECTS 
In addition to the variables analysed and discussed so far, there are a range of other 
variables that reflect cultural or religious differences across countries (for example, the 
proportion of the population that speaks a particular language, or follows a particular 
faith), or the geographic location of the country (for example, distance from the 
equator, or whether or not the country is landlocked). These differences have been 
shown to have strong explanatory power in cross-country economic growth 
regressions, but have so far been excluded from this analysis. Many of these differences 
are country fixed effects — for example, neither a country's distance from the equator 
nor the proportion of the population that speaks a particular language or follows a 
certain faith are likely to have changed significantly in the twenty year period 
analysed. Without meaning to downplay the importance of identifying these variables 
individually, the purpose of the analysis in this chapter is to identify the factors that 
affect rates of investment and that can also be affected by policy initiatives — such as 
country differences in institutional quality or health. Nevertheless, it is also necessary 
to establish that the exclusion of these fixed effects does not bias the estimates of the 
other variables. 
Table 5.12 and Table 5.13 show the regression output for a fixed effects estimation of 
the relationship between rates of investment and saving, when measured as 
proportions of GDP and GNI, respectively." This analysis shows that the results in the 
previous section were not biased by fixed effects. Rates of investment and saving are 
significantly and positively (although far from perfectly) correlated, the inclusion of 
additional variables affects neither the magnitude nor the significance of the coefficient 
on the rate of saving, and the additional variables contribute further explanatory 
power as evidenced by the increase in the within R^ coefficient. The negative coefficient 
on the dummy variables for the different years (with 1980 being the default) indicate 
that the rate of investment across countries on average has declined between 1980 and 
" The Ramsey regression equation specification error test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the 
analysis is correctly specified for all of the regression analysis in this section, and so coefficients for 
interacted variables are not estimated. 
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2000, for reasons other than those that can be accounted for by the fixed effects or the 
variables included. The country fixed effects themselves account for roughly half of the 
unexplained variation in cross-country rates of investment — something that is 
consistent across the country samples, and the different measures of rates of saving 
and investment. 
There are also a number of clear differences. For the first time, the estimated 
coefficients on the rates of national saving are similar in magnitude to those using the 
rates of domestic saving — in all of the other analysis up until this point, the former 
have always been higher. The second major difference is that economic openness has a 
strong, positive impact on the rate of investment under all of the circumstances shown. 
The level of population health and the receipt of aid have far less explanatory power in 
the specification using rates of investment and saving as proportions of GNI than they 
do for rates of investment and saving as proportions of GDP, however, the magnitude 
of the coefficient estimates are similar to those generated in the cross-section analysis 
earlier. Controlling for fixed effects has no impact on the economic significance of 
access to sound money, however, the coefficient estimates are much more strongly 
statistically significant when fixed effects are controlled for. With respect to property 
rights and law enforcement, controlling for fixed effects practically decimates the 
coefficient estimate, while the statistical significance remains low. 
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TABLE 5.12 RATES AS A PROPORTION OF GDP, FIXED EFFECTS 1980-2000 
ALL ALL ALL ALL NON-OECD NON-OECD NON-OECD NON-OECD 
I I I I I I I V I I I I I I I V 
n 490 490 410 410 389 389 311 311 
C o u n t r i e s 117 117 92 92 93 93 69 69 
R' 0 . 2 0 5 0 . 2 6 4 0 . 2 1 3 0 . 3 0 9 0 . 1 7 4 0 . 2 4 6 0 . 1 8 6 0 . 3 0 5 
P 0 . 5 2 1 0 . 6 1 6 0 . 5 0 4 0 . 5 8 9 0 . 5 3 7 0 . 5 5 5 0 . 5 4 5 0 . 5 4 8 
SRATE 0 . 3 2 6 0 . 3 6 3 0 . 3 2 9 0 . 3 6 1 0 . 2 8 1 0 . 3 1 6 0 . 2 6 9 0 . 3 0 4 
( 8 . 6 6 ) ( 9 . 6 2 ) ( 8 . 0 3 ) (8 . 6 9 ) ( 6 . 7 4 ) ( 7 . 6 0 ) ( 5 . 8 6 ) ( 6 . 5 1 ) 
MRS — - 0 . 0 4 9 — -0 . 0 5 5 — 
1 
- 0 . 0 4 6 - - - 0 . 0 4 7 
— ( - 2 . 8 6 ) — (-3 . 0 9 ) — ( - 2 . 3 0 ) — ( - 2 . 3 5 ) 
AID_GNI — 0 . 1 2 4 — 0 . 1 2 1 — 0 . 1 0 7 - - 0 . 0 9 1 
— ( 2 . 5 1 ) — (2 . 05 ) — ( 2 . 0 7 ) — ( 1 . 4 6 ) 
EFW ES — 0 . 6 4 9 — 0 . 692 — 0 . 7 3 1 — 0 . 7 4 9 
— ( 4 . 4 3 ) — (4 . 40 ) — ( 4 . 5 0 ) — ( 4 . 2 6 ) 
EFW PR — 0 . 0 7 6 — 0, . 2 16 — 0 . 0 5 5 — 0 . 2 5 3 
— ( 0 . 3 0 ) — (0, . 80 ) — ( 0 . 2 0 ) — ( 0 . 8 5 ) 
KPERLA — — — -0, . 0 1 9 — — — - 0 . 0 4 1 
— — — (-0, .90 ) — — — ( - 1 . 0 8 ) 
LU — — — 0. . 048 — — — 0 . 0 6 3 
— — — (0. . 94 ) — — — ( 1 . 0 6 ) 
OPENC — — — 0. . 049 — — — 0 . 0 5 4 
— — — (2. . 98) — — — ( 3 . 0 4 ) 
PRICE — — — 0. . 115 — — — 0 . 1 2 2 
— — — (0. ,57) — — — ( 0 . 5 8 ) 
1985 - 1 . 8 9 7 - 2 . 6 4 3 - 2 . 3 7 6 -2. ,788 - 2 . 1 1 5 - 2 . 9 6 2 - 2 . 7 7 2 - 2 . 8 5 0 
( - 2 . 7 6 ) ( - 3 . 7 6 ) ( - 3 . 4 ) (-3. ,91) ( - 2 . 5 3 ) ( - 3 . 3 8 ) ( - 3 . 2 2 ) ( - 3 . 0 8 ) 
1990 - 1 . 3 8 3 - 3 . 0 3 8 - 1 . 7 9 6 -3. ,082 - 1 . 4 1 3 - 3 . 1 0 6 - 1 . 9 0 4 - 2 . 8 1 4 
( - 2 . 0 9 ) ( - 3 . 9 9 ) ( - 2 . 6 5 ) (-3. 81) ( - 1 . 7 4 ) ( - 3 . 1 6 ) ( - 2 . 2 7 ) ( - 2 . 5 7 ) 
1995 - 1 . 7 9 5 - 3 . 9 0 5 - 1 . 8 2 8 -4. 014 - 1 . 2 9 4 - 3 . 4 0 0 - 1 . 1 2 0 - 2 . 9 1 8 
( - 2 . 7 1 ) ( - 4 . 6 1 ) ( - 2 . 6 8 ) (-4. 19) ( - 1 . 6 2 ) ( - 3 . 1 7 ) ( - 1 . 3 4 ) ( - 2 . 2 7 ) 
2000 - 2 . 8 2 6 - 5 . 8 4 8 - 2 . 8 4 3 -5. 857 - 2 . 7 3 5 - 6 . 0 0 0 - 2 . 7 4 4 - 5 . 4 2 6 
( - 4 . 2 2 ) ( - 6 . 1 3 ) ( - 4 . 0 9 ) (-5. 08) ( - 3 . 4 3 ) ( - 5 . 0 5 ) ( - 3 . 2 8 ) ( - 3 . 5 7 ) 
CONSTANT 1 7 . 3 0 0 1 6 . 4 1 8 1 7 . 4 3 5 11 . 537 1 8 . 1 3 8 1 7 . 8 4 9 1 8 . 5 5 7 1 1 . 4 0 1 
( 1 9 . 2 4 ) ( 7 . 0 4 ) ( 1 8 . 4 9 ) (3 . 98) ( 1 7 . 8 4 ) ( 6 . 0 5 ) ( 1 7 . 5 8 ) ( 2 . 7 9 ) 
F-prob 1 — 0 . 0 0 0 — 0. 000 — 0 . 0 0 0 — 0 . 0 0 0 
F-prob 2 — 0 . 0 0 0 — 0. 017 — 0 . 0 0 0 - - 0 . 0 1 1 
Note: Figures in brackets are t-statistics. 
p indicates the proportion of the unexplained variation in the rate of investment that is accounted for by the fixed 
effects. 
The R ' coefficient shown is the 'within' coefficient. 
F-prob 1 is the p-value for the test that all coefficients except for SRATE and the year dummy variables are zero. 
F-prob 2 is the p-value for the test that KPERLA=LU=OPENC=PRICE=0 for the full regression, and that 
EFW_ES=EFW_PR=0 for the preferred regression. 
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TABLE 5.13 RATES AS A PROPORTION OF GNI, FIXED EFFECTS 1980-2000 
AIL ALL ALL ALL NON-OECD NON-OECD NON-OECD NON-OECD 
I I I I I I IV I I I I I I IV 
n 431 431 368 368 335 335 272 272 
Countries 112 112 89 89 89 89 66 66 
F" 0 . 1 8 5 0 . 2 0 9 0 . 1 7 9 0 . , 2 5 1 0 . 1 8 0 0 . 2 1 0 0 . 1 8 3 0 . 2 6 9 
P 0 . 4 7 2 0 . 4 7 4 0 . 4 9 1 0 . , 4 8 1 0 . 4 7 2 0 . 4 1 6 0 . 5 0 9 0 . 4 7 5 
SRATE 0 . 3 2 6 0 . 3 3 0 0 . 2 9 1 0 . , 2 7 1 0 . 3 2 2 0 . 3 2 6 0 . 2 8 3 0 . 2 6 7 
( 7 . 1 7 ) ( 7 . 2 2 ) ( 6 . 1 5 ) (5 . ,66) ( 6 . 3 0 ) ( 6 . 3 3 ) ( 5 . 2 3 ) ( 4 . 9 0 ) 
MR 5 — - 0 . 0 3 4 — - 0 . ,028 — - 0 . 0 2 9 — - 0 . 0 1 7 
— ( - 1 . 6 4 ) — ( - 1 . ,32) — ( - 1 . 1 5 ) — ( - 0 . 6 5 ) 
AID_GNI — 0 . 0 6 2 — 0. ,018 — 0 . 0 5 3 — 0 . 0 0 6 
- - ( 1 . 0 0 ) - - (0 . ,26) - - ( 0 . 7 7 ) — ( 0 . 0 8 ) 
EFW ES - - 0 . 4 3 0 - - 0. , 445 - - 0 . 5 2 3 — 0 . 5 1 9 
— ( 2 . 5 9 ) — (2 . ,53) — ( 2 . 6 9 ) — ( 2 . 4 7 ) 
EFW_PR — 0 . 0 5 6 — 0. , 229 — 0 . 0 3 2 — 0 . 2 7 0 
— ( 0 . 1 8 ) — (0 . , 68) — ( 0 . 0 9 ) — ( 0 . 6 8 ) 
KPERLA — — — - 0 . .027 — — — - 0 . 0 6 2 
— — — ( - 1 . , 18 ) — — — ( - 1 . 3 3 ) 
LU — — — 0. .017 — — — 0 . 0 4 7 
— — — (0 . . 28 ) — — — ( 0 . 6 1 ) 
OPENC — — — 0. . 069 — — — 0 . 0 6 9 
— — — (3 . . 55 ) — — — ( 3 . 1 2 ) 
PRICE — — — 0. .187 — — — 0 . 1 9 2 
— — — (0 . . 88 ) — — — ( 0 . 8 2 ) 
1985 - 2 . 8 8 0 - 3 . 3 3 9 - 3 . 0 9 0 - 3 , . 1 5 6 - 2 . 9 9 8 - 3 . 5 0 5 - 3 . 3 0 8 - 2 . 8 3 1 
( - 3 . 6 4 ) ( - 4 . 0 7 ) ( - 3 . 9 4 ) ( - 3 , . 92 ) ( - 2 . 9 0 ) ( - 3 . 1 5 ) ( - 3 . 1 8 ) ( - 2 . 5 1 ) 
1990 - 1 . 8 3 4 - 2 . 8 9 2 - 2 . 1 1 6 - 2 , . 692 - 1 . 8 6 7 - 2 . 9 2 2 - 2 . 2 8 4 - 2 . 2 7 6 
( - 2 . 4 2 ) ( - 3 . 3 0 ) ( - 2 . 8 0 ) ( - 3 , . 0 0 ) ( - 1 . 8 7 ) ( - 2 . 3 7 ) ( - 2 . 2 6 ) ( - 1 . 7 4 ) 
1995 - 2 . 1 4 9 - 3 . 4 9 4 - 1 . 7 9 1 - 3 , . 0 9 6 - 1 . 5 3 4 - 2 . 8 1 1 - 0 . 9 0 3 - 1 . 5 3 0 
( - 2 . 8 6 ) ( - 3 . 6 4 ) ( - 2 . 3 7 ) ( - 2 , . 9 4 ) ( - 1 . 5 6 ) ( - 2 . 1 2 ) ( - 0 . 9 0 ) ( - 1 . 0 1 ) 
2000 - 3 . 3 4 1 - 5 . 3 6 4 - 3 . 2 2 8 - 5 , . 2 4 6 - 3 . 2 0 3 - 5 . 3 8 8 - 3 . 0 8 7 - 4 . 3 2 0 
( - 4 . 3 6 ) ( - 4 . 9 2 ) ( - 4 . 1 6 ) ( - 4 . 0 8 ) ( - 3 . 2 4 ) ( - 3 . 6 3 ) ( - 3 . 0 5 ) ( - 2 . 3 5 ) 
CONSTANT 1 8 . 4 8 8 1 8 . 4 8 0 1 9 . 0 7 0 13 . 6 8 3 1 8 . 5 6 6 1 8 . 6 6 3 1 9 . 2 3 3 1 1 . 2 8 6 
( 1 8 . 0 7 ) ( 6 . 7 3 ) ( 1 8 . 0 0 ) (4 . 1 3 ) ( 1 5 . 8 8 ) ( 5 . 0 0 ) ( 1 5 . 9 4 ) ( 2 . 1 9 ) 
F - p r o b 1 — 0 . 0 5 1 — 0 . 002 — 0 . 0 6 5 — 0 . 0 0 6 
F - p r o b 2 — 0 . 0 2 9 — 0 . 002 — 0 . 0 2 4 — 0 . 0 0 5 
Note: Figures in brackets are t-statistics. 
p indicates the proportion of the unexplained variation in the rate of investment that is accounted for by the fixed 
effects. 
The R ' coefficient shown is the 'within' coefficient. 
F-prob 1 is the p-value for the test that all coefficients except for SRATE and the year dummy variables are zero. 
F-prob 2 is the p-value for the test that KPERLA=LU=OPENC=PRICE=0 for the full regression, and that 
EFWJS=EFW_PR=0 for the preferred regression. 
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5 . 5 IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
For the non-OECD countries, the relationship between countries' rates of saving and 
investment is positive and strongly statistically significant in 1980 and 2000 - both for 
national and domestic rates of saving. This, and the positive, statistically significant 
coefficient on the receipt of foreign aid, supports the argument that the low levels of 
investment in some developing countries are partly attributable to a lack of 
affordability among domestic households. This relationship has weakened between 
1980 and 2000, although certainly not to the extent that it has across the sample of 
OECD countries over the same period. Chapter 3 showed that the relationship between 
rates of domestic saving and investment in the non-OECD countries was often 
statistically insignificant, however, the relationship between rates of national saving 
and investment was consistently positive and statistically significant, implying that on 
average, a non-OECD country would retain between one third to one half of national 
saving as investment locally. 
It is tempting to conclude from this that rates of investment in developing countries 
can be improved through the provision of foreign aid or foreign investment. The 
correlation between rates of investment and saving in non-OECD countries is positive 
and statistically significant, but it is neither equal to nor close to one. Additionally, not 
only has the relationship between affordability and rates of investment weakened over 
time, but the variables that control for differences in the availability of investment have 
grown stronger over time. This can be attributed to countries growing more financially 
sophisticated, the costs of search and transactions associated with international capital 
movements falling, and developing countries engaging more closely with the global 
markets. This is a trend that is likely to continue, which means that efforts aimed at 
addressing the affordability of investment may be misguided and misplaced. 
Households in poorer countries may consume out of foreign aid and save more of their 
earned incomes, but if there are insufficient investment opportunities domestically, 
that increased saving will be exported. The same is true of foreign investment — an 
inflow of capital from the rest of the world may exhaust the investment opportunities 
that domestic saving would have funded, and in the absence of anything profitable to 
invest in, this saving is exported — if not by households themselves, then by the 
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financial intermediaries or broi<ers with whom households entrust their savings. The 
analysis implies that it is much cheaper and easier for poorer countries to export 
capital to the rest of the world in 2000 than it was in 1980. 
Rates of investment in developing countries can be improved is by addressing the 
availability of investment opportunities. As the analysis in this chapter shows, the level 
of health and institutional quality have become more important to countries' rates of 
investment in 2000 than they were in 1980. There should be nothing surprising about 
this finding, since it is in line with the predictions of the neo-classical model, and with 
the empirical findings on the deep determinants of long-run growth — in particular, 
that of Easterly (2005) and Rodrik et. al. (2004) who argue that institutions rule; and 
that of Sachs (2005), Weil (2007), and Martina (2009), who demonstrate the devastating 
impact that adverse health outcomes across countries can have on economic 
performance. Furthermore, it is consistent with Lucas' conjecture that differences in the 
marginal products of capital across countries could not simply be explained by the 
capital to labour ratios of these countries, and that it is necessary to control for 
complementary inputs, and the riskiness associated with investing in different 
countries. This analysis provides strong evidence that the availability of investment 
opportunities has become, and is will continue to be, more important in explaining 
differences in countries' rates of investment than considerations of affordability, which 
have been in decline over the period analysed. This means that while there was once 
some evidence that the saving trap was a barrier to growth in incomes, there is less 
evidence for this in more recent years. Furthermore, the analysis using the alternative 
model provides support not only for capital being internationally mobile, but also for 
capital being efficiently allocated, as countries with better health and better 
institutional quality are shown to have higher rates of investment. 
All of this suggests that today's poor countries are indeed confronted with a barrier to 
growth that today's rich countries did not have to overcome. Capital is internationally 
mobile, which means that today's poor countries must compete with today's rich 
countries for investment — not only with respect to attracting foreign investment, but 
also to simply retaining domestic or national saving. This is not to say that the solution 
is for developing countries to close their borders to outflows of capital, or attempt to 
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retain saving by artificial means as suggested by Caselli and Feyrer. Even if restrictions 
are placed to keep domestic saving inside a country, this can have the adverse effect of 
frightening foreign investment away. After all, foreign investors may have legitimate 
concerns as to whether or not they will be able to recover the return on their 
investment in such a restricted market. And as the analysis in this chapter shows, when 
fixed effects are controlled for, economic openness is positively correlated with the rate 
of investment. In addition, there is no guarantee that the imposition of capital 
restrictions will ensure that domestic saving is converted into domestic investment. 
Saving is merely the difference between what is earned and what is consumed. There 
are a number of ways in which households can save without investing either 
domestically or abroad — for example, through the purchase of jewellery or other 
stores of wealth, simply by hoarding currency, or by making more sophisticated 
arrangements, such as smuggling the money across borders in illegal transactions. 
5 . 6 CONCLUSION 
This thesis set out to establish whether or not poverty was a barrier to growth. In so 
doing, the analysis focused on the saving trap — one of a number of types of poverty 
traps that can afflict a poor country. There is some evidence that insufficient saving as a 
result of low income is responsible for low rates of investment, although the same 
evidence demonstrates that the relationship as described between income, investment 
and saving is weakening over time as capital markets grow more open, and poorer 
countries become more financially sophisticated. This by itself does not mean that 
poverty is not a barrier to growth. The new model that was tested in this chapter 
treated everything other than the rate of investment as exogenous. Just as with the 
accumulation of physical capital, improvements in health come at a cost and, once 
again, poorer countries are the least able to meet this cost. Improved health outcomes 
also improve the incentives around human capital accumulation, which in turn can 
have positive impacts on institutional quality. Rates of investment in poorer countries 
may not be low because rates of saving are low, but it cannot be ruled out that rates of 
investment in poorer countries are low because these countries are too poor to afford 
good health and good institutional quality. This thesis shows that: the low-level 
equilibrium trap is not caused by low levels of saving alone; and that therefore, the 
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solution is not to simply extend aid in the form of monetary transfers or foreign 
investment, as the balance of evidence suggests that only part of these inflows will be 
retained as domestic investment. 
5 .7 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5 
COUNTRIES 
The following countries were excluded from the analysis in this chapter due to a lack 
of data: Afghanistan, American Samoa, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, 
Aruba, Azerbaijan, the Bahamas, Belarus, Bermuda, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei 
Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, 
Comoros, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Faeroe 
Islands, French Polynesia, the Gambia, Georgia, Greenland, Grenada, Guam, Guinea, Hong 
Kong (China), Iraq, Isle of Man, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Democratic Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Macao (China), Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mayotte, Federated 
States of Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Myanmar, 
Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Nigeria, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Puerto Rico, 
Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Somalia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Tonga, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Virgin Islands (U.S.A.), West Bank and Gaza, 
Republic of Yemen. 
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D A T A 
AFFORDABILITY 
RATE OF SAVING rSRATF.) 
The rates of national and domestic saving are calculated in the same way as for the 
analysis in Chapter 3. 
RECEIPT OF FOREIGN AID (AID GNI) 
Estimates of the receipt of aid (now called 'Net official development assistance 
received') as a proportion of GNI are taken from the World Development Indicators, 
where the definition given is: Net official development assistance (ODA) consists of 
disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants 
by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by 
multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and 
welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients. It includes loans with a 
grant element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent). Data are in 
current U.S. dollars (The World Bank, 2009). There are no data for the OECD countries 
(other than Turkey) — observations for OECD countries have been set to zero. 
AVAILABILITY 
CAPITAL TO LABOUR RATIO (KPERLA) 
The capital to labour ratio is derived by applying the Perpetual Inventory Method to 
the Penn World Tables, version 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006) and follows the methodology 
used by Caselli and Feyrer (2007). The investment series is calculated by multiplying 
Laspeyres real GDP per capita by the population by the investment share of real GDP. 
The stock of capital in the first year for which the investment series is available is set to: 
(5.2) Ko= 
(g + S) 
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6 is the rate of depreciation, and takes the value of 6 %, while g is the average, 
geometric growth rate for investment between the first year it is available and 1970. For 
countries where the investment series does not begin prior to 1970, g is the average, 
geometric growth rate for the first five years of the investment series. Estimates of the 
capital stock for subsequent years are estimated as: 
(5.3) + i = + L + ^ 
The capital to labour ratio is derived from this by dividing the capital stock by the 
population, and then dividing again by 1,000, so that coefficient estimates can be seen 
in the first two decimal places of the regression output. 
PRICE OF CAPITAL GOODS RELATIVE TO CONSUMPTION GOODS (PRICE) 
The price of capital goods relative to the price of final output is determined using data 
from the Penn World Tables, version 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006), where 'price' is set equal 
to pi divided by pc. 
LABOUR FORCE WITH NO FORMAL SCHOOLING qU) 
Estimates of the proportion of the labour force with no formal schooling are taken from 
the Barro and Lee dataset, and information on how the estimates are compiled can be 
found in the accompanying paper (Barro and Lee, 2000). 
UNDER-FIVE MORTALITY RATE (MRS) 
Estimates of the under-five mortality rate are taken from the World Development 
Indicators, where the definition given is: Under-five mortality rate is the probability per 
1,000 that a newborn baby will die before reaching age five, if subject to current age-specific 
mortality rates (The World Bank, 2009). 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT (PFW PR) 
Estimates of property rights and law enforcement are taken from the Economic 
Freedom of the World, and incorporate measures of: judicial independence; impartial 
courts; protection of property rights; military interference in the rule of law and 
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political process; integrity of the legal system; legal enforcement of contracts; and 
regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property. More information on how these 
indexes are estimated can be found in the accompanying annual report (Gwartney et 
al., 2009). 
ACCESS TO SOUND MONEY (EFW ES) 
Estimates of access to sound money are taken from the Economic Freedom of the 
World, and incorporate measures of: money growth; standard deviation of inflation; 
inflation (most recent year); and freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts. More 
information on how these indexes are estimated can be found in the accompanying 
annual report (Gwartney et al., 2009). 
CAPITAL MOBILITY 
OPENNESS (OPENC) 
The measure of economic openness is taken from the Penn World Tables, version 6.2 
(Heston et al., 2006), where it is defined as: Exports plus Imports divided by GDP is the 
total trade as a percentage of GDP. 
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